A PPR Oe oh, 
5 ante 


ed 


- eae 
9 mv, Sa fs 


iP 


eee 


ve 3 , r 3 
men s . ‘ PAS, > << $ hs 


iy ees 


. e Z eet ge we 
eee : EF: ae i ; Soe Bee oe 


we 
% 


x 
Res 


* ~* 
eet 
Se 
Lapras 
repay Sed 
Sh ae 


oa 


Ries 


ara To 





\ 


LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY 


PRINCETON, N. J. 





PURCHASED BY THE HAMILL MISSIONARY FUND. 





Le o ust pons 


She ef CU 2 
. ia an a 


Division..." ' 


: 


Section.....1-—... hh 


i. Bae 













es i Y ) = 
ae ie 3 f i iw 
wii) ters} a iI 


jb pias 






(h aT , y 
Be a) a 


i 


aye 





Be 








THE NORMAN WAIT HARRIS 
MEMORIAL FOUNDATION 


Miiy Arey 
Ta} el) 
a r 





ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS OF 
THE FAR EASTERN PROBLEM 


THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 


THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY 
NEW YORK 


THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LIMITED 
TORONTO 


THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
LONDON 


THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI 


THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY 
SHANGHAI 







\ UF FIN 
<u ca 


A tf. Oa 

n MAY 4 1926 
4S, & 
gy. cet nN 






ORIENTAL INTER 
TATIONS OF THE FAR 
EFASTERN PROBLEM 


[Lectures on the Harris Foundation 1925] 
4 
By, 
MICHIMASA SOYESHIMA 


Former Member of the Japanese House of Peers 


P. W. KUO 
President of Southeastern University 
Nanking, China 


THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
CHICAGO : ILLINOIS 


CoPYRIGHT 1925 By 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 


All Rights Reserved 


Published December 1925 


Composed and Printed By 
The University of Chicago Press 
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. 


PREFACE 


The Harris Foundation Lectures at the Uni- 
versity of Chicago have been made possible 
through the generosity of the heirs of Norman 
Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated 
to the University a fund to be known as “The 
Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation” on 
January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the 
following statement: 

It is apparent that a knowledge of world-affairs was never 
of more importance to Americans than today. The spirit of 
distrust which pervades the Old World is not without its 
effect upon our own country. How to combat this disintegrat- 
ing tendency is a problem worthy of the most serious thought. 
Perhaps one of the best methods is the promotion of a better 
understanding of other nations through wisely directed 
educational effort. 

The purpose of the Foundation shall be the promotion 
of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of 
the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for 
improved international relations and a more enlightened 
world-order. The aim shall always be to give accurate 
information, not to propagate opinion. 


In fulfilment of this object a First Institute 


was held at the University of Chicago in the sum- 
mer of 1924, and the public lectures delivered by 


{ vii | 


PREFACE 


the foreign scholars invited to the Institute were 
published: Germany in Transition, by Herbert 
Kraus; The Stabilization of Europe, by Charles De 
Visscher; and The Occident and the Orient, by Sir 
Valentine Chirol. 

For the Second Institute, held in the summer of 
1926, the topic selected for discussion was the Far 
East, and again the public lectures delivered as 
part of the work of the Institute are published in 
essentially their original form. This volume, Orien- 
tal Interpretations of the Far Eastern Problem, con- 
tains the lectures of Count Michimasa Soyeshima, 
graduate of Cambridge University, England, and 
former member of the House of Peers of Japan; 
and of Dr. P. W. Kuo, President of Southeastern 
University, Nanking, China. A second volume, 
entitled Occidental Interpretations of the Far Eastern 
Problem, gives the lectures of Mr. H. G. W. Wood- 
head, C.B.E., an Englishman of twenty years’ 
residence in China where he was editor of the 
Peking and Tientsin Times and of the China 
Year Book; of Mr. Julean Arnold, American Consul 
or Commercial Attaché in China since 1902, and 
editor of the Commercial Year Book of China, and 
of Mr. H. K. Norton, author of The Far Eastern 
Republic of Siberia. 


August I, 1925 


{ viii } 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


JAPAN, THE FAR EAST, AND THE 
UNITED STATES 


BY COUNT MICHIMASI SOYESHIMA 


RAGE 
I. Pottricat, Economic, AND SoctAL ASPECTS OF 
NVIGDERND TAPANH gro minora lieu niall h eUbcik igen 3 
II. Japan’s Poticy TowarD CHINA, SIBERIA, AND 
KOREA SL aCe SC OM td eed he Mal ast RN HON gO 
III. Japan’s RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES . 69 
CHINA, THE FAR EAST, AND THE 
UNITED STATES 
BY DR. P. W. KUO 
I. Pourticat, Economic, AND SoctAL TENDENCIES 
ERAVIODE RM CHIN Ale eh Eis Hi bela) uh ahora kala lien ks 
ELAGHINA(S POSITION, IN; LASTERN ASIA) (00 sy )). hse 143 
III. Cuina’s RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES . 175 
DNR ere OL aS MMCAP Ae SA othe th lal ah iat crated aad Lg 


[ ix ] 





JAPAN, THE FAR EAST, AND THE 
UNITED STATES 


By Micuimasi SoyEsHIMA 


ne 


ch Up b 
EPR yt 
vy 7 yt 
H 





I 


POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL 
ASPECTS OF MODERN JAPAN 


It is seventy-one years since Commodore 
Matthew Perry, of the United States Navy, 
knocked at the door of Japan, which slowly turned 
on its hinges, creaking with the rust of centu- 
ries. 

It is certainly one of the most interesting and, 
at the same time, most perplexing problems for the 
historian that a country given over to a form of 
medieval feudalism for several centuries should be- 
come, within the lifetime of a man, one of the five 
Great Powers, possessing an army and a navy 
second to none in efficiency, and also one of the 
most democratic countries of the world, with a con- 
stitution based upon universal suffrage; and yet 
should remain an empire reigned over and gov- 
erned by an emperor, the one hundred and twenty- 
second in the dynasty, which tradition carries 
back 2,585 years. But the facts are quite clear and 
simple. The Japanese have always been a virile 
race, and in the days of feudalism even women and 
children received very strenuous training—the 


[3] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


former chiefly mental and the latter both mental 
and physical; they have been governed by a line of 
emperors whose motto has always been ““The ruler 
governs for the sake of the people’”’; and, therefore, 
the people have always been loyal toward the im- 
perial family, as is fortunately still the case. 

As early as 1290, Marco Polo, writing from 
China concerning the kingdom of Zipangu (which 
was then the Chinese way of pronouncing Nippon- 
Koku, or the “country of the Rising Sun,” said: 
“Zipangu is an island towards the East..... The 
people are highly civilized and well-favoured,.... 
and I can tell you the quantity of gold they have 
is enormous.” This gold no longer exists, for, 
thanks to the foreign adventurers, long before the 
advent of Commodore Perry it had all been drained 
away. St. Francis Xavier, who came to the Empire 
of the Rising Sun in 1549, wrote: 

The nation with which we have had to do here surpasses 
in goodness any of the nations ever discovered. They are of a 
kindly disposition, not at all given to cheating, wonderfully 
desirous of honour and rank. Honour with them is placed 
above everything else. They never bear an insult either in 
word or deed. They listen with great avidity to discourse 
about God and divine things, especially when they can well 
understand what you say. Of all nations I have ever seen I 
cannot remember ever to have found any, either Christian 
or heathen, so averse to theft. 


[4] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


In the Introduction to his History of Japan, pub- 
lished in London in 1727, Kaempfer wrote: 

It gives an account of a Mighty and Powerful Empire. It 
describes a Valiant and Invincible Nation, an Industrious and 
Virtuous People, Possessed of a Country on which Nature hath 
lavished Her Most Valuable Treasures. 


Hon. John W. Foster, in his American Reece 
in the Orient, says: 


The testimony of all writers is that the Japanese in their 
intercourse with foreigners were distinguished for high-bred 
courtesy combined with refined liberality and generous 
hospitality. On the other hand, the merchants and mariners 
with whom they came into contact were usually of bad 
manners and morals, overreaching, avaricious, and cruel; the. 
missionaries were often arrogant, ambitious, and without 
proper respect for native customs; and the naval and other 
officials of foreign governments were haughty, actuated by a 
spirit of aggression, and unmindful of the amity of nations. 
The history of the time shows that the policy of exclusion 
adopted by Japan in the seventeenth century was not inherent 
in the constitution of the state or the character of the people, 
but that it was adopted in consequence of the unfavourable 
character of the relations with Europeans. 


I have quoted from these well-known people 
who have written about Japan during the last 
seven centuries, not because I feel that she deserves 
all this eulogy, but because no nation is more mis- 
understood in America than the Japanese. 

When the late Emperor Meiji came to the 


[5] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


throne of Japan he promulgated an oath consisting 

of five articles, by which his subjects have been 

guided during the last fifty-seven years. The Oath 

of Five Articles, as it is called, runs as follows: 

1. An Assembly widely convoked shall be established, and all 
affairs of State decided by impartial discussion. 

2. All administrative matters of State shall be conducted by 
the co-operative efforts of the governing and the governed. 

3. All the people shall be given opportunity to satisfy their 
legitimate desire. 

4. All absurd usages shall be abandoned, and justice and 
righteousness shall regulate all actions. 

5. Knowledge and learning shall be sought for all over the 
world, and thus the foundations of the Imperial Polity be 
greatly strengthened. 


Thirteen years later an imperial edict was 
issued, promising the convention of a national 
assembly, and in another ten years the first parlia- 
ment or, as the Japanese word for it is generally 
translated into English, “Impertal Diet,” was sum- 
moned. No student of Oriental problems can un- 
derstand the political tendencies of modern Japan 
unless he is prepared to study in all its phases the 
effect of this bodily transplantation of the parlia- 
mentary form of government. 

First of all, let me explain briefly the nature of 
the constitution as it was first framed. Its pro- 
visions were none too liberal, for, although the 


[6] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


minimum age for electors and elected was twenty- 
five, there was also a property qualification of 15 
yen, or $7.50, per annum paid in direct national 
taxation. Since the purchasing power of the yen 
was then eight or nine times its present value, this 
was equivalent to over 100 yew in modern currency. 
There were two houses, namely, the House of Peers 
and the House of Representatives. The former 
was in part hereditary, in part elective, and in part 
nominated by the emperor, while the latter con- 
sisted of three hundred members elected by about 
four hundred and fifty thousand voters in a nation 
of over thirty-five million, which was then the 
population of Japan. As was naturally to be ex- 
pected, a fierce struggle for the extension of suf- 
frage soon began, and ten years later the franchise 
was extended to those who paid a direct national 
tax of 10 yen. In 1920, the qualification was low- 
ered to 3 ye, giving the country an electorate of 
about three million in a population of over fifty 
million. This franchise remained in force until 
March of the present year, when the Universal 
Suffrage Bill was passed. The next election will be 
conducted on the basis of this new election law, 
which will give the vote to about twelve million 
and five hundred thousand males who are over the 
age of twenty-five. 


[7] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


It is now thirty-six years since the constitution 
was granted to his people by the great Emperor 
Meiji; but constitutional government or party gov- 
ernment, in the strict sense of these terms, has never 
existed, although the use of party organization was 
first started as early as in the year 1878 by a well- 
known liberal, Taisuke Itagaki, who afterward was 
raised to the peerage with the title of “Count.” 
This democrat at first absolutely refused to accept 
the honor the emperor had conferred upon him; but 
as no Japanese subject was supposed to disobey | 
an imperial command, a word from the late 
emperor was enough to make him join the privi- 
leged class. He was, however, one of those to 
whom “the plain appellation of ‘Mr.’ had a more 
majestic sound than the proudest of feudal titles.” 
True to his principle, he died very poor and, al- 
though he had a son of mature age, on his death- 
bed he expressed the wish that his imperial master 
would kindly permit the peerage to become extinct 
—a wish with which His Majesty was gracious 
enough to comply. 

Count Itagaki’s movement was taken up al- 
most simultaneously by another progressive, the 
late Marquis Okuma, whose name is well known in 
America. This statesman, who twice became prime 
minister and who was one of the authors of the 


[8] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


famous Twenty-one Demands on China, can hard- 
ly be called a liberal, for, although in his conversa- 
tions and speeches he was a democrat of the most 
advanced type, as premier his internal policy was 
always marked by conservatism and his foreign 
policy by extreme jingoism; also, unlike Itagaki, he 
was opulent and lived the life of a prince. Nothing 
was more self-contradictory than the way in which 
this well-known statesman thought, spoke, and 
acted. With all his faults, however, this much is 
certain, that to him and to Count Itagaki we owe 
the present growth of democratic ideas in Japan. 

During the ten years which elapsed between 
the promulgation of the imperial promise of a 
popular legislative assembly and its actual estab- 
lishment in 1891, the parties led respectively by 
Itagaki and Okuma carried on a vigorous propa- 
ganda with a view to future action. Thus, when 
the first Diet met it was found that these parties 
together had an overwhelming majority over the 
supporters of the government. The opposition was 
so strong and refractory that there was nothing 
left for the government but to dissolve the Diet in 
little more than a year after it came into existence. 

The general election which followed was un- 
fortunately marked by government interference. 
Those in authority seemed to have forgotten en- 


[9] 


{ 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


tirely the indisputable constitutional principle that 
“‘no power exists for the sake of the holder,” and 
liberty of speech was subjected to most unfair and 
stringent regulation. At one time it looked as if 
there was going to be a political struggle of tre- 
mendous proportions threatening the very founda- 
tions of the empire. However, in less than three 
years the war with China came, and from the 
moment hostilities commenced to the conclusion of 
peace the nation was unanimous in its support of 
the government. 

When it became known, however, that the 
government had accepted the “friendly advice” of 
Germany, France, and Russia to forego the legiti- 
mate fruits of victory, the exasperation of the people 
knew no bounds, and ominous clouds began to loom 
once again on the political horizon, increasing in 
magnitude each year. In 1898, that able and far- 
sighted statesman, Marquis Ito, who was then the 
premier, came to the conclusion that the best thing 
for the country would be to give a chance to the 
party leaders, and consequently he recommended 
to Emperor Meiji that he summon Okuma and 
Itagaki to the imperial presence and command 
them to form a ministry. The two leaders of the 
democratic parties, for the first time in the history 
of Japan, formed a cabinet based on popular sup- 


[ 10 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


port, with Okuma as premier. But its life was very 
short, for it was soon evident that, although 
the two leaders were capable men, their followers 
were absolutely inexperienced in administering the 
affairs of the state. Besides, there soon arose a 
strong conflict of opinion between the two leaders, 
and the ministry came to an end in four months. 

This first party government, which has left an 
unenviable name in the political history of Japan, 
was succeeded once again by a bureaucratic or clan 
government. Two years later the sagacious Mar- 
quis Ito came to realize that for the successful 
working of constitutional government it was essen- 
tial to have the support of a political party, but 
that the existing parties were too inexperienced, as 
had been proved by the Okuma ministry. He, 
therefore, decided to form a new political party 
and to summon all patriots to rally to his banner. 
Unfortunately, however, the nucleus of the party 
comprised the majority of the liberal party hither- 
to led by Itagaki, who had just retired from the 
political arena. 

Ito had further come to the conclusion that 
for the successful administration of public affairs 
it was essential to create well-organized public 
opinion, though at the same time he had no inten- 
tion of establishing a party government which 


[11] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


should be responsible to the people. He still ad- 
hered to the principle of the constitution that the 
government is responsible to the sovereign, and 
therefore he asserted that the appointment or dis- 
missal of cabinet ministers belonged to the preroga- 
tives of the emperor. The chief motive of Ito in 
forming a political party is clearly exposed by his 
subsequent action. He had formed his party, not 
because he had been converted to the principle of 
party government, but because he had come to the 
conclusion that the party system was more con- 
venient from the viewpoint of the government. He 
did not consider it as “a control, issuing immedi- 
ately from the people.”’ He abhorred the idea that 
the government derived its power from the people; 
in all his public and private utterances he strongly 
asserted that it emanated from the sovereign. 

In October, 1900, Prince Yamagata, who was 
then the prime minister, recommended to the 
Emperor that he intrust Ito with the duty of form- 
ing a cabinet. As had been expected by that 
shrewd soldier-statesman who had a large following 
in the House of Peers, the upper house showed an 
uncompromising hostility toward the new govern- 
ment, the very idea of party being detestable to 
them. Nearly every government measure was in 
danger of being rejected. Ito appealed to the Em- 


[12] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


peror, who, by issuing an imperial rescript, paci- 
fied the Peers; but it was evident that the ministry 
could not pull through another session, and it soon 
came to an end. 

Ito was succeeded by General Katsura, after- 
ward Prince Katsura, the author of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance and the statesman who con- 
ducted the Russo-Japanese War. The political 
parties which were usually in opposition to one 
another now formed an alliance against this mili- 
taristic government, and made it so uncomfor- 
table for Ito (who was a bureaucrat himself at 
heart) that he resigned the leadership of his party 
and became president of the Privy Council. The 
session of 1903 lasted only two days. Negotiations 
had been going on between Russia and Japan con- 
cerning Korea and Manchuria, and the govern- 
ment, which was most anxious to preserve the 
peace of the East, had been conceding point after 
point to Russia until it became quite unbearable 
for the nation. The session of the Diet is custom- 
arily opened by a speech from the throne, to which 
an humble reply is made from each House, the 
drawing up of which is intrusted to the respective 
presidents. The wording of the reply is almost 
exactly the same each year, and it is carried unan- 
imously with the members respectfully standing. 


{ 13 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


On this occasion, however, the President of the 

lower house was so enraged with the Russian policy 
~ of the government that he read a reply which he 
himself had secretly prepared, and in which he con- 
demned the government’s lukewarm policy toward 
Russia. The House did not notice this until the 
reply had been unanimously carried amid pro- 
found and respectful silence. Suddenly the House 
realized that there was something unusual in its 
wording; but it was too late, for it had been unan- 
imously and reverentially passed. There was noth- 
ing left for the government but to dissolve the Diet 
after it had been in session only two days. 

The war with Russia once more brought the 
nation together, and for two years almost every 
government measure was passed unanimously. 

Between 1906 and 1911, Prince Katsura, who 
was a militarist and a bureaucrat, and Prince 
Saionji, who had succeeded Ito as leader of the 
party founded by that statesman and who is the 
only Genro, or “elder statesman,” now living, by 
some mysterious arrangement held the portfolio 
of prime minister by turns; but in 1912 Admiral 
Yamamoto, who was a very strong statesman and 
who was thought to be the most capable man to 
weather the approaching political storm, formed a 
very powerful ministry. Although he was support- 


{ 14 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


ed in the lower house by the majority party, a 
naval scandal was soon exposed and there was a 
general uproar against the government, with the 
result that the ministry came to grief. 

Yamamoto was succeeded by Okuma, whose 
first diplomatic move was a very laudable one, for 
he took up arms for the cause of the Allies against 
the Germanic empires; but his second act was most 
deplorable, for he presented the famous Twenty- 
one Demands on China, of which nothing remains 
now but two articles and a bad name. Sixteen 
months later Okuma was turned out of power by 
the opposition of the elder statesmen and the 
House of Peers, who were strongly against his 
domestic and foreign policies. 

Since the fall of the Okuma ministry there have 
been no less than seven cabinet changes. Of the 
seven prime ministers, two were party leaders and 
the remainder bureaucrats. In June of last year, 
the present cabinet came into existence, and al- 
though it is a coalition ministry of three great 
political parties, all the ministers except three are 
bureaucrats both by training and, I believe, also at 
heart. These parties have quite a large number of 
leaders in the lower house who are brilliant orators, 
sound business men, and well-known lawyers; but 
in selecting his colleagues, the Prime Minister had 


{15 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


to resort to those who had received official training. 
Nor was his choice a surprise or a disappointment 
to the nation, for in Japan the officials, with all 
their shortcomings, are more upright and efficient 
than those who call themselves the “‘people’s rep- 
resentatives.” 

J have dwelt at some length on the political 
history of Japan since the promulgation of the 
constitution, because I feel that in order to under- 
stand Japan’s present political currents it is essen- 
tial to have a rough idea about it. The sketches I 
have given will have shown you that “‘party gov- 
ernment,” “‘party cabinet,” or “parliamentary gov- 
ernment’’—that is to say, government which repre- 
sents the will of the majority of the people—has 
never really existed in Japan. But great changes 
are now taking place—changes which are fraught 
with tremendous possibilities and consequences, 
and in less than ten years the whole world will 
know whether Japan has adopted popular govern- 
ment or popular misgovernment. 

That Japan has been wise in not adopting uni- 
versal suffrage and party government until the 
present year has been proved by her bureaucratic 
achievements. Since the constitutional form of 
government was introduced thirty-six years ago, 
there have been twenty-four cabinet changes, of 


[ 16 ] 


ee 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


which only four were so-called “party govern- 
ments,” the rest having been headed by bureau- 
crats, or naval or military leaders. The wars with 
China and Russia were conducted by clan leaders, 
and in the negotiations which preceded the begin- 
ning of hostilities, in the conduct of these wars, in 
the peace negotiations, and in our post-bellum 
policy toward the powers, we justly commande 
the respect and admiration of the world; but, un- 
fortunately, just at the most important crisis in the 
history, not only of Japan, but also of the whole 
world, namely, during the Great War, Japan had 
the misfortune to be governed by a political party, 
which had no fixed principle but whose policy was 
simply to court the favor of the press and the 
populace. The indiscriminate conferring of decora- 
tions and the Twenty-one Demands are the more 
important examples of this policy, which has done 
incalculable harm to the fair name of Japan. 
While the present lecturer is neither a bureau- 
crat nor a democrat, he feels it his duty to lay the 
bare facts before his audience and to say that, of 
the three parties which form the present coalition 
ministry, the majority party is the one which was 
in power when the world-war broke out. With all 
due respect to the able, upright, and honorable 
statesmen who compose the present ministry, the 


{ 17] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


lecturer has some misgivings about the motive of 
the government in granting the universal franchise 
to the people, who are not yet ready for it and the 
overwhelming majority of whom are very indiffer- 
ent about it. The present lecturer, in the last ses- 
sion of the Imperial Diet, put an interpelation to 
the Minister for Home Affairs, in which he had the 
audacity to say that universal suffrage was the out- 
come of political demonstrations by disappointed 
and intriguing politicians. The statement was 
strongly resented by the Minister, but in a few 
days the interpellator was the recipient of several 
letters and telegrams from perfect strangers and 
from various parts of the country indorsing the 
statement, but none accused him of having made a 
false statement. All the letters and telegrams re- 
ceived urged the lecturer to bring in an amendment 
granting the franchise only to the head—male or 
female—of every family, “for the strength of the 
nation,” they declared, “‘lies in its solidarity.” 
With us the individual is nothing; the family is 
everything, and the Japanese nation is one big 
family with the individual families as units and 
with the imperial household as the head of the 
sreat national family, possessing a history of three 
thousand years. This is the chief reason why the 
dynasty is regarded with such profound reverence. 


{18 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


The granting of the vote to individuals will, it is 
feared by the opponents of universal suffrage, de- 
stroy the solidarity of the nation by weakening the 
units of which it is composed. Japan may be con- 
sidered as one great communalistic state or one 
great feudal state, with the emperor as its supreme 
feudal lord. \\ 

The short constitutional history I have pre- 
sented will have shown that Japan’s recent history 
involves a continuous struggle between bureau- 
cracy and democracy; but it must have shown also 
that in this struggle the former has almost always 
come out victoriously. The reason for this is not 
far to seek, for the government, being appointed 
by the emperor, has always had him on its side, 
and an imperial message has often been instru- 
mental in averting political crises. But when 
Prince Katsura in his last ministry appealed too 
often to the Emperor for his support, a great 
demonstration took place in front of the Imperial 
Diet, and the statesman, who had rendered most 
meritorious services to the state, had to tender his 
resignation to his imperial master in utter despair 
and humiliation. The author of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and the Prime Minister who conducted the 
war with Russia was never pardoned by the people 
for his indiscretion in appealing too frequently to 


[ 19 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the Emperor for protection, and shortly afterward 
he died of cancer, an humbled and disappointed 
man, having been preceded to the grave, almost 
immediately before, by his brilliant only son, who 
had also succumbed to that malignant disease. 
Before I proceed to discuss the merits and de- 
merits of universal suffrage, I must say a few words 
concerning an institution which has been so power- 
ful that it has actually wielded the scepter of the 
government during the last thirty years. It is the 
institution known as the Genro, or “‘elder states- 
men,” who constituted a body second only to the 
emperor in power. They were not a recognized 
body either in the constitution or in the laws of 
Japan, and were a group of men less than a half- 
dozen in number, all of whom had served the 
Emperor Meiji, whose trusted advisers they were. 
They were the makers or destroyers of cabinets. 
The present ministry came into existence through 
the recommendation of this body, which has always 
been a most conservative and restraining influence 
in the political affairs of Japan. There is only one 
member now in this institution, namely, Prince 
Saionji of the old nobility, whose family dates back 
about one thousand years. When he returned from 
France nearly a half-century ago, he was a very 
advanced liberal, but later he became a conserva- 


[ 20 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


tive and is now gratified with the adoption of the 
laws pertaining to universal suffrage and the reform 
of the House of Peers. 

The average age of the members of this body 
will show you how, by their extraordinary vitality 
and physical vigor, they were able to serve their 
emperor and country, for, with the exceptions of 
Prince Ito, who was killed by a Korean assassin 
in Manchuria, and Prince Katsura, all of them 
lived to the age of eighty-five and upward. The 
last member who died, Prince Matsukata, was 
ninety-two. At the time of the great earthquake he 
was at his country home in Kamakura, which was 
near the center of the disturbance. The venerable 
old gentleman was buried underneath the débris 
of his house by the first shock, and was rescued an 
hour later, none the worse for his terrible experi- 
ence. Later he had an attack of pneumonia and 
was announced as dead, but by the sheer force of 
his will to pull through, he recovered completely. 
Six months later, he finally breathed his last, sur- 
rounded on his deathbed by his children, grand- 
children, and great-grandchildren, who are so nu- 
merous that when the late Empress asked the aged 
Genro about their total number, he humbly begged 
Her Majesty to give him time to investigate. I 
have mentioned this anecdote to show you that it 


{ 21 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


was the wonderful vitality as well as the great 
mental power of the makers of modern Japan which 
has placed her in the position that it is her good 
fortune to hold today among the great powers of 
the world. 
Truly the great Emperor Meiji sang: 
“Even to a high mountain rising 
sheer against the sky 
A way there may be for one who 
wills to climb.” 


During the last session of the Imperial Diet, 
two important bills were passed, namely, the Uni- 
versal Suffrage Bill and the House of Peers Reform 
Bill. In order to understand the current political 
thought in Japan, it is essential to study the events 
which led up to the enactment of these laws. 

When the ministry of the late Admiral Kato, 
whose name is probably remembered in America 
as Japan’s chief delegate at the Washington Con- 
ference, came to grief by his sudden death, Princes 
Matsukata and Saionji, who were the only elder 
statesmen alive, most indiscreetly recommended to 
the Emperor the appointment of Admiral Yama- 
moto to the premiership. Even the appointment 
of Admiral Kato had been strongly resented by the 
people, and therefore it was only natural that they 
should oppose the appointment of a naval officer 


[ 22 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


whose first ministry fell shortly before the world- 
war in consequence of a great naval scandal. As 
soon as it was announced that the Genro had rec- 
commended to the Emperor to command Admiral 
Yamamoto to form a ministry, there was much dis- 
satisfaction in the press, and even the leaders of the 
House of Peers, most of whom have bureaucratia' 
tendencies, refused to support him. The gallant 
admiral would never have succeeded in forming a 
cabinet but for the great earthquake. As I have 
stated before, the Japanese people act as one man 
in time of distress, and on the day following the 
great cataclysm the unpopular sailor-statesman 
was allowed to form a powerful ministry. It was, 
however, short-lived, for soon an event unprece- 
dented in the history of Japan took place, name- 
ly, the attempt by a young fanatic to assassinate 
the Prince Regent. The whole nation was now in 
uproar against the government, during whose ten- 
ure of office such a dastardly act had taken place 
—an act destined to stain forever the glorious his- 
tory of Japan. The ministry had nothing to do but 
resign in a body. 

Most unwisely, some of the leaders of the House 
of Peers thought it their duty to approach the 
Genro and ask them to advise the Emperor to con- 
fer the portfolio of prime minister upon Viscount 


{ 23 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


Kiyoura, who was then the president of the Privy 
Council and who is an uncompromising bureaucrat. 
This indiscreet advice was taken up by the Genro, 
and soon the Kiyoura ministry came into existence, 
supported by several of the leaders of the House of 
Peers. However, it was evident from the day of its 
formation that it was doomed. The people were 
now almost united in their condemnation of 
bureaucracy, and even the present lecturer thought 
it his duty to speak for two long hours in the House 
against the formation of a ministry of such uncon- 
stitutional character. The government soon dis- 
solved the Diet and appealed to the nation, but 
it was as clear as daylight that the verdict of the 
country would be overwhelmingly against the 
ministry, which tendered its resignation as soon 
as the result of the general election became known. 

Until the advent of the Yamamoto and Kiyoura 
ministries, the majority of the people were very 
indifferent about universal suffrage; nor did they 
consider it necessary to reform the House of Peers. 
When the late Mr. Hara dissolved the Diet and 
asked the opinion of the country concerning the 
question of universal suffrage, his party, which had 
been asserting that the time was not yet ripe for it, 
was returned to power with an overwhelming 
majority. However, in the last general election, in 


{ 24 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


which the chief issues in the platform were the 
universal franchise and the reform of the House of 
Peers, the supporters of democracy gained a signal 
victory over their conservative opponents. 

The Manhood Suffrage Bill, which the govern- 
ment introduced into the Imperial Diet in the last 
session, was to do away with the property qualificat' 
tion and to grant the vote to every male of twenty- 
five years of age and above, with certain disabilities 
enumerated in six clauses, of which the third clause, 
namely, the one disqualifying those who received 
monetary aid for the purpose of subsistence, be- 
came the center of dispute between the upper and 
lower houses. The purpose of the original govern- 
ment clause was simply to disqualify the paupers, 
but the upper chamber amended it to such an ex- 
tent that the clause came to disqualify those who 
received any kind of pecuniary support, for the 
amendment was worded as follows: “people de- 
pending upon others for help or support.” Had the 
amendment been adopted, about four million peo- 
ple would have been disqualified. 

The Peers, being determined to recover or, at 
all events, test their failing strength, passed the 
amendment by an overwhelming majority, namely, 
221 against 23. There was another amendment 


which the upper house had also passed by the same 
[25] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


majority, namely, the extension of residential 
qualification from six months to one year. The two 
houses appointed special committees to sit in Joint 
session in order to arrive at a compromise; but 
after several days’ deliberation they could not find 
a solution. The Peers were very insistent on their 
amendments. The last day and the last hour of the 
session had arrived. The Prime Minister was 
obliged to ask the Emperor to prolong the session 
for one day with the object of pacifying the recal- 
citrant Peers; but the noble lords of Japan abso- 
lutely refused to give way! The press of the coun- 
try was almost united in its condemnation of the 
attitude of the upper house. The last hour of the 
extended session had again arrived. The Prime 
Minister once more appealed to the Emperor, and 
the session was again prolonged, this time for two 
days. The Peers were, however, very firm, and the 
session had to be prolonged for another two days. 
When everybody had given up every hope of a com- 
promise, the Peers suddenly condescended to meet 
the people’s representatives halfway and the num- 
ber of voters was decreased by about two million by 
the insertion of the words, “on account of poverty.” 

In the same way, the Peers thought it their 
duty to mutilate both the upper house Reform Bill 
and the budget, although the decrease in the 


I 26 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


amount of money was only about nine hundred and 
seventy thousand yen. Thus the first real party 
government which came into power by the will of 
the people and whose platform at the general elec- 
tion consisted of universal manhood suffrage and 
the reform of the House of Peers had to give way 
to the House whose power it was their mission to 
curtail. The press was almost unanimous in the 
condemnation of the Peers for their assertive atti- 
tude; but they condemned the government and 
their supporters equally strongly for their imbecile 
attitude, and it is quite likely that in less than a 
year there will again be a political crisis in Japan. 

From what I have described, you may have 
jumped to the conclusion that the days of real 
democracy are still very distant in Japan. It is cer- 
tainly true that the constitutional movement that 
succeeded in overthrowing bureaucracy, which was 
hailed as a signal triumph for democracy, has met 
disappointment and humiliation with the quali- 
fied victory of the Peers. Cynical critics of the gov- 
ernment say that it tried to serve two masters and 
failed to please either of them. They ask why the 
government did not resign or dissolve the Diet. 
They accuse them of a mere desire to remain in 
office. Nothing is more unjustifiable than this ac- 
cusation. 


[ 27 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


With all due respect to the prime minister, 
Viscount Kato, it must of course be admitted that 
he is not a strong man, and it is doubtful whether 
he is really a democrat at heart. It is, perhaps, 
nearer the truth to say that he is a staunch con- 
servative at heart. So are at least six others out of 
the ten ministers who compose the present cabinet. 
Why, then, did they pledge themselves to universal 
suffrage and the reform of the upper house? Be- 
cause, in their opinion, these two measures were the 
demand of the times and had to be carried out by 
some ministry. Nothing was easier than either to 
resign or to dissolve the Diet; but that would have 
accelerated the coming struggle between the Peers 
and the populace, and I have reason to believe that 
some of the ministers thought it their bounden 
duty to their sovereign and country to alleviate the 
bitter feeling which a certain section of the people 
entertain toward the aristocracy by making the 
two houses arrive at a compromise. 

How widespread is that feeling of bitterness and 
how strong is the desire for universal manhood 
suffrage it is dificult to ascertain; for, as has al- 
ready been stated, the present lecturer was the 
recipient of numerous letters and telegrams when 
he made his speech urging that the franchise should 
be restricted to those people who have the vote in 


{ 28 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


local self-government, thus reducing the number of 
voters to about eight million. These letters and 
telegrams were from merchants, shopkeepers, 
scholars, soldiers, sailors, gardeners, common 
laborers—in fact, from all sorts and conditions of 
men—and were almost unanimous in their asser- 
tion that universal suffrage would destroy the 
family system, which is the pride of Japan, and 
that it was too early for Japan to follow the ex- 
ample of Europe and America; for, as some of them 
strongly urged, it is less than sixty years since the 
feudal system was abolished and thirty-five years 
since the constitution was granted. They all 
seemed to fear that the mass of the people are not 
yet politically conscious. ) 

Whatever may be the feeling of the people con- 
cerning the adoption of universal suffrage, and 
whatever may be its results, one fact is certain, that 
the three political parties which passed the measure 
by an overwhelming majority, as well as the one 
which voted against it, are highly apprehensive of 
the new force which is sure to come into the po- 
litical arena, namely, the proletarian class. Al- 
ready a labor party is in process of formation, and 
its promoters assert that, at the next general elec- 
tion, by collecting one yex each from five million 
of the proletariat, they can nominate five hundred 


[ 29 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


candidates for the Imperial Diet. But, in my 
opinion, it is only a dream, for the majority of them 
are very indifferent about politics while quite a 
large number have misgivings about the adoption 
of universal suffrage. What shape politics in Japan 
will assume during the next ten years will be 
watched with very keen interest. Whether the new 
franchise will establish popular government ‘or 
popular misgovernment ts a problem as interesting 
and perplexing for foreigners as Japan’s sudden 
transformation from a feudal state to a constitu- 
tional monarchy, on which problem, at the very 
outset of this lecture, I dwelt very briefly. 

From the rough sketch of the political tend- 
encies of modern Japan I now turn to the eco- 
nomic aspects in her recent development. 

It is a well-known fact that Japan is a very poor 
country. St. Francis Xavier wrote in 1549 that 
there were a great many poor among the Japanese, 
but that poverty was not a disgrace to anyone. 
This adage 1s perhaps the chief cause of our nation- 
al indigence, although there is another important 
cause, namely, that the country is very small and 
has almost no natural resources and that it was 
introduced into the family of nations only seventy 
years ago, after most powers had amassed enor- 


[ 30 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


mous wealth and appropriated all the available 
territories of the world. 

Japan is still mainly an agricultural country; 
but even agriculture itself is far from satisfactory, 
for, the country being very mountainous, less than 
14 per cent of its land is arable. Foreigners who 
have traveled in Japan cannot have failed to notice 
that even hilltops are cultivated. How to feed a 
population of fifty-six million, which increases at 
the rate of more than I per cent per annum, with 
only fourteen million acres of agricultural land, is a 
problem difficult enough even for the world’s ablest 
statesman to solve. There is no other country in 
the world which has so small a percentage of land 
under cultivation. Supposing that all the farms in 
Japan are put together into one large farm, it can 
be crossed in a Ford car from one end to the other 
in about five hours. And from this tiny little space 
our industrious peasants do their utmost to feed 
fifty-six million people, and export annually more 
than three hundred million dollars’ worth of raw 
silk for the ladies of America! It is by sheer hard 
work and by the use of expensive fertilizers that 
they produce at present enough rice to save their 
brothers from starvation. No wonder that the 
price of rice is very high, being about ten times 


{ 31 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


what it was at the time of the Restoration. As the 
price of this most important staple food is high, 
wages are high; and as wages are high, the prices 
of all commodities are high. It is this fact which is 
creating grave social problems, especially as wages 
have not risen in proportion to the rise in the price 
of rice, while the incomes of salaried men have risen 
only from 25 to 50 per cent. The population of 
Japan is increasing at the rate of about six hundred 
thousand a year; and, therefore, in another thirty 
years, there will be nothing left for us but to starve, 
unless those countries which have unlimited areas 
of fertile land grow rice and export it to Japan, or 
unless, in accordance with the Christian principle 
of human equality, the open door is declared 
throughout the world. 

Japan’s industries are still comparatively young, 
although they are developing; but how to place 
them on an even footing with those of the lead- 
ing European countries and America is another 
very difficult problem which faces Japan. We 
grow no cotton; we have only a little coal of in- 
ferior quality; we produce only about 54> per cent 
of the world’s output of oil; we have almost no 
minerals, with the exception of copper. Thus our 
factories have to be fed almost entirely from over- 
seas. Therefore, our industries have to depend 


{ 32} 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


upon our shipping, which during the war, owing to 
the world’s shortage, developed by leaps and 
bounds, but whose outlook is now most dismal. It 
is true that in tonnage our country is the fourth in 
the world, but all the leading steamship companies 
are in very distressing circumstances. Our ship- 
building industry is in consequence suffering, the 
total tonnage of ships launched last year being only 
about one-tenth of that of Ig19. 

It is no exaggeration to say that prior to the war 
with China, Japan’s industry was chiefly a house- 
hold one. The total amount of export in the year 
hostilities began, namely, in 1894, was less than 
fifty million dollars, and the total revenue of the 
state was about one-half of the present revenue of 
the city of Tokyo. Everything was in its infancy. 
But our unexpected victory over the sleeping lion 
China was then thought to be, gave us national 
consciousness which stimulated the creation of all 
kinds of factories. Another very unexpected vic- 
tory, this time over the great Muscovite Empire, 
gave us a still greater impetus, and by the time the 
European war broke out the mechanical, chemical, 
and electrical industries had made great strides, 
which fact enabled Japan to carry her industrial 
activities to a state of prosperity unknown even in 
that little country of wonderful progress. 


{ 33 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


Generally speaking, during the war our pro- 
ductive power more than doubled, and we were 
able to supply the Allies with all kinds of things, 
including even ships. However, the sudden growth 
of industries was not an unmixed good, for in their 
haste to grow richer, the zouveaux riches or, as we 
call them, the zarikin, often sent out articles which 
were not up to sample, thus damaging their coun- 
try’s commercial prestige. They are determined to 
recover their lost reputation and market, and it is a 
source of satisfaction to learn that shoddy goods 
are now fast disappearing. 

Japan’s industry is at present 1n a state of re- 
action as an inevitable result of its unnatural ex- 
pansion. One factory after another had to be either 
closed or to curtail its output. Several firms and 
banks have been hit in consequence, and there is a 
general depression throughout the country except 
in hydroelectric undertakings, which altogether de- 
velop more than one million and five hundred 
thousand horse-power and which are always very 
lucrative. 

To put it in a nutshell: Japan is now in the 
midst of economic readjustment, and there is a cry 
for retrenchment on all sides. The government has 
done well by reducing expenditures about one 
hundred and twenty-five million dollars in this 


{ 34 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


year’s budget, and also by reducing the army by 
four divisions. These changes, together with those 
accomplished last year, have cut down the nu- 
merical strength of the army by about one-third. 
But curtailment and retrenchment unfortunately 
bring much misery in their train, and the numeroys 
army and navy officers, civil officials, company 
clerks, and workmen find it difficult to secure 
means of subsistence, and although with regard to 
the bourgeois class we can still rely upon their 
loyalty and patriotism, there is no denying the 
fact that there is a great deal of unrest among the 
proletarian class. At one time it looked as if this 
unrest were going to assume very serious propor- 
tions. However, the success, taken as a whole, of 
the late Labour government in Great Britain and 
the adoption of the Universal Franchise Bill in the 
last session of the Diet have given them hope, as 
“Hope springs eternal in the human breast,” and 
there is a movement now among some of the trades 
unions to expel the extremists. 

There is not the slightest doubt, however, that 
democracy has made much headway, and that the 
day of bureaucracy is practically over. It is a mat- 
_ter of satisfaction that both the government and 
capitalists are fully alive to the fact that there is a 
strong undercurrent of radical thought. They have 


135] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


been trying to solve the grave situation by the 
traditional method of paternal kindness, while the 
socialists and workmen with uncompromising 
ideas are determined to obtain the proper recogni- 
tion of what they consider as their right. There is 
a strong resentment among them against Article 17 
of the Police Regulations Pertaining to Public 
Safety and Order, under which judges can sentence 
to major imprisonment of from one to six months 
those who seduce or incite workmen to strike, and 
there was a general movement in the press and 
among the extremists against the Peace Preserva- 
tion Bill when it was introduced into the Diet last 
session, and some of the members of the special 
committee appointed to consider the Bill received 
threatening letters; but the Bill was passed almost 
unanimously in both houses. 

In order to alleviate the bitter feelings of the 
extremists and to bring capital and labor into 
harmonious co-operation with each other, the pres- 
ent lecturer, in the last session of the Diet, inter- 
pellated the government if they were prepared to 
set aside the revenues from death-duties with the 
object of promoting the welfare of the masses, and 
was satisfied to receive a reply that the matter 
would receive the careful consideration of the gov- 
ernment. 


1 36 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


I cannot conclude this lecture without dwelling 
upon the election of General Tanaka as president of 
the Seiyukai, which is one of the three political 
parties forming the present coalition ministry. 
This gallant soldier was at one time a great admirer 
of Germany, and was thought to be a staunch 
jingo and the real author of dual diplomacy. Most 
military and naval men in most countries are un- 
fortunately jingoistic; but General Tanaka is a 
shrewd statesman and therefore he knows that the 
day of jingoism is now past and over. I have reason 
to believe that he will not lead this party to a jingo- 
istic policy but that he has bowed to democracy, 
and if ever he becomes prime minister (which is 
quite likely), his foreign policy will be quite differ- 
ent from what he is credited with, namely, the 
policy indicated by the Twenty-one Demands. 

In conclusion, I should like to point out that in 
the long struggle between bureaucracy and democ- 
racy, the time has at last arrived for the latter to 
triumph, although whether it is to be a popular 
government or a popular misgovernment remains 
to be seen; that there is great economic depression, 
consequent upon undue expansion of industries 
during the Great War; and that, as a result of this 
depression and also as a pernicious effect of social 
unrest and labor troubles throughout the world, 


{ 37] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


there is a strong undercurrent of radical thought. 
But it is the sincere hope and firm conviction of 
the present lecturer that, as in the past so in the 
future, the leaders of the country will, by their 
wisdom and also by their loyalty and patriotism, 
succeed in piloting the ship of state through the 
storm. 3 


{ 38 ] 


UL 


JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARD CHINA, 
SIBERIA, AND KOREA 


Nothing has been more welcome to the liberals 
of Japan and in fact to the whole world than the 
wonderful change which has taken place in Japan’s 
policy toward China, Siberia, and Korea during 
the last five years. It was only about six years ago 
that the present lecturer was obliged to contribute 
a lengthy article to the Diplomatic Review, which 
is the leading Japanese magazine on diplomatic and 
international affairs. In this article he felt it his 
duty strongly to condemn Japan’s policy toward 
China. Perhaps in the course of this lecture I may 
be allowed to quote two or three passages from a 
summarized translation which appeared in the 
Fapan Chronicle, an influential English paper, un- 
fortunately with anti-Japanese tendencies. The 
article begins as follows: 

The diplomacy of this country since the outbreak of the 
Great War has been a series of failures and it is now in a state 
of impasse, all because our authorities have lacked insight 
into the general situation of affairs. 

Thus the contributor wrote, because he sus- 


pected the existence of an undesirable influence in 


{ 39 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the shaping of Japan’s policy toward China and 
because he was firmly convinced that for the per- 
manent tranquility of the Far East it was essential 
for Japan to change her China policy. It is there- 
fore a source of gratification, not only to the liberals 
of Japan, but also to those who at one time had 
jingoistic tendencies, that Japan’s policy toward 
her colossal neighbor has undergone a complete 
change. Baron Shidehara, our minister for foreign 
affairs, in the last session of the Diet made a 
brilliant speech, in the course of which he said: 


We have followed with the strictest exactitude the prin- 
ciple of non-interference in China’s internal politics. We have 
absolutely refrained from supplying any party in China with 
arms, munitions or loans that might be utilized for the purpose 
of continuing hostilities. Knowing that the Chinese were sick 
of war, we believed that the refusal of assistance to any partic- 
ular party in China was, in effect, assistance rendered to the 
whole nation of China. Another point to which we attached 
particular importance was our belief in international good 
faith. The Japanese government had already subscribed to 
the resolution of the powers prohibiting the supply of arms 
and ammunition to China. We further declared on more than 
one occasion our policy of non-interference in the domestic 
troubles of that country. We have now translated these com- 
mitments faithfully into fact. 


So spoke our democratic Foreign Minister, 
whose one great ambition is to assist China, with- 


{ 40 J 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


out interfering in her domestic affairs, in the re- 
generation of that great republic. 

Baron Shidehara, in the statement I have 
quoted, has put in a nutshell our policy toward 
China; but in order to understand how identical 
our interests are with those of our huge neighbor, 
it is essential for the students of Oriental problems 
to go back- twenty-five years and look at the po- 
litical situation in the Far East at the beginning of 
the present century. Perhaps I may be allowed to 
go back still farther and look at the critical condi- 
tion in which the Oriental countries were placed at 
the time of the advent of Commodore Perry. 

After her isolation of more than two hundred 
years, Japan awoke to see that India was gone— 
gone as an independent state; that several bits of 
territory belonging to her great neighbor, China, 
had been ceded to European powers; that Aus- 
tralia, New Zealand, Java, Sumatra, the Philip- 
pines, and, in fact, all the other fertile islands of the 
Pacific, large and small, were in the hands of 
European countries; that Siam was in danger of 
being absorbed; that the northern half of Saghalien 
and the Kurile Islands, which were really portions 
of the Japanese Empire, had been seized by Russia; 
that the British fleet had seized a Korean island as 
a coaling station; that the Muscovite Empire had 


{ 41] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


expanded from Europe to the very door of Japan; 
that the British Empire covered every part of the 
globe; and that a scramble for Africa was about to 
begin. She soon foundout also that even Commodore 
Perry, who had come out on a peaceful and friendly 
mission, had his eyes on the Bonin and Loochoo 
Islands, not certainly for the purpose of territorial 
agerandizement, but with the object of preventing 
Russia from snatching them from the hands of 
Japan. Witha similar object in view, Great Britain 
had her eyes on the islands of Tsushima, which are 
within a stone’s throw of the main island. If Com- 
modore Perry’s mission had been delayed a few 
years, Japan would, in all probability, have awak- 
ened to find several of her islands gone. It is this 
fact which at one time endeared to the hearts of the 
Japanese the memory of Perry, and the American 
people—a feeling of gratitude which is unfortu- 
nately gone for the time being, for the Japanese are 
a very susceptible people and deeply feel the recent 
exclusion law, which some of them consider as a 
studied insult on the part of the leaders of the anti- 
Japanese agitation. 

From what I have described, it is clear that the 
interests of China and Japan have been in the main 
identical; but the statesmen of the two countries 
have always acted in a way which has produced 


{ 42 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


exactly opposite results. Before the Chino-Japa- 
nese War, the “Celestial Empire,” as the Chinese 
were then proud to call their own country, treated 
Japan with contempt, and in all her diplomatic 
negotiations with us her attitude was most high 
handed. Japan, on the other hand, looked down 
upon China as a corrupt and monstrous anach- 
ronism, destined humbly to accept European 
domination unless she was determined to reform. 
Besides, there was a great common danger ap- 
proaching, which Japan had the foresight to fear, 
but which China refused or failed to see, namely, 
the advance of Russia toward Manchuria and 
Korea. China had always claimed Korea as her 
dependency, but the peninsular kingdom was even 
more corrupt and rotten than her protector, and 
there was the danger of her finally passing, by 
Russia’s skilful diplomacy and intrigues, into the 
hands of that country. In order to prevent this, it 
was essential to make Korea an independent state 
and reform her administration. It was China’s 
stubborn refusal to see the danger ahead and 
Japan’s fear of the imminence of the menace to her 
very existence that really caused the war between 
these two countries. 

How justified Japan was in her fear is proved by 
the fact that six days after the signing of the 


{ 43 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


treaty of peace between the belligerent countries, 
Russia, Germany, and France forced Japan to re- 
nounce the most important fruit of her victory 
over China, namely, the Liaontung peninsula. 
Three years after the retrocession by Japan of this 
legitimate fruit of the war with China, in the guise 
of a leasehold, Russia took possession of the pen- 
insula which she had forced Japan to evacuate, 
while Germany had already established herself in 
Kiaochow in the province of Shantung. France 
now came in and extorted from the powerless em- 
pire of China a concession for the occupation of 
Kuang-Chow, Great Britain soon followed their 
example by obtaining a lease of Wei-hai-wei. 
These foreign encroachments on the integrity 
of China were the cause of an outbreak against 
foreigners, which is known as the Boxer Rising. 
Counseled by all the powers except Russia, Japan 
dispatched a strong force, and the foreign lega- 
tions and residents in Peking were saved. True to 
her traditions, making the unfortunate rising a pre- 
text, Russia dispatched a large force to Manchuria, 
and was soon in virtual possession of that huge and 
fertile province. Not content with the military 
occupation of this large territory, she soon began 
to cast her covetous eyes on Korea and carried on 
all kinds of intrigues at the court of the peninsular 


[ 44 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


kingdom. At the same time she sent large bodies of 
soldiers, disguised as civilians, into Korea in order 
to consummate her aggressive designs. It was now 
a question of life or death for Japan, and the gov- 
ernment of Tokyo approached the government of 
the Czar with the object of preventing further en- 
croachment by Russia on the sovereignty of Korea. 
The Muscovite government simply dragged on the 
negotiations, in the meantime pouring large bodies 
of troops into Manchuria and dispatching battle- 
ships and cruisers to Port Arthur. It was in order 
to safeguard her own independence that Japan 
finally and reluctantly decided to take up arms 
against her colossal foe. 

After the battle of Mukden, in which the Rus- 
sian Army was crushed, and the naval battle of the 
Japan Sea, by which the Russian Baltic fleet was 
annihilated, President Roosevelt invited the bel- 
ligerent countries to open peace negotiations at 
Portsmouth. The events which led up to the con- 
clusion of the peace treaty, its terms, and the sub- 
sequent happenings are still fresh in everybody’s 
mind. | 

Having fought against frightful odds with the 
colossal empire of Russia and having finally de- 
feated her, Japan now felt that she could pursue her 
peaceful aims of giving assistance to China and 


{ 45] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


Korea for their regeneration. But, as I have said 
already in connection with America’s exclusion 
policy, the Japanese as a nation are highly suscep- 
tible, and easily take offense. They knew that it 
was the moral and material assistance of Great 
Britain that enabled their country to bring Russia 
to her knees, and therefore the whole nation felt 
very grateful to her loyal ally. Thus, when the 
violation of Belgian. neutrality dragged Great 
Britain into the European war, the Japanese were 
almost united in their desire that their country 
should go promptly to her assistance. 

Although I know no diplomatic secrets, I have 
reason to believe that at first our offer of services 
was not very heartily welcomed by our ally, and 
that when the increasing activity of the German 
men-of-war in the Eastern waters finally induced 
them to approach us, inviting us to clear the China 
seas of the enemy, we were asked to restrict our 
activity within certain spheres and not to go 
beyond a certain latitude. This fact and the firm 
conviction that we were the sole guarantors of Chi- 
na’s integrity against foreign aggression, coupled 
with the fact that all the Great Powers of 
Europe were then engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle, unfortunately persuaded our government 
to assume a defiant attitude, contrary to our tradi- 


{ 46 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


tional courtesy in international dealings, and to 
present to our friendly neighbor what are known as 
the Twenty-one Demands. While admitting that 
many of the attacks made upon this policy of 
Japan are justifiable, it should be said in fairness 
that she was simply walking in the footsteps of the 
Great Powers of Europe. 

Of the Twenty-one Demands, there remain now 
only two articles of importance, namely, those con- 
cerning the extension of the term of lease of Port 
Arthur and Dalny and of the terms of the South 
Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Rail- 
way and the right of Japanese subjects to lease land 
necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade 
and manufacture or for pursuing agricultural enter- 
prises. 

How we conceded point after point to China at 
the Washington Conference until there remain 
practically only the two articles just mentioned, all 
the world knows. But, unfortunately, China has 
been asserting ever since that even those two 
articles must be abrogated, on the plea that the 
whole treaty was signed under duress. It should, 
however, be remembered by students of interna- 
tional affairs, especially of Oriental problems, that 
Port Arthur and Dalny—in fact, the entire penin- 
sula of Liaotung—had been ceded to Japan by 


147 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


China by the treaty of Shimonoseki, as a legitimate 
fruit of our victory, but that Russia, France, and 
Germany, at the point of the sword, forced us to 
relinquish it. It should also be noted that three 
years later Russia leased 1t from China by coercion. 
If the Chino-Japanese treaties of 1915 should be 
abrogated because they were not negotiated will- 
ingly, then it follows that the retrocession of the 
Liaotung peninsula by Japan should also be de- 
clared void, and instead of being a leased territory 
it should become a permanent portion of the 
Japanese Empire, for the retrocession was forced 
upon Japan by the three Great Powers of Europe. 
It logically follows, then, that Great Britain must 
return Hongkong, and several other international 
agreements will have to be abrogated for similar 
reasons. Your Senator Robinson, of Arkansas, 
spoke truly when he said, on July 24, Ig19g, as 
follows: 

Every commercial treaty of importance now in force be- 
tween China and European nations is the result of war or some 
other form of duress. 

In view of the fact that the commercial relations of nearly 
all nations with China are based on duress in some form, and 
in contemplation of the further fact that the most important 
treaties now in force between the various nations are the out- 


come of wars—which, of course, are the supreme manifesta- 
tions of duress—why then should the claim that China was 


{ 48 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


induced to make the treaty with Japan through fear of war 
invalidate that treaty, and all other treaties with China, many 
of which she was compelled by war to execute, be left in force? 

If we go back into history and invalidate every treaty into 
which duress has entered chaos in international relations will 
result. 


Continuing, this impartial observer says: 


Shall we assert that treaties tainted with duress in which 
Japan is interested must be invalidated and at the same time 
recognise English, French, and Russian compacts with the 
Chinese government—compacts, for the most part, extorted 
through war engaged in for the express purpose of compelling 
China to yield? Shall we attempt to make one rule for Japan 
and a totally different rule for other nations? To ask the 
question is to answer It. 


Because I have quoted at some length from 
Senator Robinson’s speech, it must not be assumed 
that I am defending a jingoistic policy. In an 
article which I contributed to the Diplomatic 
Review three months before the Washington Con- 
ference was opened, I used these words: “In the 
eyes of God strong nations are often defendants on 
the suit of weak ones.” 

From Japan’s past policy toward China I now 
turn to her present policy, which, as stated by our 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Imperial Diet, 
is one of non-interference in the domestic affairs of 
China and of merely safeguarding our rightful posi- 


1 49 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


tion, and, in particular, our rights and interests in 
Manchuria and Mongolia. As he emphasized in 
his speech, our concern 1s not confined to the condi- 
tion of affairs in these two provinces only. We are 
certainly interested in the whole of China to such 
an extent and degree as conditions there are essen- 
tial to our national existence. Baron Shidehara in 
his speech referred to above went on to say: 

Japan, in self-defence and in the interest of peace in the 
Far East, staked the country’s fortunes on two great wars in 
the Manchurian plains. By such supreme efforts, we are now 
enabled to engage in peaceful undertakings in that region. I 
desire to repeat here once more what has been so often declared 
by the Japanese government, that we have no territorial de- 
signs of any kind in that or any other part of China. 


Then he proceeded to dwell upon the principle 
of non-interference which I have quoted at the 
beginning of the present lecture, and concluded as 
follows: 

What has been the result of this attitude? I am happy to 
believe that the sense of justice and fairness with which we 
have met the situation is now widely appreciated not only by 
the Chinese people, but by all the powers of the world, with a 
consequent marked improvement in our relations with China 
and increased mutual confidence between us and the other 
powers. 

With the assumption of the office of Provisional Executive 
by Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, we have, on consultation with the 
Powers, recognized his government as the de facto government 


1 50 } 


JAPAN AND.THE UNITED STATES 


of China. We are not directly interested in the question, who 
will assume the reins of government in China, or what con- 
stitutional system may be adopted in that country. With a 
long historical background and amidst the surroundings 
peculiar to the country, the Chinese people must be left free 
to order their own national life in their own way. All that we 
consider important is that China should be provided with a 
sufficiently strong government to fulfil her international 
obligations in good faith and to maintain peace and order 
within her borders. 

Believing that the provisional government of China is 
seriously striving to attain these objects, we pray with deep 
sympathy for its success, and we are further prepared to 
render to China, in common with the other powers, such 
friendly assistance as may lie in our power. It should, how- 
ever, be clearly understood that such sympathy and assistance 
are extended, not so much to any particular person or any 
particular party in China, as to the whole nation of China 
whose greater good we have always at heart. 

It is undoubtedly a tremendous undertaking to establish 
peace and unity in China. Although that work has not so 
far made such progress as might be desired, it must not be 
concluded that the Chinese people are not fully endowed with 
the gift of character needed for self-government. Such in- 
ference seems to us entirely unwarranted. In no case can we 
accept any plan based on these mistaken premises to place 
Chinese railways and other administrative organs under inter- 
national control. We are satisfied that no such project is under 
contemplation by any foreign government. 

The reports that China may possibly become a com- 
munist state, or that she contemplates repudiation of all inter- 


{ 51 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


national commitments which she may deem prejudicial to 
herself, do not seem to us to be worthy of credence. We shall 
watch, with hope and tolerance, the efforts of the Chinese 
people to carry out political reforms so much needed for the 
country. While fully asserting our legitimate rights and inter- 
ests in China, we shall give due and sympathetic consideration 
to the special conditions under which she is labouring, and we 
shall direct our best attention to the promotion of mutual 
understanding and co-operation—spiritual, cultural, and eco- 
nomic—between the two nations. 


From our policy toward China let us now pass 
to our policy toward Siberia. Here again we must 
survey for a few moments our past policy, which 
was in reality forced upon us. 

It was at the invitation of the Allied Powers 
that Japan decided to send an expedition to 
Siberia. The Diplomatic Advisory Board was not 
unanimous in giving its approval, nor was the 
cabinet undivided in its decision. The expedition 
was undertaken in common accord and in co- 
operation with the United States in order to 
render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops 
who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from 
European Russia, found themselves in grave and 
pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under 
German command. 

In January, 1920, the United States withdrew 
its forces, leaving our troops to carry out alone the 


{ 52 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


unpleasant and ungrateful task of guarding several 
points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfil- 
ment of interallied arrangements, and of giving 
facilities to the stranded Czecho-Slovaks. Japan 
could not withdraw troops as easily as America for 
very obvious reasons, for she had thousands of her 
people settled and doing business in Siberia, and 
the fact that we had dispatched troops had so 
antagonized the bolsheviki that their withdrawal 
would have created a very dangerous situation for 
the Japanese residents. 

There are indeed only a few instances in the 
history of the world of such a tragedy as that in 
which more than seven hundred Japanese, includ- 
ing women and children as well as the Japanese 
Consul and his family and his official staff, were 
brutally murdered, after having been most cruelly 
tortured. This one fact would have supplied a 
casus belli for any nation. It was the burning of a 
number of cases containing opium which was the 
cause of what is known as the Opium War, after 
which China had to cede Hongkong to Great 
Britain. It was the blowing up of the battleship 
“Maine” of Havana by the disintegration of gun- 
powder, as has since been proved, which became 
the cause of the war, as a result of which Spain had 
to part with the Philippines. When we consider 


{53 1] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


these two cases and several other causes of wars 
which are too numerous to mention, the United 
States and the other powers can easily appreciate 
the forbearance in our dealings with Russia. 
In fact, three years before the conclusion of the 
treaty restoring the relations between the two 
‘countries, we had withdrawn all our troops from 
the mainland, leaving only a battalion or so in the 
island of Saghalien. As I have stated at the begin- 
ning of the lecture, the island as well as the group 
of small islands known as the Kuriles formerly be- 
longed to Japan, but Russia snatched from us the 
northern half of the island and the Kuriles. In 
1876, the father of the present lecturer, who was 
then Minister for Foreign Affairs, had extracted a 
promise from the Russian government to restore 
them to Japan on receipt of one million dollars. 
The Foreign Minister was encouraged in this deal 
by his American adviser, Le Gendre, who suggested 
to his chief to get back the island by purchase, as 
the United States had bought Alaska from Russia 
for four million dollars. Unfortunately, the late 
Count Kuroda, who was then governor of Kok- 
kaido—a large Japanese island which almost 
touches Saghalien—sent a memorial to the govern- 
ment urging them to relinquish our claim to the 
island—advice which was most unfortunately ac- 


1 54] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


cepted by the government, and this was one of the 
causes of the Foreign Minister’s resignation shortly 
afterward. 

Fifty years ago we could have had the island of 
Saghalien restored to us for one million dollars. 
Two years ago, when at the Tokyo conference our 
delegate approached Mr. Joffe, the Russian dele- 
gate, for a price, I understand he mentioned the 
modest sum of $750,000,000, or seven hundred and 
fifty times as much as a half-century ago. 

I have been asked to say something about our 
policy toward Siberia, because I presume that there 
are Americans who think that, as Japan is thickly 
populated and as Siberia is a fertile plain large 
enough to sustain a population several times that 
of Japan, we must have some sinister designs in 
that part of the Asiatic continent. Nothing is 
farther from the truth. The following are some of 
the more important points in the treaty recently 
concluded by Japan with Russia, which will show 
how lenient we have been toward our much dis- 
tressed neighbor: 


ArTIcLE II 


The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees that the 
Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905, shall remain in 
full force. 

It is agreed that the Treaties, Conventions and Agree- 


155] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


ments, other than the said Treaty of Portsmouth, which were 
concluded between Japan and Russia prior to November 7, 
1917, shall be re-examined at a Conference to be subsequently 
held between the Governments of the High Contracting 
Parties and are liable to revision or annulment as altered cir- 
cumstances may require. 


ArtTicteE III 


The Governments of the High Contracting Parties agree 
that upon the coming into force of the present Convention, 
they shall proceed to the revision of the Fishery Convention of 
1907, taking into consideration such changes as may have 
taken place in the general conditions since the conclusion of 
the said Fishery Convention. 

Pending the conclusion of a convention so revised, the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall 
maintain the practices established in 1924 relating to the 
lease of fishery lots to Japanese subjects. 


In concluding these brief remarks on the 
Japanese policy toward Siberia, let me quote a 
passage from Baron Shidehara’s speech in the Diet. 
The Foreign Secretary says: 


Let us now turn to the Russian problem. As I stated here 
in the last session, we fully realize that Russia and Japan, 
having common interests in many respects, are bound to 
maintain relations of amity and friendship. There have been, 
however, between them many important questions calling for 
solution, and involving in some cases difficulties of serious 
nature. If, therefore, the re-establishment of diplomatic rela- 
tions were not preceded by the adjustment of these pending 


{ 56] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


questions, it is certain that there would immediately follow 
unpleasant disputes, compromising the future relations of the 
two nations. Nothing is farther from our thought than the 
idea of bargaining away recognition of the Soviet Government, 
in return for oil or coal concessions. We have only tried to 
forestall and eliminate sources of future trouble, in the belief 
that the restoration of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations 
should be effected in a generally congenial atmosphere. This is 
the reason why so much time has already been taken in the 
negotiations. These negotiations finally came to a successful 
close and a Basic Convention and supplementary documents 
were duly signed on the night of January 20. 

The long outstanding questions have thus been satis- 
factorily adjusted, and upon the exchange of ratifications of 
the pacts just signed, friendly relations between the two 
countries are to be formally reopened. It is with sincere 
gratification that I am now able to announce this happy issue 
of the Russo-Japanese Conference at Peking. 


Let me now say a few words about our policy 
in Korea, which has been the cause of two great 
wars. 

The late Marquis Curzon, of Kedleston, at one 
time viceroy of India, and during the European 
war secretary of state for foreign affairs, and at the 
time of his death lord president of the Privy 
Council, in his well-known book called Problems of 
the Far East, which he wrote when he was still 
called ‘“‘the Honorable” George Curzon and as far 
back as the year 1894, said: 


157] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


The spectacle of a country possessing an historical antiq- 
uity, contemporaneous, as alleged, with that of Thebes and 
Babylon, but owning no ruins; boasting of a separate, if not 
an independent, national existence for centuries, and yet 
devoid of all external symptoms of strength; retaining latest of 
all the kingdoms of the East the title to successful exclusion of 
the foreigner, and yet animated by no real hostility to aliens; 
containing beautiful natural scenery still virgin to the travel- 
ler’s foot; claiming to have given Japan her letters, her science, 
her religion, and her art, and yet bereft of almost all vestiges 
of these herself; inhabited by a people of physical vigour but 
moral inertness; well endowed with resources, yet crippled for 
want of funds—such a spectacle is one to which I know of no 
counterpart even in Asia, the continent of contrasts, and which 
from a distance had long and powerfully affected my imagina- 
tion. A bridge between China and Japan, Korea is neverthe- 
less profoundly unlike either. It has lacked the virile training 
of the Feudal System in Japan, and the incentives to industry 
supplied by the crowded existence of China. Its indifference to 
religion has left it without the splendid temples that adorn 
the former country, without the stubborn self-sufficiency of 
character developed by Confucianism in the latter. 


In a chapter called “The Destinies of the Far 
Fast,” that farsighted statesman wrote: 


That that petty kingdom cannot expect for long to retain 
any real independence, the description which I have given 
will have shown. A palace intrigue, the death of a king or a 
queen, an internal rebellion, may at any moment produce an 
émeute or imbroglio, such as has already invited outside inter- 
ference, and can only end in a diminution or abrogation of the 
national claims to autonomy. The friends of Korea do wrong- 


1 58 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


ly, in my opinion in encouraging the latter pretensions. A 
country that is too weak to stand alone gains nothing by an 
affected indifference to external support. 


So wrote, thirty years ago, that young traveler 
who became one of the world’s most eminent 
statesmen. How true were his words have been 
proved by subsequent events, and the seventeen 
million people who inhabit the peninsula of Korea 
now enjoy perfect security of life and property—a 
thing which they could not even dream of in the 
days of their independence. 

It is fifteen years since Japan and Korea were 
amalgamated, with the object, as stated in the 
treaty of amalgamation, of “promoting the com- 
mon weal of the two nations and of assuring per- 
manent peace in the Extreme East.” Since then a 
wonderful transformation has taken place, and the 
general culture and welfare of the people have been 
much advanced. Unfortunately, however, in 
March, 191g, disturbances broke out in several 
places, their chief causes having been the unpopu- 
larity of Governor-General Count Hasegawa and 
President Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination 
of nations. It is a matter sincerely to be regretted 
that the agitation was first started by influential 
Christians as well as by believers of the Tendokyo, 
which is a new Korean religion. The majority of 


[59 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the populace hardly knew what the disturbances 
were all about, but at one time the situation be- 
came very serious. Fortunately, however, the 
majority of the Koreans of the upper and middle 
classes were too prudent to take part in the move- 
ment. They not only refused all inducements and 
threats to join the agitation, but many of them 
were bold enough to visit various places and, at the 
risk of their own lives, to use their restraining influ- 
ence against rioting. The turbulent period lasted 
sixty days, during which six hundred and eighteen 
places were affected, the number of rioters being 
over a half-million. 

Every cloud has a silver lining, and although 
the movement itself was most deplorable, the 
militaristic Governor-General was soon forced to 
resign and was succeeded by one of the most 
humane and human statesmen of modern times— 
Baron Saito. I have been told by a number of 
Japanese, foreigners, and Koreans that there are 
many Korean malcontents who are quite anxious 
to see the Governor-General but who are afraid of 
doing so, for they hear that once they have a talk 
with him there is the danger of losing the anti- 
Japanese spirit and becoming pro-Japanese, so 
kindhearted and attractive is their administrator, 
whose one ambition 1s to do his utmost for advanc- 


[ 60 J 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


ing the welfare of the Korean people. On the day 
of his arrival in the capital of Korea as governor- 
general a bomb was thrown at him, and although 
he escaped unhurt, several people who had as- 
sembled to welcome him were killed or wounded. 
He was fired at several times during his trips on 
the frontier, but he does not care, for he is fearless. 
If he ever falls at the hands of a Korean, which 
God forbid, I know that his dying words will be 
“Forgive him.” With such a governor-general ad- 
ministering the affairs of the peninsula, the hap- 
piness of the people is assured. 

I shall now describe briefly what reforms have 
already been accomplished in Korea and what will 
be its future. I shall not attempt to describe the 
reforms effected in the administration prior to the 
appointment of the present Governor-General, for 
great as they were they fall into insignificance when 
compared with the titanic changes made since 
191g. Briefly stated, the main points are as follows: 


1. Replacement of the former military government with a 
civil government, making the governor-generalship open 
to a civil official 

2. Replacement of the gendarmerie system with an ordinary 
police system 

3. Establishment of non-discrimination between Japanese 
and Koreans | 

4. Establishment of a cultural policy with a view to raising 
the Korean people to the same standard as the Japanese 


[ 61 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


The spirit of the new policy is indicated by the 
Imperial Rescript which was promulgated in 
August, 1919, and which reads as follows: 


We have ever made it Our aim to promote the security and 
welfare of Our territory of Korea, and to extend to the native 
population of that territory as Our beloved subjects a fair and 
impartial treatment in all respects, to the end that they may 
without distinction of persons lead their lives in peace and 
contentment. We are persuaded that the state of develop- 
ment at which the general situation has now arrived calls for 
certain reforms in the administrative organization of the 
Government-General of Korea, and We issue Our Imperial 
command that such reforms be put into operation. The meas- 
ures thus taken are solely designed to facilitate the working of 
the administration and to secure good and enlightened govern- 
ment in pursuance of Our settled policy, and in fulfilment of 
the altered requirements of the country. Specially in view of 
the termination of the war in Europe and of the rapid changes 
in the conditions of the world do We consider it highly desir- 
able that every effort should be made for the advancement of 
the national resources and the well-being of the people. We 
call upon all public functionaries concerned to exercise their 
best endeavours in obedience to Our wishes in order that a 
benign rule may be assured to Korea, and that the people, 
diligent and happy in attending to their respective vocations, 
may enjoy the blessing of peace and contribute to the growing 
prosperity of the country. 


The first work of the present Governor-General 


as soon as he assumed the reins of government was 
to invite influential and leading men from all the 


[ 62} 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


provinces to assemble in the capital with the object 
of coming to a real understanding with them and 
of hearing their unreserved opinions on the ad- 
ministration. A few months later he dispatched 
several leading secretaries to the provinces with 
instructions to meet prominent Koreans, including 
elders and learned men, and thus to become ac- 
quainted with their views and opinions on the ad, 
ministration. 

As officials, Koreans are now equally eligible 
with Japanese for any rank or decorations, and 
there are now five Koreans among the thirteen 
provincial governors, and the present lecturer is 
of the opinion that in ten years or so there will 
probably be a Korean deputy governor-general. 
Perhaps it will interest you to hear that the Uni- 
versal Suffrage Law which was passed in the last 
session of the Imperial Diet grants the franchise 
alike to Japanese and Koreans who have the resi- 
dential qualification of one year or more. Thus if 
the seventeen million Koreans come and settle in 
Japan—and the law grants them that right—they 
will become, not only a great political influence, 
but a deciding factor in the administration of the 
empire of Japan. 

I must not conclude this lecture before I tell you 
something about the many interesting talks I have 


{ 63 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


had with some of the leaders of the Korean inde- 
pendence movement and about the future of the 
peninsula. Although I have traveled a great deal, 
I am almost ashamed to say that it was only the 
year before last that I went to Korea for the first 
time. And I would probably have never gone there, 
had I not heard, at a meeting held in Tokyo, a 
lecture on Korea, in which the lecturer said that 
another independence movement was in sight and 
that ominous clouds were gradually looming on 
the horizon. 

When I arrived in the capital, some of the high 
officials of the Government-General asked me what 
my program was—if I wanted to be presented to 
the former Emperor of Korea and the leading 
Korean noblemen. In reply I said that I had come 
‘in order to exchange views with some of the anti- 
Japanese American missionaries and Korean mal- 
contents. My reply naturally shocked the officials, 
but they did not prevent me from seeing them. On 
the contrary, they gave me every facility. With 
regard to the interviews I had with the American 
missionaries I will tell you this much—they are 
not really anti-Japanese at heart. They spoke their 
minds and I spoke mine, and we were finally agreed’ 
that the policy of the present administration is 
liberal and enlightened. With regard to the many 


1 64 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


interesting talks I had with some of the leaders of 
the independence movement, some of whom had 
been liberated from prison only two years pre- 
viously, I will tell you somewhat more at length. 
They were almost unanimous in their desire to 
have back their independence. I said to them that 
during the many centuries they were nominally 
independent they had no security of life andi 
property. They had almost fallen into the abyss of 
national ruin. Their hills had been denuded of all 
the trees, with the result that in the dry season the 
rivers were almost dry and in the rainy season 
they were destructive. They were kept ignorant 
because it paid their rulers to make them igno- 
rant. Quoting from a well-known American author, 
I said: 

In the days of your independence gross abuse existed— 
a veritable sink of misgovernment, corruption, filth, and 
misery. As the Japanese are not angels but fallible human 
beings, it is not surprising that the best of them have made 
mistakes, and that the worst have committed crimes. It was 
equally inevitable that some of the best of the Koreans should 
feel their national pride wounded by the domination of an 
alien government; that corrupt officials and indolent peasants 
should resent the reforms that had to be forced upon them; 
that some misguided men should resort to violent methods 
against their new rulers; and that subordinate [Japanese] 
officials should not always be considerate and humane in 


carrying out their task. 
[65 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


After having quoted these words, I said to them 
that it was doubtful whether it was a wise thing 
for Japan to have annexed Korea, but that it was 
as clear as daylight that it was a wise thing for 
Korea to have amalgamated with Japan. For, I 
told them, if Japan had not annexed Korea, Russia 
would have done so. “Look,” I said, “‘at the pres- 
ent condition of Russia. Imagine Korea to be 
under the tutelage of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinovieff, 
Stalin, Kameneff, and gentry of that sort!’ Then 
I said to them that, first of all, the system of unti- 
versal compulsory education must be adopted in 
Korea, and that when the people have become 
politically conscious a liberal measure of self- 
government should be granted. “In my opinion,” 
I continued, “‘that would be the best thing for 
Japan as well as for Korea.” And I felt quite 
honored when I saw, on the day of my departure 
for home shortly before the great earthquake, a 
number of the leaders of the independence move- 
ment standing on the platform together with 
Japanese officials and others and also two or three 
so-called anti-Japanese American missionaries, 
and some of the first inquiries I received soon after 
the earthquake came from these Koreans. They 
are also human and very likable people. 

May it, therefore, be our good fortune, with the 


1 66 J 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


good will and, if possible, the moral support of the 
powers interested in the affairs of the Far East, 
especially of America, to lead the Koreans to that 
destination which, I hope, they will reach in less 
than twenty years and where, I trust, they will be 
able to govern themselves under the guidance and 
as an integral part of the Empire of the Rising, 
Sun. 


[ 67 ] 





III 


JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES 


In opening this lecture, perhaps I may be per,, 
mitted to quote a few passages from a lengthy 
article I contributed to the Japanese Diplomatic 
Review in 1920, summarized translations of which 
appeared in the Fapan Chronicle and the Fapan 
Advertiser. It is from these condensed translations 
that I shall quote. 

In this article, after having dwelt at length upon 
the causes of estrangement between Britain and 
Japan, which I attributed chiefly to our mistaken 
policy toward China during the world-war, I pro- 
ceeded as follows: 

“Tt is nearly for the same causes that the rela- 
tions between America and Japan are not so satis- 
factory as could be desired, but it seems that half 
the blame rests with America. Having forced 
Japan to open the country to foreign intercourse, 
America was comparatively friendly to Japan up to 
the time of the Russo-Japanese War, during which 
her people subscribed to Japanese war bonds and 
the American press was also highly sympathetic 


[ 69 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


with Japan. It is, however, regrettable that there 
has been a marked change in the feelings of the 
Americans toward this nation since the Peace of 
Portsmouth. But it seems to me that unfortu- 
nately there are some Americans who are very wil- 
ful and headstrong in their disposition toward 
foreigners. Personally I like the Anglo-Saxons very 
much. I have a great love for the British nation, 
and I also attach high value to the friendship of 
the Americans. Speaking frankly, however, the 
Anglo-Saxons are too proud. This is particularly 
the case with the Americans. At the same time, 
they are an interesting nation, simple-minded and 
sincere, and firm and constant. When they come to 
a full understanding, I do not think that it will be 
difficult for the three powers of Japan, Britain, and 
America to co-operate permanently to safeguard 
the peace of the world. As for the Californian prob- 
lem, it implies a question of labour as well as eco- 
nomic and racial questions, but one of its chief 
causes is the sense of suspicion and hatred enter- 
tained against Japan. In order to remove this, it 
is imperative to change Japan’s China policy, nay, 
the whole of her Asiatic policy. This brings me toa 
discussion of the China policy of America. 
“Originally America acted on the Monroe 
Doctrine, interdicting foreign powers from inter- 


[ 70 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


ference with the American continent, while she 
herself refrained from interfering with foreign 
powers. Without any rhyme or reason, however, 
she annexed Hawaii and also proceeded to meddle 
with the colonial policy of Spain, whom she fought 
and from whom she wrested the Philippines, and 
ended by acquiring great power in Asia. Up ta 
that point, she was not actuated by any conscious 
world-policy and her development was not deliber- 
ate. But when she became conscious of her being 
a great power in Asia, she awoke to the fact that, 
compared to Britain and Japan, her influence, both 
commercial and political, in China was very slight. 
Twenty years ago, Dr. Reinsch, then a professor at 
Wisconsin University and afterward American 
minister to China, wrote that China was to be con- 
quered by means of railways. That time is now 
past. It is by education that America is now con- 
quering China. Not content with receiving kindly 
Chinese students to America, the Americans have 
established influential universities in Peking, Nan- 
king, Shanghai, etc., which boast many thousand 
students in the aggregate. Unfortunately, anti- 
Japanese sentiments are prevalent in these seats of 
learning. 

“In some extreme cases, anti-Japanese ideas 
are strongly emphasized even in the magazines 


{71 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


published by the students. One of these organs 
actually contained a poem in praise of the assassin 
of the late Prince Ito and it was asserted that Japan 
was the concocter of civil war in China. On my 
entering a protest with the president of the unt- 
versity concerned, he regretted that offence had 
been given to the Japanese by the too great liberty 
of speech given the students. At the same time he 
pointed out that for some years past a certain 
clique in Japan had governed Japanese diplomacy 
and thereby incurred the ill will of the Chinese, 
that Japan had let slip a great opportunity for 
guiding China, that if Japan had acted on a sound 
policy after her war with China she would have 
gained great influence there, but that as her policy 
had been always selfish she had aroused the enmity 
of her neighbour. He added that it was not yet too 
late to mend, and that though China also had many 
faults Japan would forfeit the sympathy of the 
world if she persisted in the policy she had so far 
pursued toward China. 

“The remarks of the president were quite right. 
I want the nation to put down our militarist 
diplomacy by all means and recover the credit and 
reputation of the state. In the meantime, Amer- 
ica is conquering China by education. Less than 
twenty years hence almost all the Chinese occupy- 


{ 72} 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


ing important posts in the state will be men edu- 
cated either in America or in Chinese universities 
under American management. The result of all 
this is not difficult to imagine. While the Japanese 
government and people are eagerly running after 
trivial gains of the moment, the Americans are 
steadily pursuing a grand policy which will beat 
fruit in a more remote future. When they come to 
govern China peacefully with their boundless 
wealth and their wonderful energy, what will its 
effect be on Japan? In short, unless Japan gives up 
her mistaken militarist policy and amends her 
attitude toward China agreeably to the general 
tendency of the world, she will have to repent when 
too late and bequeath troubles to after genera- 
tions.” 

After having trounced most severely the jingoes 
of my own country, I concluded the article as fol- 
lows: 

“But militarism still reigns not only in the five 
Great Powers but even in Communist Russia. The 
policy of Britain, France, and Italy toward Greece 
is of the same type as the pro-Tuan policy of the 
Terauchi ministry of Japan. Their operations in 
Constantinople are similar in nature to those of 
Japan in Vladivostok. When I was in America in 
Ig1g, an influential American said to me that the 


{73 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


naval extension of America was for the mainte- 
nance of the peace on the two oceans agreeably to 
the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
I replied, ‘But in that way armament competition 
among nations will never cease.’ For my part, how- 
ever, I have no doubt whatever that the Ameri- 
cans, who have a great regard for peace, justice, 
and humanity, will act faithfully on high principles. 
At the same time, I should like those praiseworthy 
Americans employed in mission and educational 
work in China always to bear in mind the follow- 
ing words of the Saviour Jesus Christ: 

Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptising them 
in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy 
Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have 


commanded you: and, lo, I am with you always even unto 


the end of the World [Matt. 28: 19-20]. 


“At present, there are no nations on earth who 
are less inclined to war than Britain and Japan. 
The Japanese know that their country is poor and 
she is no match (for America) in a war of wealth 
and science. In Britain war is regarded as a crime 
by the majority of the nation. At least, it is known 
by all the world that British workers will never 
allow Britain to go to war again. Such being the 
case, the large-scale extension of armaments by 
America would seem entirely senseless.” 


1 74 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


In another lengthy article, which I wrote in the 
same magazine two months later and which was 
translated by the same English papers almost 
in toto, | began as follows: 

“In this article, I will discuss the distant and 
proximate causes of the naval competition which 
has unfortunately arisen between Japan and' 
America, refer to the menace offered to the peace 
of the world by the arbitrary proceedings and 
reckless and extravagant habit of the United 
States, trace how the very unwise diplomacy pur- 
sued by the Japanese Foreign Office has aggra- 
vated American suspicions against this country, 
suggest a way for sweeping away the misunder- 
standings now existing between Japan and Amer- 
ica, and end by appealing to the common sense of 
the two nations and giving a warning to them that 
in case the problems between the two countries are 
not amicably settled and war breaks out between 
them, the world will again be plunged into an 
irretrievable chaos and confusion, bolshevik ideas 
will spread everywhere, and civilization itself may 
be brought to a termination, no matter which side 
achieves a final victory.” | 

Proceeding, I said that in my opinion nothing 
was more significant and grave than the change in 
America’s diplomacy during the last twenty-five 


175] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


years. Peaceful America, who had faithfully ad- 
hered to the Monroe Doctrine, waged war with 
Spain and by annexing the Philippines became a 
great power in Asia. It was about this time that 
the government of Hawaii, which was then still 
an independent country, refused the landing of a 
large number of Japanese immigrants. Thereupon 
the Japanese government entered a strong protest, 
which was quite justified; but, unfortunately, to 
back it up, a cruiser was dispatched to Hawaii, 
where she stayed for six months at great expense. 
The foreign minister at that time was Count 
Okuma, who was afterward raised to the rank of 
marquis and whose name became famous twenty 
years later in connection with the Twenty-one 
Demands on China. The only result of this protest 
and expedition was an indemnity of seventy-five 
thousand dollars and tons of barnacles on the 
cruiser’s hull. While the negotiations were going 
on, America finally annexed the islands, upon 
which she had been casting a covetous eye for some 
time past. The stupid steps taken by the Japanese 
government only accelerated the execution of the 
American design of absorption. 

It was soon evident that the occupation of the 
Philippines and Hawaii was making the naval ex- 


1 76 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


pansion of America appear more necessary than 
ever; but the mere acquisition of oversea posses- 
sions was not a sufficient argument, so there was 
started a vigorous propaganda on the part of ship- 
builders, and the possibility of war between the two 
countries of traditional friendship was preached 
by American jingoes. Unfortunately, just at this 
delicate moment the Californian problems be- 
came more and more complicated, culminating in 
the famous school question, and a certain well- 
known Japanese statesman with jingoistic tend- 
encies gave vent to a very irresponsible utterance 
amounting to almost a threat of war with America. 
A certain section of the American press, well known 
for its yellow character, was not slow to seize the 
opportunity for urging naval expansion and the 
fortification of the Philippines and Hawaii. The 
result, as is well known, was the tour of inspection 
in the Far East of Mr. Taft, who was then secre- 
tary of war in the Roosevelt administration, and 
the cruise around the world of the American fleet. 
At that time the military party in Japan was at the 
height of its power, and, therefore, the island em- 
pire, strongly entrenched in Manchuria as a result 
of the Russo-Japanese War, was looked upon as 
another Muscovite Empire, cloaked in the guise of 


{77 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the protector of China and Korea. There is no 
denying the fact that even President Roosevelt, 
who was a sincere admirer and a real friend of 
Japan, was determined to check what his govern- 
ment thought Japan’s undue expansion. The 
American Navy, which had been diligently ex- 
panded with this object, was more powerful than 
that of Japan when the world-war broke out, being 
then almost second to none, except Great Britain, 
in strength and efficiency. 

Most unfortunately, just at the time when the 
relations between Japan and America were becom- 
ing very strained, owing to mutual suspicions and 
misunderstandings, the Japanese government com- 
mitted a serious blunder. Instead of waiting, as 
America did, until a more opportune moment to 
join in the war, in their haste to assist Great 
Britain, especially as the nation was then unan- 
imous in her desire to do so, they took a wrong 
course. Instead of declaring war on Germany in 
accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance, Japan sent a cynical ultimatum to 
Germany, couched in similar terms to the “‘friend- 
ly advice” of the triple intervention, which robbed 
her of the most important of the legitimate fruits 
of her victory over China. Under the circum- 
stances it was not to be wondered at that many 


{ 78 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


Americans believed that Japan had decided to 
participate in the war in order to satisfy her terri- 
torial ambitions. 

Not only was the manner in which Japan 
joined in the war conducive to misunderstanding, 
but it was considered most offensive by Americans, 
of German origin. Then came the Twenty-one 
Demands, of which, as I have said in a previous 
lecture, there remain only two articles of impor- 
tance and a bad name. Before the presentation of 
these demands, Japan’s faithful adherence to inter- 
national engagements and her comity toward all 
nations had never been questioned; but her mis- 
management of the negotiations, which shrewd 
diplomats would have settled at a dinner table, has 
unfortunately left a blemish in her diplomatic his- 
tory. Later came two more blunders, namely, the 
loan of money to the Yuan ministry of China in 
1916-17 and the acceptance of the invitation of 
America and the other Allies to send an expedition 
into Siberia. 

Since the outbreak of the Great War, a pre- 
paredness campaign has been started in America 
on a very extensive scale, urging that the nation 
must be prepared for all emergencies. If I remem- 
ber rightly, no less a person than General Wood, 
the present governor of the Philippines, in an 


{ 79 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


article contributed to a book containing several 
interesting and instructive articles, went to the 
length of proclaiming that the United States should 
be prepared to mobilize at any time five hundred 
thousand officers and ten million men. This pre- 
paredness campaign was, of course, directed 
against the menace of German aggression. But, as 
the “war to end war’ fortunately ended in the 
victory of the Allies (thanks to the entry of the 
United States!) there was apparently no need for 
a further campaign. Yet the United States, who 
had the glorious honor of having won the war, 
decided to adhere to the 1916 program of naval 
expansion. 

Mr. Daniels, the naval secretary, said in Paris 
on March 26, 1919, that though America was in- 
tent upon having the strongest navy in the world, 
she had no designs against Britain’s suzerainty at 
sea. In July of the same year he said to me at 
Washington, if I remember rightly, that she had 
no intention of robbing Great Britain of the scepter 
of the sea, but that it was her duty to keep the 
freedom of the seas. From an American viewpoint, 
perhaps this was America’s navy policy put in a 
nutshell. IfAmerica considered it her duty to insure 
the freedom of the seas and check the alleged 
ageressive designs of Japan on the Pacific, she was 


[ 80 J 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


certainly justified in doing so. The British people 
are tactful and shrewd and are well known for their 
common sense, and their Empire being the strong- 
est power in the world, they could afford to watch 
quite calmly the American naval expansion. But 
could Japan look on equally calmly? Unfortu,, 
nately, she could not; for, although there was no 
cause of war behind the two English-speaking 
peoples, between America and Japan there were 
more than two possible causes. At least, such was 
the view entertained by many people on both 
sides of the Pacific. 

Dwelling upon the possible causes of war be- 
tween America and Japan, in my article of 1920 
I said: 

“Tn my opinion, the Californian issue is, after 
all, a Californian issue—it cannot be a cause of 
war between the two nations. In other states, 
Japanese are comparatively favourably treated. In 
California, too, there is no reason why the Jap- 
anese immigrants should be subjected to so much 
opposition and persecution. Even according to the 
report of the committee for the investigation into 
the conditions of Japanese immigrants, composed 
exclusively of American citizens, “They are well 
educated, they are eager to learn English, they 
have a high standard of personal cleanliness, they 


{ 8x } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


are generous in their relations with others and 
they are generally temperate.’ In fact, the Cali- 
fornians are benighted, deficient in the sense of 
justice and impervious to reason, but while Japan 
has the absolute right to protest against their 
benightedness, their injustice, and their unreason- 
ableness, and it is further necessary that she should 
resolutely assert and enforce this her right, it would 
be absurd for Japan to stake her national fortunes 
on a local issue like this. 

“While a possible cause of war between Japan 
and America exists on the Asiatic continent, 
Japan’s desire to annex China is not such a cause. 
Even a child knows that even if Japan had such 
an ambition it is utterly impracticable. Where, 
then, do motives of war exist? They are latent in 
the three questions of Korea, Shantung, and 
Siberia.” 

When I wrote the article from which I have just 
quoted there certainly existed the three possible 
causes of war which I have mentioned; but none 
of them now exists, for even those Americans in 
Korea who were at one time most anti-Japanese are 
now agreed that Japan’s administration in the 
peninsula is a most benevolent one, and the activi- 
ties of Korean sympathizers in America have now 
fortunately dwindled. With regard to our policy 


[ 82 } 


JAPAN AND THE UONITED STATES 


toward China and Siberia, as is well known, we 
have now returned Shantung to our neighbor and 
we have also withdrawn from Siberia. Not only 
have we done that, but we are now on good terms 
with China and also, unfortunately, with Russia. , 
I have said “unfortunately,” for 1am no admirer of 
the gentlemen who hold the reins of government at 
Moscow. During the last twenty-five years I have 
been a staunch supporter of a thorough under- 
standing and good friendship with Great Britain 
and America, but have always abhorred the idea of 
rapprochement with Germany and Russia, and I 
have no hesitation in saying that I am viewing 
with much concern the friendly attention which 
the bolshevik government is paying to my country. 

From what I have said, it is clear that there is 
now no possible cause of war between America and 
Japan. Regarding our navy, which is the third in 
strength among the navies of the world, let me 
again quote from my article of 1920: 

“The naval expansion of Japan,” I proceeded 
to say, “is passive, and therefore, it is merely de- 
fensive and self-protective. If we entertained ag- 
gressive designs against America, five “eight-and- 
eight’ fleets would not be sufficient to vanquish 
America with all her geographical advantages, her 
boundless wealth, her invincible spirit, and her un- 


{ 83 } 


{ 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


surpassed scientific knowledge. With one ‘eight- 
and-eight’ fleet perfected, Japan may perhaps be 
able to defend herself against foreign aggression, 
but our armaments and our national resources 
alike forbid us to be aggressive against any strong 
power. We are a poor nation and shall be the first 
to welcome any reliable arrangement for restriction 
of armaments, but I am afraid that a paper ar- 
rangement of the kind avails little, unless the vari- 
ous questions liable to lead to a clash are thorough- 
ly settled. So I will proceed to express my views 
and suggestions on those questions for the approval 
of the intelligent sections of the American and 
Japanese peoples.” 

Regarding a possible cause of war, namely, the 
Korean issue, which was then assuming rather 
serious aspects, I said: 

“The annexation of Korea was approved by all 
the powers at the time. In her independent days, 
Korea was really a ruined country in every social 
respect. The people had been harrassed by a 
tyranny extending over several centuries, and 
there had been no security of person and property. 
And the endless Russian intrigues there had been 
a constant menace to the welfare of this nation 
and the peace of the Far East. Things are now 
changed. The peace of the Far East is guaranteed, 


1 84] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


civilisation is rapidly progressing in Korea, and the 
general welfare of the Koreans has greatly in- 
creased. The royal family of Yi is now actually 
related to our imperial family. What will be the 
feelings of American sympathisers of refractory | 
Koreans when they compare these facts to the fate 
of the royal family of Hawaii after its annexation 
to America?” 

Concerning another possible cause of friction, 
namely, the American activities in China, I said: 

“My countrymen are apt to attach great im- 
portance to a ‘special position’ or ‘special interests’ 
in China, more especially in Manchuria and Mon- 
golia, but interests on paper will be of little avail 
unless they are backed up by real strength and 
Chinese amity. I am for the open door with refer- 
ence to the whole of China, because that will be in 
the interest of China, Japan, and other powers as 
well. In this connection, I have a hope to express 
to America. American activities in China are of 
two classes. One is worthy of all praise and admira- 
tion, while the other is highly unworthy of America, 
a champion of justice. Educational work of Amer- 
icans in China and the active operations of Amer- 
ican merchants there are of the former class. The 
latter classes comprise the movements of biassed 
non-business Americans making anti-Japanese 


{ 85 J 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


propaganda their sole business, and American ad- 
venturers who feed upon newspapers and reviews 
and also upon China. It is beyond imagination how 
adroitly these men instigate the Chinese and how 
badly they injure Sino-Japanese and American- 
Japanese relations. As for the way, however, in 
which the Americans build universities and middle 
schools everywhere in China at enormous cost and 
send out presidents, principals, and teachers of 
admirable character for the benefit of their far- 
sighted China policy, I am compelled to take my 
hat off to it, though I am well aware of the un- 
favourable results to this country accruing from 
this great work of the Americans.” 

Dwelling upon the consequence of war between 
America and Japan, I argued: 

“T repeat that an American-Japanese war 
would be a great sin against civilisation. Which- 
ever side may win an ultimate victory, it would be 
hard for the other powers to look on passively. 
Should Japan win, there would be racial strife. In 
case an ultimate victory lay with the United 
States, that would lead to a rivalry for sea~-power 
between Britain and America. In this connection, 
a certain Japanese gentleman, who was formerly 
a well-known diplomat and is now publishing an 
influential review, wrote from Europe, where he 


[ 86 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


was, to a certain influential paper here, that Britain 
and France were eagerly anxious for the outbreak 
of a war between America and Japan. But this was 
a great mistake. Of course there are jingoes even 
in England who may be glad to have misfortunes, 
fall to other countries. When I was in England, a 
certain Britisher came to me one day and informed 
me that a certain statesman had spoken that day 
to the effect that British business men might feel 
easy about the future, as Japan also would sooner 
or later be confronted with serious difficulties about 
labour questions. In reply, I said that for my part 
I should not like to see Britain in such difficulties. 
Nor did I wish misfortune to America, France, 
Italy, and China, or even to Germany and Turkey 
[I should like to add the words, ‘and even to 
Russia’!]. The interests of the countries of the world 
after the war were so interwoven that no country 
could suffer misfortune without others being imme- 
diately affected. Should Germany be bolshevised, 
Italy would fare likewise, and the plague would 
spread to other countries also. This is a considera- 
tion to which I referred when I had the honour of 
seeing President Wilson. 

“In short, in the possible event of an American- 
Japanese war, Britain, who is so solicitous about 
the peace of the world and the amity of America 


{ 87 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


and Japan for financial considerations as well as by 
reasons of labour difficulties, would ultimately get 
involved in the trouble, and other countries would 
also have to follow suit. The result would be higher 
prices, more intensified class enmity, a world 
bolshevised and plunged into chaos and dark- 
ness.” 

I have quoted at such length from my article 
because most of what I said five years ago still 
holds good, and because I feel convinced that 
America and Japan will never fight and must never 
fight; for a war between these two countries is a 
crime against mankind and a sin against God. 

Of course, it must not be forgotten that there 
are jingoes in both countries. There are not a few 
Japanese who say that America 1s selfish. They say 
that the United States is worse than pre-war 
Germany. They maintain that with her unlimited 
wealth and strength she will try to swallow China, 
and after she has done so she will place the South 
American republics under her tutelage, and finally 
will come to hold the hegemony of the world. It 
was Japan who brought the once arrogant China 
to her knees. It was also Japan who exposed to the 
world the signs of decadence of the great Musco- 
vite Empire. “America is a bully,” these Japanese 
jingoes say, “and we should not be afraid of her.” 


[ 88 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


“America’s diplomacy is cunning and her attitude. 
hypocritical,” they declare, “and therefore no 
stone should be left unturned to thwart her am- 
bition of seizing China ultimately by peaceful,, 
means.” It is a question of life and death for us, 
they think. Even if we do not fight America now, 
she will sooner or later threaten our very existence. 
There was a chance for us to beat Russia and we 
made full use of it; but against America there is no 
such chance. “War or no war,” they say, “the 
result will be just the same. Far better to die with 
our swords in our hands than die a lingering 
death.”’ This is the sum total of what our jingoes 
say. Happily, however, there are only a few people 
who thus argue, and the majority of those who 
have taken even the slightest pains to study 
military matters are of the opinion that war be- 
tween America and Japan is impossible for phys- 
ical reasons. 

During the Great War, although France and the 
other Allies were most anxious that Japan should 
send an expeditionary force to the western front, 
we did not, for the simple reason that it was 
physically impossible. Even if we had decided to 
send troops to the theater of war we should never 
have been able to maintain more than one hundred 
thousand soldiers; for, in order to keep our expedi- 


{ 89 } 


.ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


tionary force at this strength and to supply them 
with food and munitions and other necessary 
equipments, we should have had to employ our 
mercantile shipping for that purpose—a thing 
which was obviously impossible. 

Now, assume for a moment that Australia has 
become independent, that Japan with aggressive 
designs has declared war upon her, and that for 
some unknown reason Great Britain refused to give 
assistance to her former dominion. It should be 
remembered that, during the world-war, Australia 
and New Zealand sent to the seat of war a half- 
million gallant soldiers known as Anzacs. A coun- 
try who was able to send an expeditionary force of 
five hundred thousand can easily mobilize twice 
that number in order to defend her shores. For 
Japan to defeat a million gallant Anzacs, it would 
be necessary to send at least an equal number of 
troops. In order to maintain the strength of our 
expeditionary force and to supply them with food, 
clothing, ammunitions, and other necessary equip- 
ments, it would require at least three times the 
mercantile marine which we now possess. It is thus 
clear that we cannot subdue Australia, even if no 
power assists her. If it is evident that war is 1m- 
possible, for physical reasons, between Japan and 
Australia, which is a small power with a population 


[ 90 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


of only about eight million, is it not as clear as 
daylight that, for similar reasons, war is impossible 
between America and Japan? The former is the 
richest, the greatest, and the strongest power in the | 
world, while the latter is the third greatest naval 
power, whose position in the Far East is impreg- 
nable. As long as Japan is on the defensive, no 
power will succeed in destroying her navy—to say 
nothing of the impossibility of landing a single 
soldier on her shores. 

Having thus argued, I am now in a position to 
declare again most emphatically that war between 
America and Japan is impossible for physical rea- 
sons as well as for moral reasons. 

Perhaps it may not be out of place here to quote 
again from the speech of our Foreign Minister 
which he delivered on the opening day of the last 
session of the Imperial Diet. Regarding our rela- 
tions with the United States, especially the im- 
migration question, Baron Shidehara said: 

As for our relations with the United States, it is evident 
that the two nations should live in cordial friendship for all 
time and co-operate with each other in the great mission of 
promoting the peace and security of the Pacific regions and of 
the world. We are confident that these views are shared by a 
vast majority of the American people. 


With regard to the discriminatory clause against Japanese 
in the Immigration Act of the United States of 1924, which we 


{ 91 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


regret, I explained in the last session of the Diet the circum- 
stances attending the insertion of that clause and the views of 
the government on the subject. The question still remains un- 
settled. It should, however, be remembered that a law cannot 
be modified except by law, and that under the constitutional 
system of the United States, the legislature is entirely inde- 
pendent of the executive. It is obvious, therefore, that the 
continuance of discussions between the two governments at 
this time will not, in itself, serve any useful purpose. What is 
really important in the final analysis of the question is that 
the American people shall come to have a correct understand- 
ing of our people and of our points of view. Impetuous mood 
or impassioned utterances will not conduce to international 
understanding. There is no doubt that the same love of justice 
that kindled American independence still continues to inspire 
the minds of the American people. The day will come when 
this fact will be fully demonstrated. 

In concluding his speech, the Foreign Minister 
sald: 

In conclusion, I wish to repeat that the guiding principle 
of our foreign policy is to safeguard and promote our legitimate 
rights and interests, with due respect to those of other nations, 
and to advance international co-operation, instead of inter- 
national antagonism. In acting on this line of policy, we trust 
that we may count upon the approval and support of the 
people. 

The present lecturer in an hour’s speech vigor- 
ously attacked the Foreign Office, especially its 
Intelligence Department, for its inactivity in trying 
to dispel anti-Japanism, which has been in vogue 


{ 92 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


during the last few years in Great Britain, Amer- 
ica, and China. I can do nothing better than to 
quote from that speech: 

“In reviewing the course of Japanese diplomacy 
during the last few years,” said the interpellator, 
“I feel constrained to ask the Foreign Minister 
what the Intelligence Department has done to 
justify its existence. While the Intelligence De- 
partment is sleeping over its work, the tendency is 
growing abroad to misunderstand Japan. Foreign 
misunderstanding and suspicion of Japan has 
manifested itself in concrete form in two important 
things, and these are the Singapore base scheme 
and America’s grand naval manceuvres. The 
world-war was to be a war to end war. I believe 
that Japan took this view when she joined it. The 
Washington Conference was the gospel of peace for 
the world. I trust that in taking part in that Con- 
ference Japan was actuated by a desire to promote 
the permanent peace of the world. And yet the 
world remains ‘an armed camp,’ though six years 
have already elapsed since the Armistice was 
signed and three years have gone by since the 
Washington Conference. In my opinion, no coun- 
try in the world is so peacefully disposed as Japan 
at present. Since the Washington Conference the 
whole people of Japan have disarmed spiritually. 


{ 93 I 


— 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


A country which was profoundly martial has come 
to turn her back upon everything military. Thus, | 
Japan has carried out a reduction of armaments 
twice already of her own accord, notwithstanding 
the fact that other powers were bent upon piling 
up armaments. Although the Minister of War de- 
clares that army reduction causes no defect in 
national defence, it is clear that defence will be 
weakened by the extent of reduction. The proposed 
military training of students is presumably for the 
purpose of making up for this defect. Politicians 
who are blind to the trend of world-affairs and 
some professors and students are opposed to the 
military training scheme. 

“Few peoples are so peacefully disposed, per- 
haps idiotically so, as the Japanese. And yet, 
Japan is an object of wide foreign misunderstand- 
ing. What, then, 1s the cause of this misunderstand- 
ing? In my opinion, four causes may be given. The 
first cause is the Sino-Japanese War, which Japan 
was obliged to wage for self-defence. The second is 
the Russo-Japanese War, which was forced upon 
Japan. Before taking up arms against Russia, 
Japan had made concession on concession and 
pocketed one insult after another. The third is the 
Twenty-one Demands, or what is left of them. 
There are only two demands left out of twenty-one, 


[ 94 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


and these two demands are both essential for main- 
taining peace in the Far East. The last is the 
Siberian expedition, which was opposed by public 
opinion in this country, by some members of the 
Diplomatic Advisory Council, and by some of the 
governmnent authorities at the time, but which 
Japan was obliged to undertake in compliance 
with the Allied demand. When once the expedition 
was undertaken seven thousand troops were found 
inadequate, and the force had to be increased con- 
siderably. The withdrawal of large forces naturally, 
took much time, and delays were occasioned cul- 
minating in the creation of misunderstandings in 
foreign minds. If Japan can rightly be denounced 
as an aggressive country because she fought two 
wars of self-defence, committed a diplomatic 
blunder once, and sent an expedition to Siberia in 
obedience to the Allied demand, what power can 
escape the same accusation? Had Japan had ag- 
gressive designs, she would not have let slip the 
many opportunities she has had for carrying them 
out—opportunities which presented themselves 
very often during the war. As a matter of fact, the 
Japanese government and people did what the 
geographical position of their ocuntry could permit 
for the Allied cause, and Japan’s distinguished 
services are appreciatively noted in a book written 


1 95 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


by no less person than Mr. Winston Churchill, the 
present British Chancellor of the Exchequer, who | 
was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time. 
“The friendly powers whom Japan did her best 
to help in their time of exhaustion are now recov- 
ered from their war wounds, and they now stand 
four-square on their own solid bases; while, on the 
other hand, Japan is reduced to great distress 
financially. The great earthquake-fire consumed 
in forty-eight hours one-tenth of Japan’s wealth, 
and it is expected that the process of rehabilitation 
will take scores of years. How can Japan in her 
present exhausted state ever adopt an aggressive 
policy toward countries who have fully recovered 
from the effects of the war? The idea is simply pre- 
posterous. I therefore most sincerely regret that 
the foreign powers are still obsessed by these ab- 
surd misconceptions. This deplorable state of 
things is, I believe, due to the absolute incompe- 
tence of the Intelligence Department, which was 
created for the express purpose of dispelling foreign 
misunderstandings. Japan, Britain, and America 
are the three most healthy countries of the world. 
I think I can say without exaggeration that it was 
owing to the healthy existence of these powers that 
the world has hitherto been immune from bol- 
shevisation. These powers are barriers against the 


[ 96 } 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


bolshevisation of the world. If by any chance a 
serious collision should occur among these coun- 
tries the world’s civilisation will go down in ruins.” 

In replying to the attack, the Foreign Minister 
said: 


Count Soyeshima referred to Japan’s pacifism, and sug- 
gested that the Intelligence Department in the Foreign Office 
was not properly fulfilling the mission for which it had been 
created. As everybody knows, Japan pursued a policy of ex- 
clusion for several centuries, and when, after that long period 
of exclusion she took her place among the nations of the world, 
she found that she lived in an age in which the strong preyed 
on the weak, and that imperialism, militarism, and the prin- 
ciples of aggression and territorial aggrandisement were in 
vogue everywhere. Japan’s position among the countries de- 
voted to such principles was, indeed, very perilous and in- 
secure. This brought home to her the need of providing her- 
self with sufficient strength to defend herself. She therefore set 
about the building of her army and navy. Subsequently she 
went through two great wars, the Sino-Japanese and the 
Russo-Japanese wars. One thing which caused the gravest 
anxiety to the Japanese government and people in those days 
was how the safety of the Empire could be preserved and how 
the national existence could be maintained. Nobody dreamt of 
adopting an aggressive policy toward any other country. As 
for foreign countries, they fully understood Japan’s attitude 
in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, and took a 
sympathetic view of her position. No criticism or accusation 
whatever was then levelled at her by foreign critics as an ag- 
gressive country. About the close of the world-war, or, about 


{ 97 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the time the Peace Conference was called, foreign misunder- 
standing and misgiving about Japan’s true intentions began, 
and there was a sudden growth of pernicious propaganda 
against her. Canards alleging Japan’s aggressive designs upon 
China found vigorous circulation about that time. Notwith- 
standing the fact that Japan’s attitude in the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese wars was neither misconstrued nor un- 
favorably criticised at the time of the outbreak of these wars, 
criticisms began to appear suggesting that those wars were 
fought by Japan for aggressive purposes. I do not care to go 
this time into the question of why or by whom such mis- 
chievous propaganda was put into circulation. Nor do I desire 
to make any public statement regarding these points. In any 
case, we were accused of things of which we were entirely inno- 
cent. To take a fair and dispassionate view of things, it may 
be that the Japanese government in the past made a number 
of diplomatic blunders. The foreign policy which I am now 
pursuing may not be quite satisfactory to you. But I firmly 
believe that no diplomatic action in the past was actuated by 
ageressive motives. Fortunately, since the Washington Con- 
ference the anti-Japanese propaganda deliberately engineered 
has been fast subsiding. 

What particularly embarrasses us is not pernicious anti- 
Japanese propaganda, but a lack of knowledge on the part of 
foreigners about Japan’s true intentions. It is due to their 
ignorance of the national conditions of Japan. Many un- 
founded reports have hitherto been circulated because of the 
lack of true understanding about Japan’s attitude. We have 
no intention of setting propaganda against propaganda, for I 
am of opinion that propaganda warfare is an out-of-date 
practice. 


{ 98 J 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


From the quotations I have made from the two 
speeches of Baron Shidehara, Japan’s policy not 
only toward America but toward the other powers 
is quite clear. And with regard to the immigration 
question, as the Foreign Minister said, all that we 
can do is to rely upon that sense of justice which 
kindled American independence and which still 
continues to inspire the minds of the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the great American people. Japan 
has never asked for permission to send an unre- 
stricted number of immigrants. All that she asks 
for is equal treatment with the European countries, 
that is to say, the right to send a certain number 
of immigrants on the quota basis, namely, one 
hundred and forty-six per annum. 

Before I sit down I should like to read the 
concluding portion of an interview I gave to the 
Fapan Times shortly before I left Japan: 

“America and Japan, facing each other across 
the Pacific Ocean, must unite their best efforts to 
promote peace and tranquillity in the regions of the 
Pacific. We must dispel mutual suspicion and mis- 
understanding, and we must promote mutual re- 
spect and confidence which are essential for friend- 
ly co-operation. Though the forms of the two gov- 
ernments may differ, yet the ideals of the two 
peoples are one. The love of liberty, peace, and 


1 99 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


progress is inherent in the hearts of the two 
peoples. Japan has had her history of twenty-five 
centuries and the continuous succession of the 
imperial family, so unique in the history of man- 
kind. Successive emperors took the reins of the 
government, and the people have always remained 
the foundations and loyal bulwark of the country. 
She has had a monarchical form of government, but 
her history has never seen tyrants; and the Japa- 
nese people have always enjoyed a large measure of 
freedom. Today, we have a constitutional mon- 
archy which is similar to that of Great Britain. In 
the form and fundamental principles of government, 
there is no difference between the governments of 
England and Japan. On the other hand, from the 
landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth to the present 
day, America has been the vanguard of liberty and 
justice; and she has been our friend for more than 
half-a-century. Hence, the friendly co-operation 
of America and Japan together with Great Britain 
will mean a great asset for peace in the Pacific. 
“There are no issues between America and 
Japan that need the arbitrament of arms for settle- 
ment. If the jingoes of our countries succeed in 
bringing our two nations into collision, we shall 
have to see international chaos, revolution, and 
the destruction of our civilization. However, I 


[ 100 ] 


JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 


have confidence in the sound common sense of our 
two peoples and I know that they will not be 
easily swayed by the agitations of jingoes and 
demagogues who are seeking to embroil us into a 
scramble. 

“So long as the American people are led by the 
noble ideals of so grand a figure as Abraham 
Lincoln, we can depend upon them and trust them, 
and co-operate with them. While I am going to 
the University of Chicago to deliver a series of 
lectures, I have the other important mission ,of 
making my pilgrimage to the tomb of the Great 
Emancipator at Springfield, Illinois, to lay a 
wreath of flowers in order to pay my homage to 
the memory of the ‘Saviour of his country.’ Lin- 
coln has been the source of my inspiration.” 


{ ror } 





CHINA, THE FAR EAST, AND 
THE UNITED STATES 


By P. W. Kuo 





I 


POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL 
TENDENCIES IN MODERN CHINA 


The problems of the Far East are receiving 
greater attention today in this country than was 
the case a decade ago. This is one of the clear evi- 
dences that the American people fully realize that 
in the coming great era of the Pacific the Far Hast 
is to play an important part. The widespread in- 
terest in China and in her problems is particularly 
noticeable and significant. 

Some are interested in China because they real- 
ize that the Chinese civilization represents one of 
the greatest civilizations of the world, from the 
point of view of art, of literature, and of philos- 
ophy, and that this ancient civilization, having 
been brought face to face with the civilization of 
the West through many points of contact, is bound 
to be of fundamental importance in the develop- 
ment of the world’s new civilization. Others take 
an interest in China from the points of view of 
industry and of commerce, realizing that China is 
one of the greatest markets as well as one of the 
greatest reservoirs of raw material that the world 


{ 105 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


has ever seen. There are also those who find in © 
China’s internal problems and foreign relations 
abundant material for interesting and profitable 
study. Without inquiring further into the motives 
underlying the growing interest in the study of 
China, it is evident that a careful and sympathetic 
study of her conditions and problems by the Ameri- 
can people will enable them to have a better under- 
standing of her conditions and will pave the way 
for a closer relationship and more sympathetic co- 
operation. Such a movement is quite in keeping 
with the noble spirit and high ideal which prompt- 
ed the establishment of the Harris Foundation in 
this University under whose auspices this Institute 
of Far Eastern Affairs is being held, and I consider 
it a great privilege to have been invited to have an 
humble share in this noble undertaking, namely, 
the promotion of better understanding among 
nations. 

Confucius once said: “To review what is old 
and to learn something new, that is the duty of the 
scholar.” In the spirit of this teaching, we should 
review something of the past history of a nation 
before studying her present conditions. But in the 
treatment of China, this would be too difficult a 
task to undertake, having, as she does, a history 
extending over four thousand years. Evena review 


{ 106 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


of the important happenings of modern times 
would occupy more space and time than we can 
afford. We are obliged, therefore, to make a brief 
statement of her immediate past in order that the 
present may receive more adequate attention. 
The Chinese people, after having been governed 
under a monarchy for over forty centuries and hav- 
ing been influenced by the lessons learned in her 
contact with other nations, decided in 1911, after 
a successful revolution against the old régime, to 
adopt the republican form of government and start 
on her way to a modern democracy. As the path 
leading to democracy is often thorny in character, 
so during the fourteen years that followed there 
have been much unrest and disturbance in the life 
of this newborn republic. 

In brief, there have been eight changes in the 
presidency; two unsuccessful attempts at the res- 
toration of monarchy; repeated dissolutions of the 
parliament; at one time or another some form of 
opposing government has been established in Can- 
ton, with two parliaments sitting at the same time, 
each claiming constitutionality; and now and then 
military and political parties have found cause to 
group themselves in one way or another either to 
declare independence from the central government 
or to wage war one with the other. The latest de- 


{ 107 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


velopments are still fresh in the minds of the public. 
In September last the greatest conflict of the period 
was waged between the forces of the Chihli party, 
on the one hand, and those of the so-called Triple 
Alliance, on the other. The Chihli party was the 
dominant military party then in power, while the 
Triple Alliance, consisting of Fengtien, Chekiang, 
and the southern government in Canton, was the 
group not satisfied with the central government. 
While the conflict was on, Feng Yu-hsiang, one of 
the generals under Wu Pei-fu, the leader of the 
Chihli party affected a coup d’état resulting in the 
defeat of Wu Pei-fu and the collapse of the Chihli 
forces. With this turn of events, President Tsao 
Kun, whose election was considered illegal because 
of the use of bribery, was made a prisoner and in 
order to remove the last possibility of the restora- 
tion of monarchy, the boy-emperor was expelled 
from his old palace. 

Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, the veteran soldier and 
leader of the Anfu party, was considered the man 
of the hour, and was made the chief executive of - 
the provisional government to meet the emergency. 
He proposed to call two conferences to settle the 
perplexing problems of the day, the Rehabilitation 
Conference and the Citizens’ Conference. The 
former was called according to promise, and al- 


{ 108 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


though its achievements failed to come up to the 
expectation of the people, it succeeded in formulat- 
ing a plan for the calling of the Citizens’ Confer- 
ence, which is expected to revise the existing con- 
stitution for China, upon the basis of which a per- 
manent and constitutional government may be or- 
ganized. This state of affairs naturally has had its 
evil effects. The central government is made un- 
stable; its financial condition is more or less pre- 
carious; the mandates of the president oftentimes 
Recamie ineffective; and banditry becomes rampant 
in certain parts of ae country. All these should be 
speedily and effectively remedied. It is but natural 
that some observers of China become discouraged 
over the situation. Some of the more pessimistic 
ones become impatient and begin to raise the ques- 
tion as to whether or not China is actually ready for 
a republic. Others go so far as to think that the 
events of the past few years seem to show that the 
Chinese people are not able to manage their na- 
tional affairs and that some form of international 
control over certain phases of her administration 
would be desirable if not inevitable. 

Such misgivings would have been entirely justi- 
fiable were it not for the fact that the situation in 
China is not as deplorable as it appears on the sur- 
face. As every dark cloud has its silver lining, so 


[| 109 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the situation in China has its bright aspects. To 
begin with, one has to acknowledge that the task of 
creating a modern democratic government is by no 
means an easy one and certainly requires a con- 
siderable amount of time to do it well, especially in 
the case of China, a nation possessing more than 
one-quarter of the human race, covering a territory 
more extensive than the combined territories of 
the United States and Central America, and having 
a history and a tradition richer than any other 
ancient civilization. The fact that confusion and 
disorder have more or less existed during the four- 
teen years since the proclamation of the republic 
should not be taken as an evidence that her people 
are unfit for democracy and have no possibility of 
becoming a united and constitutional state. What 
modern democracies in Europe or America did 
not pass through initial stages of internal discord, 
marked by revolutions, bitter parliamentary dis- 
cussions, attempted secession of provinces, and 
civil war? True it is, China is expected to profit 
by the experience of other nations and shorten 
her period of experimentation, but “Rome was not 
built in a day.’”’ A modern democracy cannot be 
created overnight by revolution, but rather 
through the slow process of evolution. 

Moreover, the political troubles of this period of 


{ 110 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


transition and readjustment, while fraught with 
dangers and causing a certain amount of suffering 
among the people, have not had as serious an 
effect upon China as similar troubles would have 
had in a Western country. So far, the political life 
of China has never been highly organized, and to 
a certain extent this is true today. It is a weakness 
but at the same time a source of strength. Hence 
the troubles of recent years, though they loom 
large in the chronicles of the day, do not actually 
reach very deeply into the life of the Chinese 
people. This accounts for the singular fact that, in 
spite of all the political upheavals and contro- 
versies, China and her people have made note- 
worthy progress. 

In certain instances the unfortunate happen- 
ings have been either greatly misrepresented or 
misunderstood. Take, for example, the fact that 
the recent civil wars in China have given some peo- 
ple the erroneous impression that the Chinese 
people are divided and that there is no unity 
among them. As a matter of fact, whatever divi- 
sion there is in China, it is confined to the military 
and political leaders and their mercenary soldiers. 
So far as the people are concerned, they are abso- 
lutely united. The old demarcation of provincial- 
ism is greatly weakened, and the spirit of unity has 


{ 111 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


never been as strong as it is today. Thus we find 
that national organizations in education, in com- 
merce, in industry, and in other interests have 
come into existence, in which representatives from 
all parts of the country are united in their endeavor 
to carry out programs calculated to benefit the 
whole country. 

The underlying causes of the political unrest of 
this period are many and varied. On the one hand, 
there have been repeated struggles against the res- 
toration of monarchy, the continuous fighting for 
a constitution and for constitutionality; and, on 
the other hand, there have been rivalry among 
military leaders, party politics, personal ambition, 
and other selfish interests. A certain amount of 
international complication also comes into play in 
some of the struggles and contentions. The illicit 
import and sale of arms and ammunition on the 
part of foreign nations give encouragement to 
and make possible frequent outbreaks of warfare 
among military leaders of rival factions. Aside 
from these causes, there have been also certain 
definite political principles in which the military 
and political leaders believe and for which they 
have been willing to struggle and sacrifice. First, 
there are those who believe that China can only be 
welded together by a strong central government 


{ 112 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


and that her unification can only be affected 
through military force. Marshal Wu Pei-fu, the 
defeated leader of the Chihli party, is a strong 
believer in this principle, and this belief is even 
shared by certain foreign powers having interests 
in China for reasons which are not far to seek. The 
supporters of this idea would like to see a strong 
man at the head of the government and would give 
him strong powers to cope with the situation. Then 
there are those who believe that the varying needs 
of different parts of China can best be met through 
the establishment of a federal system of govern- 
ment, allotting to the central authority the con- 
duct of foreign affairs, communications, and other 
functions which concern the nation as a whole, and 
leaving all other matters to provincial autonomy 
and control. This movement, which is gaining in 
popularity, has made some progress, as is shown in 
the adoption of provincial constitutions on the 
part of certain more progressive provinces, such as 
Chekiang and Hunan, and it is likely to be favor- 
ably considered during the coming Citizens’ Con- 
ference. 

There is a third movement, that of the Na- 
tional Patriotic League, headed by Hsu Chien, 
which has been urging the adoption of a system by 
which the central government would be conducted 


{ 113 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


by a central commission of one hundred persons, 
the members of which would be elected by the 
Citizens’ Conference, which would itself take the 
place of the parliament as the legislative body of 
the nation, while the provincial governments would 
be conducted by a provincial central commission 
composed of nine persons elected by the Pro- 
vincial Citizens’ Conferences, which would take the 
place of legislative bodies for the provinces. The 
chairman of the commission in each case would be 
the chief executive, thus doing away with the office 
of the president and with that of the governor. 
The fundamental idea of this commission plan of 
government is to secure for the people direct 
participation in and control of the affairs of the 
government. This plan, which is unique in char- 
acter, received certain suggestions from the con- 
stitution of the Union of Soviet Republics and from 
that of Switzerland. Inasmuch as this movement 
is still in its infancy, and the practicability of the 
working of the system is yet to be proved, it is 
considered as being radical, and the possibility of 
its adoption is uncertain and doubtful. 

In addition to these general political tendencies 
which have been the cause of much political un- 
rest, there have been other movements that are 
vital toward the solution of China’s perplexing 


{ 134 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


problems. One of them is to separate the civil au- 
thority from that of the military, or to prevent 
militarists from interfering with civil matters. 
Since Yuan Shih-ka1’s time China has been more 
or less under a military régime. The policy of the 
central government has been greatly influenced by 
militarists in power. In most of the provinces there 
are two governors—one military and the other 
civil. Nominally, the military governor is in charge 
of military affairs, while the civil governor has 
charge of civil affairs, such as finance, education, 
and industry. As a matter of fact, the military 
governor often overstretches his power and inter- 
feres with civil matters especially in time of dis- 
turbance. This is also true with those supermili- 
tary governors appointed to take charge of a group 
of provinces. In a few provinces the powers of two 
offices are given to one man. Another movement 
is to abolish altogether the system of provincial 
military governors which has been more or less 
responsible for the growing weakness of the central 
government and the conflicts between rival fac- 
tions. In principle, the office of these military 
governors has been abolished, but the change so far 
has been more or less nominal, and much is yet left 
to be done. 

There is another movement in which the people 


{115 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


are greatly concerned, namely, the reduction of the 
existing army, whose maintenance forms a very 
heavy burden upon the national treasury. Accord- 
ing to the report submitted by the ministry of war 
to the Rehabilitation Conference, China had, dur- 
ing IgIg, an army numbering between 1,400,000 
and 1,500,000, and spent $260,000,000 (Mex.) 
which represents more than half of the total budget 
of the year, which was $490,000,000 (Mex.). For 
the solution of this difficult problem a number of 
schemes are being contemplated. Some advocate 
that the superfluous soldiers should be utilized to 
build national highways good for motor traffic, as 
has been done in certain provinces such as Cheki- 
ang and Shansi. Others urge the establishment of 
more industrial plants, making possible the turning 
of disbanded soldiers into useful artisans and 
craftsmen. As a preparation for this, vocational 
education has been introduced in the armies of 
progressive military leaders. The use of soldiers for 
conservancy work is another solution that has been 
urged. But perhaps the solution which is meeting 
with the greatest popular favor is that of making 
use of the soldiers for colonization work on the 
western frontier, in Tibet, Mongolia, and certain 
northwestern and northeastern provinces and 
special districts, as is being advocated by Feng 


{ 116 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


Yu-hsiang. Meanwhile, the government has made 
known its decision to reduce the army to 500,000 
soldiers and the budget of the army and navy to 
$150,000,000 (Mex.), while a military rehabilita- 
tion commission is being organized to deal with the 
problem. 

- From earlier references made one can draw the 
conclusion that the political parties in China, as in 
other countries, represent an important factor in 
her political life. Thus far the political power is 
not held alternately by two great national parties, 
as is the case in the United States, but is exercised 
by the dominant group of parties in league with the 
dominant military faction which happens to be in 
power. This constitutes one of the sources of 
China’s political instability, for parliamentary gov- 
ernment has attained its highest success usually in 
those countries where political power is held alter- 
nately by two great national parties. Moreover, 
the existing political organizations, whether in the 
- form of a party, a faction, or a club, have been lack- 
ing in stability and in definite policy. The best 
organized party, one with a definite platform, 1s 
known as the Kuomintang, or “People’s party,” 
which, however, upon the recent death of Sun Yat- 
sen, was left for the time being without a leader. 
Meanwhile, a number of new parties have recently 


{ 117 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


come into existence or are in the process of forma- 
tion, to add their influence to the sum total of 
political life. 

After this cursory survey of the political ten- 
dencies and movements in China, we shall now 
turn our attention to her economic life and see 
what factors are working for change and what new 
problems have been brought into existence. One 
of the important factors affecting the economic life 
is communications, which have been greatly ex- 
tended. All parts of China have been connected 
by telegraph. The postal system has extended its 
facilities, and 1s now maintaining relations with 
foreign countries adequate to meet all require- 
ments. This system has in recent years reached 
such a high degree of efficiency that at the Wash- 
ington Conference the four powers having for- 
eign postal agencies decided to withdraw them 1m- 
mediately. The development of railways has not 
been as rapid as one would expect, owing to inter- 
nal political unrest and international complica- 
tions. But it is the plan of the government to de- 
velop the existing and future railways in accord- 
ance with a general program that will meet the 
economic, industrial, and commercial requirements 
of China. Plans for the construction of long- 
distance telephone and air services between princi- 


{ 118 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


pal cities have been made, but have been held up, 
owing to political changes and international com- 
plications. 

Since 1921 there has been 1n existence in China 
a movement known as the Good Roads Move- 
ment, which is being advocated by the National 
Good Roads Association. Within the short period 
of three years, the Association has accomplished 
results of permanent value which justify its con- 
tinued existence and popular support. The move- 
ment is attracting nation-wide attention. It has 
now over twenty branch associations and ten 
thousand members. It has enlisted as its support- 
ers many leaders in various walks of life. Even the 
militarists are interested in it, and some of them 
have been making use of their soldiers as road- 
builders. Already some 12,934 miles of good roads 
have been built through the direct influence of the 
Association. As a natural consequence, the newly 
built roads have occasioned the establishment of 
many motor-car companies and the importation of 
a large number of motor busses from foreign coun- 
tries, especially from the United States of America. 
The extension and improvement of these various 
ways of communication, together with the intro- 
duction of scientific method and mechanical power 
to ways of production, will hasten the development 


[ 119 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


of China’s natural resources, the progress of her 
commerce and industry, and the betterment of her 
economic conditions. 

The problem of financial rehabilitation, which 
has an important bearing upon China’s economic 
life, is, to say the least, as perplexing as the problem 
of military rehabilitation, involving as it does the 
disbandment of troops, reorganization of the 
revenues of the central government and the prov- 
inces, the abolition of /ikin, the system of internal 
taxation, and the increasing of customs revenues. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that although the 
problem has been tackled by the Financial Re- 
habilitation Commission and by the recent Re- 
habilitation Conference, no comprehensive plan 
has yet been devised, and the question has been 
left for further consideration to a new commission 
that is being organized. Owing to the growing 
strength of the militarists and other reasons, the 
provinces have the tendency to withhold from 
Peking funds which should be remitted. This is 
responsible for the inability of the central govern- 
ment to fulfil some of its obligations, and for other 
embarrassments which it has been obliged to face. 
This state of affairs naturally has given cause for 
alarm to foreigners having financial interests in 
China. Some of them with good intentions suggest 


{ 120 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


that some sort of “Dawes Plan for China” be 
organized for the purpose of reorganizing her 
finances. As a matter of fact, the financial diffi- 
culty in China is not as serious as it appears on 
the surface to be. To quote Mr. Julean Arnold, the 
American Commercial Attaché at Peking: 

China is financially solvent and sound, as the country has 
never departed from a specie basis and has not, during the 
period of war or since, suffered from inflated currency. China’s 
outstanding obligations are no greater than the funded debt 
of the city of New York. Its per capita foreign debt is about 
$2.50, which is very low, especially in the light of China’s 


wonderful resources in man-power and raw materials. 


We are inclined to share the views of Mr. Arnold. 
The financial trouble in China is not economic but 
political. There is every reason to believe that as 
soon as a stable government is maintained, her 
financial status will be greatly improved. 

That China is bound to become one of the 
greatest industrial nations of the world is a fore- 
gone conclusion, possessing as she does an abund- 
ant supply of coal, iron, man-power, and other nec- 
essary elements of a great industrial nation. But 
that she has been able to make great strides in this 
direction, in spite of her internal unrest and po- 
litical instability, reveals the strength as well as 
the resources of her people. While exact statistics 


{ 121 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


are not available, it is safe to say that there are at 
least fourteen hundred modern factories now oper- 
ating under Chinese management with every indi- 
cation of their further development. 

This rapid growth of modern industry in China, 
affecting as it does the social and economic as well 
as the political life of the Chinese people, has cre- 
ated new problems pressing for immediate solution. 
Although modern industry is still in its infancy, the 
workers in industry, directly or indirectly influ- 
enced by the modern socialistic views of Marx, 
Lenin, and others, are rapidly developing a class 
consciousness and, as a result, hundreds of labor 
unions have been organized to promote and to pro- 
tect their interests. Already many labor strikes 
have taken place, resulting in the increase of wages 
and the giving of other privileges to laborers, and 
it may be said that some of the labor unions are the 
direct result of successful strikes. 

With a view to mitigating the evils of modern 
industrialism, and in order to avoid any serious 
clash between the employer and the employee, thus 
retarding the progress of industry, thinking people 
in China have begun to make serious efforts to im- 
prove existing labor conditions through direct and 
accurate studies of labor conditions, through the 
encouragement of welfare work among the labor- 


{ 122 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


ers and through agitation for better legislation. Al- 
ready some of the more progressive leaders in in- 
dustry have taken steps to improve the existing 
order through the introduction of shorter hours of 
labor, better sanitary conditions, and profit-shar- 
ing schemes. A beginning has been made in con- 
ducting welfare work among the workmen. Thus 
one of the modern industries in Shanghai known'as 
the Commercial Press has provision for pensions, 
maternity allowances, medical care, educational 
facilities, and recreational and social amenities for 
its staff, while a considerable amount is set aside 
out of its profits to be distributed as a bonus. And 
in compliance with the needs of the time, the Min- 
istry of Agriculture and Commerce promulgated in 
1923 two sets of regulations, one for factory-work- 
ers and the other for miners, which represent the 
beginning of government legislation in industry. It 
remains to be seen whether China, profiting by the 
experience of the West and taking the necessary 
precautions in due time, will be able to usher in the 
impending industrial revolution with a minimum 
of suffering and a maximum of human happiness. 

For the time being, the most important factor 
in the economic life of China is agriculture, upon 
which she has always depended for her economic 
stability and prosperity. Its importance can be 


{ 123 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


realized when we recall that the farming population 
in China is as great as three hundred million, repre- 
senting over 80 per cent of her total population. 
The fact that 75 per cent of the goods exported con- 
sists in agricultural products shows their impor- 
tance to foreign trade. The success of modern in- 
dustry will depend largely upon the quantity and 
quality of the raw material produced by agricul- 
ture. For China to neglect agriculture, therefore, 
would be to ignore the welfare of the majority of 
her people and to overlook the chief source of her 
economic strength. Realizing the importance of 
this fact, the National Southeastern University, 
the Peking Agricultural College, the Canton Chris- 
tian College, the University of Nanking, and other 
government and private agencies have been intro- 
ducing modern scientific methods in agriculture, 
achieving results in the improvement of cotton, of 
wheat, and of silk which show the possibility of 
raising the whole economic structure of society to 
a higher plane. 

The commercial aspect of China’s economic life 
is Closely related to her industrial and agricultural 
life. In spite of political disturbances, foreign trade 
has advanced steadily every year during the past 
twenty years, each succeeding year’s return being 
in advance of its predecessors. The trade of China 


{ 124 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


in 1923 was 1,676,320,303 Hai Kwan taels, which 
represents an increase of 76,378,720 Hai Kwan taels 
over the preceding year’s total. During the past 
year conditions in China have been most unfavor- 
able for trade, and it was expected that trade 
statistics would reveal extreme economic depres- 
sion. But facts proved to be to the contrary. The 
customs figures show that the export and import 
duties collected in 1924 total 169,000,000, or 
6,000,000 Hai Kwan taels ahead of all previous 
records. The anomaly of a rising customs revenue 
in adverse times can be easily explained. China ts 
so great that although much of the country may be 
paralyzed by disasters of various kinds, the popula- 
tion of the remainder is so increasingly prosperous 
that the volume of trade is maintained. Whether 
or not this is a correct explanation, the surprising 
fact remains that, in spite of discouragement, the 
volume of business has not been affected, and the 
national wealth is slowly but surely increasing. 
Given a good government and the maintenance of 
better civil order, there is every assurance that 
China will rise to a high economic level. 

The impression is abroad that the political and 
economic unrest in China makes her a fertile soil 


t A tael is a unit of account reckoned at approximately seventy- 
five cents gold. 


{ 125 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


for the spread of bolshevism and communism. 
This is true to a very limited extent. It is true that 
the apostles of destruction have found their way 
into China as in other countries, that they have 
won the sympathy of certain radical elements dis- 
satisfied with the present state of things, and that 
they are utilizing every opportunity and capitaliz- 
ing every disturbance to their advantage. They 
are, however, being strongly opposed by the 
Chinese people in general, who hold the firm belief 
that both bolshevism and communism are undesir- 
able and impracticable in China as they are against 
the psychology and tradition of the Chinese people. 
At least the present government is taking stringent 
measures toward the suppression of the propa- 
ganda. The recent disturbance in China, which 
originated through a strike in a Japanese mill, and 
which has since been directed toward the improve- 
ment of conditions under the municipal council of 
the Shanghai settlement and the revision of the so- 
called unequal treaties, is an expression of the de- 
sire of new China to realize her legitimate ambi- 
tions, and is essentially a patriotic and nationalistic 
movement which is gaining in strength. 

The changes in the political and economic life of 
China have brought about changes in her social 
life. Under the old régime the family formed the 


{ 126 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


social, industrial, and political unit in Chinese 
society. In modern times the growth of modern 
industry, the development of ways of communica- 
tion, and the introduction of new ideas of personal 
liberty have had a tendency to weaken home ties 
and thus undermine the very foundation of the 
social agency which has been an effective force'in 
the life of the Chinese people for many centuries. 
The demands of modern times too, called for direct 
participation in political and economic life on the 
part of the individual instead of through the me- 
dium of the family. This tendency toward disin- 
tegration of the family, in turn, is being remedied 
by the creation of other agencies of co-operative 
effort—social, economic, and political—consistent 
with the larger conception of the individual’s 
relationship to his community and his country. 

As a result of the changing conditions and con- 
ceptions of society, the old standards of morality 
are being questioned, while new standards are in 
the process of formation. During this period of 
transition one sometimes faces the difficulty of not 
knowing what standards to follow and with which 
to judge the right conduct of living. 

In modern China public opinion has become a 
very strong factor in all political and social move- 
ments. Formerly, the public in general paid little 


{ 127 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


or no attention to affairs of the state, believing as 
they did that as long as they were not in govern- 
ment service they were not supposed to participate 
in its affairs. In recent years through the spread of 
modern education, the rapid growth of the modern 
press, and the influence of the student movement, 
through sufferings and humiliations, there have 
been developed a new patriotism and a new na- 
tionalism, and as a result this traditional attitude 
of indifference is giving way to an active interest in 
problems of government. Hence we see educational 
associations and chambers of commerce vieing 
with one another in making their influences felt in 
the determination of national and local problems. 
Truly the voice of the people in China is being 
heard in the government, and is becoming increas- 
ingly an important factor in the solution of her 
national problems. It is generally admitted that 
public opinion was the most decisive factor in the 
founding of the Chinese republic, in the downfall 
of Yuan Skih-kai, in the failure of the attempts to 
restore monarchy, and in other political and social 
movements of the day. This is one of the hopeful 
signs of the times, and its importance in the de- 
velopment of a democratic government can never 
be overemphasized. It becomes a problem to new 
China to educate and develop further this public 


{ 128 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


opinion so that it will become an effective and con- 
structive force for good in government and 1n com- 
munity life. 

Both a cause and a result of the weakening 
influence of the family is the change in the status of 
women. In modern China the sphere of women’s 
activity is no longer confined to the home or'to 
the field as it was in the days past, but it has been 
greatly extended. Their position in industry has 
been firmly established, and is becoming an im- 
portant factor in economic life. Those who have 
the opportunity of education have found their way 
into the ranks of nurses, doctors, and teachers. The 
business career is now open to them. In Shanghai 
there exists a modern bank organized by women 
and operated by women but catering to both men 
and women. Coeducation has been introduced into 
China with success, and women have an equal op- 
portunity with men in the pursuit of education. A 
special law school for women has been established 
in Shanghai. Educated women are taking an active 
interest in social service and in the affairs of 
government, and are becoming an increasingly im- 
portant factor in modern society. 

Education as a social process is naturally influ- 
enced by and in turn exerts its influence upon the 
political as well as the economic changes of the 


{ 129 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


day. Indeed, in China, more than in any other 
country, education underlies the solution of all her 
problems. It is the most potent factor working for 
China’s unification and regeneration. Such being 
the case, we cannot help being optimistic when we 
witness that in spite of her troubles China has 
made steady progress in modern education. The 
modern educational system, adopted in the first 
year of the Chinese republic (1911), was thorough- 
ly reorganized in 1922, and is a decided advance 
over the old system, quite in keeping with world- 
movements in educational theory and practice and 
with the changing ideals and demands of modern 
China. The number of educational institutions has 
greatly increased, numbering, in 1923, 125 colleges 
and universities, 385 normal schools and institutes, 
547 middle schools, 603 vocational schools, 10,236 
higher primary schools, and 167,076 lower primary 
schools, while the enrolment in these modern 
schools increased from 2,933, 387 in 1912 to 6,615,- 
772 in 1923, representing an increase of over 100 
per cent. China has introduced a phonetic script 
of thirty-nine characters to facilitate the spread of 
education and the unification of the spoken lan- 
guage. There has been a movement to substitute 
the spoken tongue, the vernacular, in place of the 
literary language as a medium of expression, similar 


[ 130 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


to the movement to substitute modern languages 
for Latin which took place in Europe several 
centuries ago with all its significant influence. 

But the most significant progress lies in the 
fundamental change in the ideals of education, 
which in turn has resulted in the improvement jp 
method and content of education. One of the 
changes lies in the emphasis on the social aim in 
education. Under the old régime, education em- 
phasized the ideal of individual culture, the health 
of the inner man. Now education is being re- 
garded as a process to liberate men and women 
from selfish interests, and social efficiency has be- 
come a watchword. There is much that can be said 
in favor of this change from the old ideal, for to 
secure genuine democracy we must have citizens 
who are socially responsible with a devotion to 
public ends and an interest in public affairs. 

With this changing conception of education, 
there has come a change in method and content of 
education. The ideal of social responsibility 1s 
being held up before the students. Student govern- 
ment and social service are being encouraged. In- 
deed, it is this new element in modern education 
which is responsible for the existence in China of 
the student movement, and it is this that explains 
the reason why the students are taking such a 


{ 131 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


prominent part in the national life of China. 
Modern education has developed in them a strong 
sense of social responsibility, a desire to improve 
social, political, and industrial conditions. For this 
reason, they are most sensitive to social evils and, 
in a way, they are the reformers of China. They 
create public opinion. Their efforts have already 
been rewarded with success. They wield an influ- 
ence the like of which is not found in any other 
country and which is bound to grow and to exert a 
strong influence in the upbuilding of new China. 
It is true that sometimes the students misuse their 
power, and sometimes are led astray, but on the 
whole, it is one of the hopeful signs of the time, 
and should not be taken as an expression of bol- 
shevistic influence, as is sometimes done. 

Then there is a tendency to emphasize freedom 
of education. For many centuries, the intellectual 
life of China was fettered to certain accepted 
standards of ideas and interpretations. But under 
the influence of a new impulse and a new attitude 
produced by direct contact with the ideas and 
methods of the modern world, there have come a 
revolution against authority and the rise of a 
critical spirit, manifested in the new birth of an 
old civilization, known as the New Thought Move- 
ment, or the Chinese Renaissance. This movement 


{ 132 J 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


calls for a new estimation of traditional values and 
a revision of the old standards. Great changes have 
been thus produced in morals, literature, and social 
customs. In some quarters the tendency has gone 
too far. Instead of trying to revise the old system 
and conserve what has permanent value, there ‘is 
sometimes an almost wholesale condemnation of 
traditional values and canons. The influence of 
this change in the method and content of education 
is seen in the emphasis on the study of the child— 
his interests and instincts—on self-activity or 
initiative, and in the wide introduction of project 
method, of the elective system, and of the Dalton 
Plan, and other means to develop initiative and 
natural interests. 

There is also a tendency in Chinese education to 
place new emphasis upon scientific education as a 
reaction against the old one-sided emphasis on 
spiritual culture, seen in the efforts that are being 
made to improve the methods of teaching science, 
in the application of scientific methods in educa- 
tion as well as in the study of history, philosophy, 
and literature. This is a happy tendency, for in 
the words of Dr. Paul Monroe: “The great need 
in the intellectual life of the Chinese is the intro- 
duction of the scientific mind to modify the phil- 
osophical, speculative and theoretical attitude 


{ 133 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


towards the problems and activities of everyday 
lifters 

Let me mention one more change, namely, the 
tendency to emphasize the vocational aim of educa- 
tion, which is also a reaction against the traditional 
emphasis on spiritual culture. The old Chinese 
education paid little attention to the means of life. 
More importance was attached to the quality of 
life lived than to material self-preservation. Trade 
was held in far greater contempt by Chinese phi- 
losophers than ever it was in the West. Now this 
scale of values is being gradually overturned. 
Material efficiency is being considered as important 
as spiritual culture, or as a necessary basis for 
spiritual culture. This new emphasis on vocational 
training is manifested in the activities of the 
National Association for Vocational Education, 
in the important position given to vocational 
education in the new educational system, and in 
the fact that there were in 1924 no less than 1,353 
schools in China giving vocational courses. 

Thus far I have dwelt on the encouraging as- 
pects of Chinese education. In so doing I am not 
blind to the fact that modern education in China 
is still in its infancy compared with Western 
standards, and great and perplexing problems are 
still waiting to be solved. One of the big problems 


{ 134 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


in modern education is the introduction of com- 
pulsory education. According to the new educa- 
tional system, compulsory education is temporarily 
limited to four years. In 1920 the Ministry of 
Education mapped out certain definite steps for the 
enforcement of compulsory education in accord- 
ance with which education is to be made universal 
by 1928. On account of political disturbances, 
these provisions have not been carried out. The 
province of Shansi, under its able governor, Yen 
Hsi-shan, has however enforced a most effective 
program of compulsory education. Although com- 
plete success has not been achieved, yet the latest 
statistics show that 72 per cent of the children of 
school age are now provided with education. This 
is, however, one of the few bright spots of educa- 
tional advance in China, and the difficulties to be 
overcome are still tremendous. First, the expendi- 
tures for education have to be multiplied many 
fold, and this is not an easy task when the govern- 
ment is finding difficulty in meeting its present 
obligations. Second, a vast number of new schools 
have to be built and equipped. But the greatest 
difficulty lies in the training of the additional 
teachers that are needed to provide for universal 
education. 

Roughly, China has about 40,000,000 children 


1 135 } 


mentary grades. But according to the latest re- 
turns, China has only 123,279 teachers, who are 
now serving the lower elementary schools. More 
than three times as many as the present number 
have to be added, in order to enforce a nation-wide 
compulsory education. There are now 43,846 stu- 
dents in normal schools and institutes which can 
turn out not more than 10,000 teachers every year 
as against the need of 770,000 teachers. 

The removal of illiteracy is another serious edu- 
cational problem in China. Deducting 120,000,000 
children who are either below school age or belong 
to the sphere of compulsory education and 80,000,- 
000 who have spent on an average of three years in 
the old-fashioned Chinese schools from the total 
population, there are about 200,000,000 illiterates 
constituting the problem for popular education to 
solve. The popular-education movement is now 
being pushed by the National Association for the 
Promotion of Popular Education, and is receiving 
nation-wide support. The course of study used 
consists of four readers, based on a vocabulary of 
the thousand most commonly used characters, 
known as “foundation characters.’’ An ordinary 


1 136 J 





= = ee ee Se a Wty Nae ay Pee Dy ae oe DE tn amt | Se ee ee eee: ee De ee re a hs me 


papers, pamphlets, books, and correspondence 
based on this vocabulary, and he will be able to 
express himself by using the same. The four read- 
ers cost twelve cents (Mewx.), which is about six 
cents in American money, so even the poorest can 
afford to pay for them. 

There are three ways to learn the books. First, 
there is the “‘people’s school,” which has a teacher 
who meets his class regularly at definite periods of 
time. Second, there is the “people’s reading circle,” 
which takes the home, the store, etc., as units and 
encourages the literate in the home or in the store 
to teach his own illiterate members. Third, there 
is the “‘people’s question station,” where illiterates 
can stop and ask questions on any points in the 
books which they do not understand. With these 
means these readers have been introduced into 
homes, stores, factories, schools, churches, mon- 
asteries, offices, steamers, prisons, and armies. 
Within two years’ time—in spite of flood, famine, 
and war—the circulation of these readers and other 
series have reached the two million mark. The 
readers are followed by series of booklets on various 
branches of knowledge. Supporters of the popular- 


{ 137 | 





ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


education movement have adopted as their slogan, - 
“the removal of illiteracy in this generation.” This 
is one of the most hopeful signs of the day, for 
democracy cannot succeed in China as long as a 
large percentage of her people remains illiterate. 

_ These are some of the big educational problems 
of China that are fraught with difficulties but are 
full of great possibilities for China’s future. The 
encouraging aspect lies in the fact that these prob- 
lems are being tackled with all seriousness, and a 
good beginning has already been made toward their 
solution; we know that “well begun is half done.” 
Think what it will mean to China, and to the na- 
tions of the world, when her 200,000,000 illiterates 
shall have been educated and their wants in- 
creased! 

There is left to be mentioned one more social 
tendency, namely, an awakened interest in the 
fight against corruption and other social evils. 
When the news was made known that bribery was 
resorted to in the election of Tsao Kun to the 
presidency, there was condemnation on the part of 
intelligent people throughout the republic. The na- 
tional conscience could not tolerate such a dis- 
grace, and naturally there was great rejoicing when 
he was finally ousted from his office. Those mem- 
bers of the parliament who refused to be influenced 


{ 138 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


by monetary considerations received in many 
instances great ovations from the people of their 
native provinces, and all were given seats in the 
recent Rehabilitation Conference as a recognition 
of their honesty and integrity. In the fall of last 
year the movement against opium was launched 
through the establishment of the National Anti- 
Opium Association, and so ready was the response 
that in the course of three months no less than 
seven hundred cities throughout the nation ob- 
served the national Anti-Opium Day, and two 
hundred and thirty centers had organized them- 
selves for a fight against the planting of opium. The 
petition sent to the International Anti-Opium Con- 
ference at Geneva against theimportation of opium, 
and to the Peking government against the planting 
of opium, was signed by more than two thousand 
organizations in different provinces, representing 
more than two million people. It is by such phe- 
nomena as this that one 1s led to the conviction that 
the moral sensitiveness of the Chinese people 
toward public corruption and evil is healthy and 
sound. 

This general survey of the conditions in modern 
China has to be brought to an end. I have at- 
tempted in this inadequate review to point out 
some of the political, economic, and social tenden- 


{ 139 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


cies in modern China. Although the treatment is. 
general and cursory in character, I hope it 1s suffi- 
cient to show that China, as a reupblic, is still go- 
ing through a period of transition and of readjust- 
ment; that she has been trying her best to meet 
the new situation and to solve the difficult prob- 
lems confronting her; and that, notwithstanding 
the instability of the government, and in spite of 
internal unrest, she has made advancement in 
many phases of her national life. Indeed, all the 
great changes which happened in the West during 
the last four or five hundred years—political, eco- 
nomic, and social—are not only simultaneously 
taking place in China today but are influencing 
one another. True, not all change is progress; and 
with change there comes new danger. But certainly 
in these tremendous changes one can see great 
possibilities of China’s future. She is now in a 
plastic stage. She has been brought face to face 
with new situations and new problems. She is no 
longer a nation of isolation and of mystery, but a 
nation with new ideals and new hopes as well as 
new aspirations. 

What is her future destiny? What is to be the 
result of all the changes that are taking place to- 
day? And what will be its effect upon her civiliza- 
tion and upon the civilization of the West? These 


[ 140 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


and other questions that might be raised are ex- 
tremely interesting but most difficult to answer. 
One thing is certain, that is, Chinese people hold 
the firm conviction that, given sufficient time and 
freedom from interference, they will be able to 
overcome their present difficulties and come out 
victorious as a united and democratic nation. 


{ 147 ] 





II 
CHINA’S POSITION IN EASTERN ASIA 


Students of Chinese history are familiar with 
the fact that for many centuries China was the 
dominant power in Eastern Asia. Within the con- 
fines of her vast territory she rules with unques- 
tioned authority. Her influence extended as far 
west as Aden and as far south as India while her 
boundaries in Central Asia touched the distant 
borders of Persia. She was, moreover, surrounded 
by many important dependencies whose rulers 
recognized her overlordship and sent her tribute 
as a token of their allegiance. In like manner, 
Chinese civilization was for many centuries the 
dominant culture of Asia and its influence was felt 
throughout the Eastern hemisphere. She sowed 
her seeds of culture among the Mongols and 
Manchus in the north; in Turkestan and Tibet to 
the west; in Burma, Annam, and Siam to the 
south; and in Korea and Japan to the east. During 
the T’ang and Ming dynasties, Japan, Korea, 
Siam, and other neighboring states sent students to 
China to receive education and special quarters 
were provided for them, and during the early part 


{ 143 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


of the Manchu dynasty students from the Liu > 
Chiu Islands and from Russia were admitted into 
the Chinese national university under specially 
designated Chinese professors. 

But in less than three hundred years from the 
beginning of her intercourse with other nations, 
this great empire has been gradually eaten away at 
the fringes through the loss of her valuable de- 
pendencies: the Liu Chiu Islands to Japan in 
1881; Tongkin and Annam to France in 1885; 
northern Burma to Great Britain in 1886, and 
Sikkim to the same in 1899; and Korea, Formosa, 
and the Pescadores to Japan in 1895. In addition, 
she has been forced to give away the so-called 
treaty rights and privileges which infringe upon her 
sovereignty, such as the deprivation of her tariff 
autonomy, the existence of extraterritoriality and 
consular jurisdiction, concessions and settlements, 
leased territories and treaty ports, spheres of influ- 
ence and interest, the most-favored-nation clause 
as applied in China, as well as the existence of 
legation quarters and the stationing of legation 
guards, and the presence of foreign military and 
police forces under foreign command and until 
recently the establishment of foreign postal agen- 
cies. All these resulted in the loss of much of her 
former prestige and influence. Indeed, on more 


{144 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


than one occasion the international rivalry in ag- 
gression in China became so serious that the very 
existence of China as a nation was threatened. The 
record of how all this happened forms a most 
pathetic tale in the history of China as well as an 
index of the international morality of modern na- 
tions. 

Fortunately, through the bitter experience of 
humiliation and suffering China learned many 
valuable lessons which were responsible for the 
turning of the tide in her favor. She realized, 
among other things, that she must discard some 
of her former pride and self-sufficiency which were 
partly responsible for her growing weakness, and 
that she must learn lessons from the West, as did 
Japan, her next neighbor. Thus convinced of the 
necessity for change, she began to introduce re- 
forms in her government. She organized a modern 
educational system. Instead of receiving students 
from other countries she began to send her own 
students abroad to study in Japan, Germany, 
France, England, and the United States. 

These early efforts at reform soon began to bear 
fruit. Great changes—political, social, and intel- 
lectual—began to take place. The most significant 
result was the birth of a new patriotism or the 
growth of a new nationalism, which found expres- 


1 145 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


sion in the successful throwing off of the yoke of 
the old régime and in the determination of her 
people to permit no further infringement upon 
China’s political sovereignty and territorial in- 
tegrity. At a most critical time of her history the 
United States also came to her rescue by the 
enunciation of the principle of the open door and 
equal opportunity, which proved to be an effective 
check upon the encroachments of the aggressive 
nations. 

Since China became a republic, and particular- 
ly since the close of the European war, a change of 
policy on the part of the treaty powers toward 
China has taken place. Instead of competing with 
one another at the expense of China they have 
once more adopted the so-called co-operative 
policy in their dealings with her, manifested in the 
conclusion of the reorganization loan in 1913, in 
the formation of the international banking con- 
sortium in 1920, and in the holding of the Washing- 
ton Conference in 1921-22. These factors, together 
with the fact that China has entered into a new 
relationship with Germany and the Soviet Republic, 
promise to give China a new international status 
not only in Asia but also in the family of nations. 

In this lecture we are not to deal with China’s 
international relationship as a whole but rather to 


{ 146 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


confine ourselves to a brief examination of her 
relationship with Russia, Japan, and Great Britain 
with reference to Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet, 
and of the present crisis in China as affecting her 
future position in Eastern Asia. 

A study of the eastward expansion of Russia 
reveals the fact that the Russians made their ap- 
pearance on the Manchurian plain as early as the 
middle of the seventeenth century. During the two 
hundred years following, repeated advances were 
made by the Russians, who were in turn pushed 
back by the Manchus. By the middle of the nine- 
teenth century, however, the Russian government 
had become so seriously concerned over the desire 
for territorial expansion that it made repeated at- 
tempts upon one excuse or another to secure the 
cession of Manchuria from the Chinese govern- 
ment, but failed. However, during China’s second 
war with Great Britain and France (1857-60), 
Russia, taking advantage of the situation, suc- 
ceeded in securing the recognition from China of 
the northern bank of the Amur River as Russian 
territory and the cession of the territory east of 
the Ussuri River, including the maritime province. 

Later (1896), through the pretense of the forma- 
tion of a defensive alliance against Japan, Russia 
secured from China the right to build a railway 


{ 147 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


through Manchuria toward Vladivostok, making 
possible the necessary connection between Eastern 
Asia and European Russia. It turned out that this 
represented only the beginning of her program of 
territorial expansion in North China. During and 
after the Boxer uprising her troops occupied 
Manchuria and Russia, posing once more as a 
friend, entered into a separate convention with the 
Manchu general in Mukden, restricting the sover- 
eign right of China in Manchuria, and demanding 
the concession of its economic development, virtu- 
ally making Manchuria a Russian protectorate. 
All these demands China’ resisted, and Great 
Britain, Japan, and the United States entered 
vigorous protests. In 1902 we witness the con- 
clusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which for 
a time appeared to be an effective check upon 
Russian advance in Manchuria, for by the treaty 
of 1902 Russia promised to complete the evacua- 
tion of Manchuria in three successive periods of six 
months each. But instead of carrying out her prom- 
ise, she demanded from China the non-alienation 
of Manchuria and the closing of Manchuria against 
the economic enterprise of any other nation but 
Russia, and sent troops into Korea, thus threaten- 
ing the safety of Korea and Japan. 

Here Japan appeared on the scene and demand- 


{ 148 ] 


CHINA AND THE. UNITED STATES 


ed a mutual understanding to respect the integrity 

of China and Korea, and the reciprocal recognition 

of Japan’s preponderating influence in Korea and 

Russia’s special influence in Manchuria. Russia 

was willing to concede to Japan the recognition of 
her preponderance in Korea, but she insisted on 

Japan’s recognition of Manchuria as being outside 

her sphere of influence, and refused to give the 

pledge to respect the integrity of China in Manchu- 

ria. The Russo-Japanese War that ensued resulted, ' 
among other things, in the transference to Japan 

of the southern section of the Russian Manchurian 

Railway, thus putting an effective check upon 

Russian advance in Manchuria. 

Turning now to Mongolia, we find that Russia’s 
interest in that region found its earliest expression 
in the Treaty of St. Petersburg (1881), which gave 
the Russians the right to trade in Mongolia free 
from payment of duties. During the period of the 
international struggle for concessions, Russia 
claimed Mongolia and Manchuria as belonging to 
her sphere of influence. After her great loss in 
Manchuria she tried to better her position in 
Mongolia. In 1911 Russia encouraged outer Mon- 
golia to declare her independence of China. Be- 
tween IgI1t and 1915 Russia concluded various 
conventions with outer Mongolia and China 


[ 149 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


through which she practically established her joint 
suzerainty over outer Mongolia and made it a 
buffer state between China and herself. 

With the passing of the tsar’s régime China re- 
asserted her authority and succeeded in 1917 in 
compelling outer Mongolia to rescind her declara- 
tion of autonomy. Meanwhile, the new Soviet gov- 
ernment adopted a policy toward China funda- 
mentally different from that of the old régime. In 
the summer of Ig91g9 and 1920 the Soviet govern- 
ment seeking recognition from China, made various 
declarations and offers favorable to China. To 
these offers China made no answer, having as yet 
not recognized soviet Russia; but taking this op- 
portunity, China terminated all official relations 
with the old régime and made herself the tempo- 
rary trustee of Russian interests in China, pending 
the establishment of a national government in 
Russia. While all this was taking place, Baron 
Ungern von Sternberg, leader of a band of the 
Whites who were hard pressed by the Reds, con- 
veniently descended with his men upon outer Mon- 
golia, and as relief columns sent by the Chinese 
government did not reach there in time, took Urga 
in February, 1921. At this juncture the Reds inter- 
vened, occupied it in turn against Chinese protests, 


[ 150 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


and gave encouragement to the setting up of the 
people’s revolutionary government. 

In the meantime, soviet Russia did not cease to 
approach China for the restoration of normal rela- 
tions. Between 1920 and 1922 no less than three 
different missions were sent out but brought no 
result, the chief obstacle being their unwillingness 
to discuss the Mongolian question. Finally, M. L. 
Karakhan became the head of the Soviet mission, 
and succeeded after several months of discussion 
with the representatives of the Chinese government 
in signing the treaty of May 31, 1924, which gave 
formal recognition to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and provided for the resumption of 
normal diplomatic relations between the two coun- 
tries. In this new treaty the soviet government re- 
nounced all special rights and privileges in relation 
to concessions which had been acquired by the 
tsar’s government in any part of China; it re- 
linquished the rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction; 
it renounced the Russian share of the Boxer in- 
demnity; it recognized outer Mongolia as an 
integral part of China, respected China’s sover- 
eignty therein, and agreed to withdraw its troops 
from that region. The two governments agreed 
that treaties concluded between the tsar’s govern- 


{ 151] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


ment and other countries whereby the sovereign 
rights or interests of China are affected are null 
and void; they pledged that henceforth neither 
should conclude any treaties or agreements which 
would prejudice the sovereign rights or interests of 
the other, and that all new treaties would be made 
on a basis of equality, reciprocity, and justice. It 
was further agreed that the question of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway should be settled in accordance 
with principles laid down, among which were the 
provisions that the railway was to be considered a 
purely commercial enterprise; that, with the ex- 
ception of matters pertaining to the business opera- 
tions which are under the direct control of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affect- 
ing the rights of the national and the local govern- 
ments of the republic of China, such as judicial 
matters, matters relating to civil administration, 
military administration, police, municipal govern- 
ment, taxation, and landed property, shall be ad- 
ministered by the Chinese authorities; that the 
Soviet republic agrees to the redemption by the 
Chinese government with Chinese capital of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway, and that the future of 
the railway shall be determined by the two coun- 
tries to the exclusion of any third party or parties. 

Since the signing of the treaty the Soviet gov- 

/ 


{ 152} 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


ernment has shown good faith in withdrawing from 
outer Mongolia all her troops without waiting for 
the final arrangements to be adopted by the special 
conference provided by the treaty. Thus the Sino- 
Russian relationship has been put upon a new 
basis, but it remains to be seen whether the recent 
action of the soviet republic is merely a stroke of 
diplomacy or the embodiment of a sincere desire to 
live up to the high ideals which she professes. 
Meanwhile, soviet Russia once more comes for- 

ward proclaiming herself as China’s best friend, 
and is being regarded as such by many Chinese 
people, not because they are in sympathy with her 
radical views, but because she has given up her 
old treaty rights which infringed upon China’s 
integrity. True it is that since the European 
war Germany has also concluded a treaty with 
China on the basis of equality and reciprocity, 
and that she no longer enjoys the privileges which 
the other treaty powers still enjoy; but Germany 
gave up her rights because she was obliged to, 
for by the Treaty of Versailles the German govern- 
ment renounced all former German rights, titles, 
and privileges in China. In the case of the Soviet 
republic, she surrendered all her former treaty 
rights voluntarily (which action is naturally deeply 
appreciated by the Chinese people). 


1 153 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


Having completed our survey of Russia’s rela- 
tionship with China as affecting her position in 
Eastern Asia, we now pass on to the study of 
Japan’s interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. We 
have noted that before the Russo-Japanese War 
Japan in conjunction with Great Britain and the 
United States made repeated protests against 
Russian aggression in Manchuria and that, in the 
negotiations with Russia just before the declara- 
tion of war, Japan insisted on the integrity of China 
in Manchuria, the observance of which Russia re- 
peatedly refused to pledge. Had Japan continued 
in this policy China would have recognized her as a 
big sister, and how different would have been the 
relationship between these two nations! 

Unfortunately, after the victories of war the 
policy of Japan toward China took a radical change. 
By virtue of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), 
she obtained from Russia the transfer of the lease 
of Port Arthur and Talienwan and the cession of 
the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Rail- 
way with the adjoining mines. Possessed of these 
railways and mining interests, the Japanese gov- 
ernment organized the South Manchurian Railway 
Company, which has been a strong factor in ex- 
ploiting the economic resources of that region. By 
subsequent treaties and exchanges of notes, Japan 


1 154 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


secured various other important concessions and 
has dominated south Manchuria and eastern inner 
Mongolia with strategic lines of railways. By vir- 
tue of Article 6 of the original grant to Russia, 
which was transferred to Japan after the war, al- 
though the original grant was qualified by special 
provisions for the protection and preservation of 
Chinese sovereignty, she has exercised actual sover- 
eignty over the railway zone of 70.54 square miles,, 
permitting no Chinese soldiers and police to enter 
without permit and maintaining exclusive police 
and military guards of her own. Moreover, she has 
established Japanese settlements along the railway 
under Japanese jurisdiction and sovereignty. 

Not content with the advances already made in 
Manchuria, Japan, taking advantage of the fact 
that the Western nations were busily engaged in 
the European war, made the bold attempt in Ig91§ 
by means of the now famous Twenty-one De- 
mands, to capture the sovereignty of south Man- 
churia and eastern Mongolia and even to threaten 
the independence of China. The final treaties and 
notes signed between China and Japan on May 25, 
1915, although falling short of her original de- 
mands, nevertheless represent another advanced 
step taken in tightening her hold upon south Man- 
churia and eastern inner Mongolia. The terms of 


1155} 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the concessions of the South Manchurian Railway 
and the Antung-Mukden Railway as wellasthe lease 
of Port Arthur and Dalny were extended to ninety- 
nine years. Additional suitable places were to be 
be opened in eastern inner Mongolia as commercial 
ports. The floating of loans for the construction of 
railways in south Manchuria and eastern inner 
Mongolia and of general loans on the security of 
taxes in the same region must first be offered to the 
Japanese. If foreign advisers or instructors on po- 
litical, financial, military, or police matters should 
be employed in south Manchuria, the Japanese 
were to have preferential rights. Finally, the 
Japanese subjects in south Manchuria were to have 
the right to lease land by negotiation, such leases 
being understood to imply a long-term lease of not 
more than thirty years and also the possibility of 
their unconditional renewal. 

This by no means ended Japan’s advance to- 
ward the further control of south Manchuria and 
eastern inner Mongolia, for a year later came the 
conflict between the Chinese and the Japanese 
soldiers in Chengchiatun over a trifling affair. 
Seizing this opportunity, Japan demanded that 
China agree to the stationing of Japanese police offi- 
cers in south Manchuria and eastern inner Mongo- 
lia, and that Chinese miliary cadet schools employ a 


{ 156 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


certain number of Japanese officers as instructors. 
These demands the Chinese people resisted with 
all their might. Meanwhile, the Okuma cabinet, 
which had engineered the Twenty-one Demands 
and also those for the Chengchiatun incident, suf- 
fered severe popular censure for the mishandling. 
of Chinese relations and was compelled to yield to 
the Terauchi cabinet, which adopted a more con- 
ciliatory attitude toward China, and the case was 
settled without concession. _ 

It is necessary to pause here for a moment to 
examine a few of the fundamental reasons which 
have been used to Justify Japan’s advance in Man- 
churia. Weare told over and over again that Japan 
needs an outlet for her excess population and that 
Manchuria is the natural outlet. Granting this 
to be true, it is necessary to remember that China, 
also, has a crowded population; that Manchuria is 
a natural outlet more truly for her than for Japan; 
and that, so far as rights to this territory are con- 
cerned, China has the better claim, in view of 
recognized ownership and occupation thereof for 
many centuries. Moreover, Japan has unused land 
within her own confines sufficient to support the 
growing population for the next half-century, be- 
sides, she holds Formosa, Korea, and south Sag- 
halien which offer further opportunities for expan- 


{ 157 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


sion. It is also said that Japan has a special claim 
to Manchuria inasmuch as she made a great sacri- 
fice in the Russo-Japanese War to preserve the 
integrity of Manchuria. But one should recall that 
Japan fought the war, not for the preservation of 
Manchuria, but rather for her own self-preserva- 
tion. Moreover, she has been more than fully com- 
pensated for her sacrifice in the form of economic 
concessions in these regions already granted by 
China. But to entertain designs in these regions 
for other than commercial and industrial expan- 
sion, as she attempted to do through the Twenty- 
one Demands and on other occasions, would be to 
do the very thing against which she waged war 
with Russia, namely, to infringe upon the integrity 
not only of Manchuria, but of China as a whole. 
Such a course Japan cannot afford to take since 
her own national existence depends largely upon 
China, and since she repeatedly has announced to 
the world that she will not violate the political and 
territorial integrity of China and will observe the 
principles of the open door and equal oppor- 
tunity. 

_ Meanwhile, important events brought about by 
the end of the European war together with political 
changes both in China and Japan have caused the 
Japanese government to change its foreign policy. 


[ 158 J 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


In response to the Chinese agitation for the abroga- 
tion of the Twenty-one Demands, or the treaty of 
May 25, 1915, Japan made three concessions: first, 
she threw open to the new international banking 
consortium the right, previously held exclusively 
by Japanese capital, of granting loans for the con- 
struction of railways in south Manchuria and east- 
ern inner Mongolia and other loans secured on 
taxes in that region; second, she yielded her pref-' 
erential right concerning the engagement by 
China of Japanese advisers or instructors in po- 
litical, financial, or military matters in south Man- 
churia; third, she withdrew the reservation to 
Group § of the Twenty-one Demands according to 
which they had been postponed for future dis- 
cussion. 

By the treaty of the special conference collateral 
with the Washington Conference and by a subse- 
quent conference, Japan restored Kiaochow to 
China and settled all the problems related to the 
long-disputed Shantung question, thus removing a 
cause for future war in the Far East and a sore spot 
in Sino-Japanese relationships. Furthermore, in 
the Nine Power Treaty of the Washington Con- 
ference, respecting policies and principles in rela- 
tion to China, Japan, together with other powers, 
pledged herself to respect the sovereignty, the 


{ 159 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


independence, and the territorial and administra- 
tive integrity of China.” 

This new policy of Japan toward China can also 
be read between the lines of the speech of Japan’s 
Foreign Minister at the opening of the last session 
of the Diet. In this speech, Baron Shidehara tells 
the world that Japan intends to safeguard her 
rightful position in China, particularly her rights 
and interests in south Manchuria and Mongolia, 
but she has no aggressive or territorial designs of 
any kind in that or in any other part of China. He 
reiterates the oft-repeated principle of non-interfer- — 
ence in China’s internal politics, which, if followed 
strictly by Japan and other powers, would give 
China the necessary freedom to solve her problems 
in her own way. The speech embodies a declara- 
tion of faith, hope, and sympathy with the Chinese 
people in their present trouble and an assurance 
that Japan will accept no plan to place the Chinese 
railways and other administrative organs under 
international control, thereby further infringing 
upon the sovereignty of the Chinese nation. The 
general tone of this message is quite in keeping with 
the spirit of the Washington Conference, and it re- 
mains for Japan to live up to her professions, for in 
international intercourse between nations as be- 
tween individuals actions speak louder than words. 


{, 160 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


Judging from what has been said, the future 
Sino-Japanese relationship, however affected it 
may be temporarily by the recent unfortunate hap- 
penings in China, is destined to become more 
cordial as soon as the causes of the present friction 
are removed and questions over south Manchuria 
and eastern inner Mongolia are satisfactorily set- 
tled. The policy of Japan, as we have noticed, is 
decidedly conciliatory and friendly, as she is anx- 
ious to overcome the Chinese resentment at the 
Twenty-one Demands and other actions of her 
military régime and to pave the way for closer 
economic and cultural relationships. All thinking 
Chinese and Japanese realize that China and Japan 
are closely interwoven in interest, and that in their 
future destiny they should sustain cordial relation- 
ships one with the other for their own interest as 
well as for the interest of the world. Indeed, since 
the settlement of the Shantung question and until 
the outbreak of the recent trouble their relation- 
ship had been greatly improved. But the fact that | 
Germany and soviet Russia have renounced their 
former treaty rights and privileges and entered 
into new treaties with China on the basis of 
equality, reciprocity, and justice has placed Japan 
and other treaty powers not yet ready to take the 
same step in a somewhat unfavorable light by com- 


{ 161 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


parison, for both Germany and Russia in losing 
their old treaty rights and privileges have attained 
a specially favorable position. America gave up a 
portion of her Boxer indemnity and won the good 
will of China which money cannot buy. “He who 
loses his life shall find it” is a principle which holds 
true in international relationships as well as in 
religious and spiritual life. 

Let us turn now our thoughts for a moment to 
Anglo-Chinese relationships with reference to 
Tibet, a territory rich in gold and other mineral 
resources. It is a well-known fact that British 
interest in the possibilities of trade with Tibet 
began as early as the middle of the nineteenth 
century. After various attempts to get that trade 
started, a Sino-British agreement was signed at 
Chefoo in 1876 which was the first British recogni- 
tion of Chinese authority in Tibet. By various sub- 
sequent agreements the right of the British to carry 
on trade with Tibet was definitely authorized by 
China, though it was limited to certain specified 
towns. By the beginning of the twentieth century 
a new situation had arisen. The Tibetan authori- 
ties at Lhasa in their attempt to thwart the British 
had turned to the Russians for support in anti- 
British efforts. Russia was entirely willing to help 
the Tibetans because such help gave a chance for 


{ 162 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


further expansion and especially for a thrust down 
into India. Since then British advances in Tibet 
have been influenced by two considerations: to 
secure the right to trade and develop the resources 
of Tibet and to protect India from Russian ageres- 
sion. 

In 1903 Great Britain, under strong opposition 
from the Tibetans, sent an expedition to Tibet, 
under the command of Colonel Younghusband 
and entered into a direct treaty with Tibet which 
virtually created a British protectorate over Tibet 
and secured for Britain an equal voice with China 
in the management of Tibetan affairs. The extent 
of the domination over Tibetan affairs which the 
British intended to set up is made clear in Article 


IX: 


a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, 
leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any 
Foreign Power; 

6) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in 
Tibetan affairs; 

c) No Representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power 
shall be admitted to Tibet; 

d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining 
or other rights shall be granted to any Foreign Power or to 
the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to 
such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent con- 
cessions shall be granted to the British Government; 


[ 163 |} 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall 
be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the sub- 
ject of any Foreign Power.* 

In 1906 Great Britain entered into another 
agreement with China by which Great Britain 
secured the right to construct telegraph lines con- 
necting India with the trade markets provided for 
and promised not to annex Tibetan territory or to 
interfere in the administration of Tibet, while 
China undertook not to permit any other foreign 
state to interfere with the territory or internal ad- 
ministration of Tibet. Thus from Tibet and China, 
Great Britain secured agreements enabling her to 
trade in Tibet and guaranteeing her against Rus- 
sian aggression through Tibet. A year later Great 
Britain entered into a direct agreement with Russia 
in which the two powers pledged themselves to 
respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, to abstain 
from all interference in its administration, and to 
enter into no negotiations with Tibet except 
through the intermediary of the Chinese govern- 
ment. And in 1908 a tripartite conference was 
held in Calcutta which resulted in the signing by 
Chinese, Tibetan, and British representatives of a 
new agreement which is the last formally ratified 
agreement between China and any foreign power 


? Sir F. Younghusband, India and Tibet (London, 1910), p. 442. 


1 164 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


dealing with Tibetan affairs, and which nominally 
at least is still in force. Since then Great Britain 
has made repeated attempts to strengthen further 
her hold over Tibet. In 1913, through the con- 
ference at Simla, she attempted to put herself in the 
position of a protector in Tibet. In 1917 she pre- 
sented twelve demands concerning Tibet similar to 
the spirit of the Twenty-one Demands of Japan.\, 
All of these demands China has persistently re- 
fused to consider. 

Briefly put, the Anglo-Chinese relationship over 
Tibet as it stands today is as follows: Thus far 
China has never given up her sovereign right over 
Tibet, whose inhabitants constitute one of the five 
races which make up the Chinese republic of the 
present day. Tibet has been represented in the 
Chinese parliament, in the recent Rehabilitation 
Conference, and will be represented during the 
coming Citizens’ Conference. In fact, Chinese 
suzerainty over Tibet has been formally recognized 
by the Tibetans and by all others. What China 
desires about Tibet is the continued recognition 
of Tibet as a part of China and the assurance 
that no foreign power will ever seek to take a part 
of Tibetan territory or to interfere in Tibetan 
affairs. 

On the other hand, Great Britain, through the 


[ 165 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


various treaties and agreements she has made with 
Tibet and China, has now a strong hold upon 
Tibet. Some of the steps taken in recent years have 
led Chinese to believe that Great Britain still enter- 
tains designs for the final annexation of Tibet. 
British official statements, however, claim that all 
Great Britain desires is peace along the border and 
opportunity to trade. It is to be hoped that such 
official statements are true, and that, in view of 
Russia’s changing policy toward Mongolia, of the 
present patriotic and nationalistic uprising in 
China and of Great Britain’s own commitments at 
the Washington Conference, the strong sense of 
justice and fair play of which the British people are 
proud will assert itself and bring its influence to 
bear upon their government so that from now on it 
will adopt a less aggressive and more democratic 
policy toward Tibet and toward China. 

The treatment of this subject will not be com- 
plete without reference to the recent uprising in 
China because it has a very intimate bearing upon 
China’s relations with other nations. The origin of 
the disturbance can be traced to the movement to 
improve labor conditions in China. It 1s a well- 
known fact that working conditions in many of the 
mills and factories in Shanghai and other cities are 
far from satisfactory. Working hours are often too 


{ 166 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


long; the environment is often unsanitary; and 
wages are frequently too low. There is a movement 
to improve these conditions in the hope that the 
modern industrial era may be ushered in with the 
maximum of benefit and the minimum of suffering. 
Naturally, the laboring class 1s most intimately 
concerned, and as in other countries they have 
organized labor unions and found out that they 
calling of a strike 1s one of the effective means of 
getting results, especially when they fail to secure 
them through peaceful means. In the present case 
it is the Japanese cotton mills that are concerned. 
For some time the workmen of a Japanese cotton 
mill in Shanghai have been working for better 
conditions, and on failing to make much headway 
they called a strike. The Japanese authorities were 
inclined to take stringent measures to suppress 
the strike, measures which resulted in the killing 
of a workman and the wounding of others. The 
students, deeply interested in the movement to 1m- 
prove labor conditions, felt sympathy toward the 
strikers and together with them organized a peace- 
ful demonstration to show their sympathy and to 
lodge their protest against the killing of strikers. 
The police interfered and a conflict ensued. In 
obedience to the order of a British constable, the 
police fired, killing and wounding many innocent 


{ 167 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


and unarmed students and laborers. Since this un- 
fortunate occurrence the Chinese government has 
entered a number of protests with the foreign lega- 
tions concerned, but so far the latter have refused 
to acknowledge the responsibility of the municipal 
council for the deplorable act and have been trying 
to shift it on to the shoulders of the unarmed 
Chinese, claiming that the action was taken when 
the safety of the police was being threatened. In 
consequence, a deep feeling of resentment now 
prevails among the Chinese people and the situa- 
tion is fraught with grave dangers. 

While the present uprising originated in the 
attempt to improve labor conditions, the killing of 
unarmed Chinese has opened up the wound of 
a long-standing discontent against the Shanghai 
municipal council. Shanghai is one of the treaty 
ports of China in which there are two concessions, 
one French and the other international. The inter- 
national settlement is controlled by the municipal 
council with two Americans, one Japanese, and 
six British representatives, elected by foreign 
taxpayers in the settlement. It claims to be the 
supreme administrative authority in this area, 
the supreme administrative authority in this area, 
which was originally set apart by the Chinese gov- 
ernment merely for foreign merchants to reside in, 


{ 168 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


and it actually exercises unrestricted police juris- 
diction therein without the sanction of treaties. 
Even in judicial administration the municipal 
council has assumed unlawful control. Where for- 
eigners commit an offense or are sued they are of 
course tried before the courts of their own repre- 
sentatives in China, but when Chinese citizens are 
defendants they are tried before the so-called 
“Mixed Court,” which was originally a Chinese 
court but which has been seized by the foreign 
consuls at Shanghai since the revolution of 1911, 
and of which the judges are now appointed by the 
foreign municipal council. The Chinese residents 
within the area contribute the main portion of its 
revenue by paying more than 70 per cent of the 
taxes. They are denied the right of vote at the 
election of council members or any voice in the en- 
actment of the laws and rules of the settlement. 
For many years the Chinese fought for the right of 
representation but obtained no result. Three years 
ago the fight was renewed with vigor and resulted 
in the creation of a board of Chinese advisers, but 
it is a more or less nominal body. While foreign 
children in the settlement are practically all pro- 
vided with education, the facilities for the educa- 
tion of Chinese are far from being adequate. The 
council maintains a number of public parks which 


[ 169 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


refuse admission to the Chinese residents although 
they pay taxes for their upkeep. 

This discontent against the administration of 
the Municipal Council has led to a still larger issue. 
Believing that the mere settlement of this particu- 
lar incident will not suffice to improve the situation 
and that in order to prevent the recurrence of simt- 
lar incidents and to place the relations of the 
Chinese people and foreign residents in China on a 
more stable and satisfactory basis a more satis- 
factory solution is needed, the former are asking 
for a fundamental revision of the existing treaties 
between China and the foreign powers which made 
possible the recent unhappy occurrence and which 
have been the cause of much friction between 
China and foreign nations. 

Inasmuch as the question at issue represents 
one of the burning questions of contemporary 
international politics in the Far East, it is nec- 
essary that we give the matter a little more careful 
consideration. The existing treaties between China 
and foreign nations with the exception of the new 
treaties with Germany and the Soviet republic were 
not contracted on a basis of equality. They were 
made long ago, mostly as the price of defeat and 
under circumstances that did not permit free dis- 
cussion, and were based upon nothing better or 


{ 170 J 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


higher than the traditional policy of exploitation 
of the weak nations. Under these treaties the 
foreign nations enjoy certain privileges and rights 
which infringe upon China’s integrity, restrict 
the exercise of her sovereignty, and obstruct her 
fullest development. China believes that the time 
has now come for a fundamental revision of these 
treaties. Most of the conditions obtaining when 
they were negotiated do not exist now. The times 
in China have changed and the standard of general 
enlightenment ts considerably higher than in form- 
er days. The educated classes today cherish with 
no less fervor than the peoples of the West the 
fundamental principles of government and of inter- 
national relationship. They now understand the 
meaning of the numerous treaties, by which China 
is bound and her freedom of action restricted. 

In a recent note sent to the foreign diplomatic 
corps in Peking the Chinese government declared 
that at the time China entered the world-war with 
the Allies she was encouraged to hope for a definite 
improvement of her international status. Great, 
therefore, must be the disappointment of the 
Chinese people when, after the Great War for a 
common cause has been won, China’s own status 
remains unimproved, and in some respects inferior 
to that of the defeated nations, for in none of the 


{ 171 } 


- 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


defeated nations do we find the existence of extra- 
territorial courts, concessions, leased territories, 
and externally imposed tariffs. It is feared that 
worse tragedy may result if the powers concerned 
ignore this reasonable and legitimate aspiration of 
the Chinese people and turn a deaf ear to their » 
earnest request for a readjustment of China’s 
treaty relations on an equitable basis. On the other 
hand, we are convinced that the relations of all 
nations with China can be made more cordial and 
their rights and interests can be advanced without 
rather than with the enjoyment of all the extraor- 
dinary privileges and immunities given the foreign 
powers by existing treaties with China. 

It is necessary to point out that while the agita- 
tion for the fundamental revision of the so-called 
“unequal treaties” is being given a new impetus by 
the recent disturbance in China and by the new 
treaties with Germany and with soviet Russia, it is 
by no means a new movement but rather a policy 
adopted long ago by China in her relationship with 
other nations. During the early years of the pres- 
ent century, and in her treaties with Great 
Britain, the United States, and Japan, China made 
known her determination to reform her judicial 
system, looking toward the relinquishment of 
extraterritoriality on the part of these powers. In 


{ 172} 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


1919 she announced her claims for the recovery of 
impaired rights at the Peace Conference at Ver- 
sailles, but they received no consideration. In 1921 
she made similar claims at the Washington Con- 
ference, and this time with some success. In our 
study of China’s relations with the United States 
we shall have occasion to observe that the treaty 
powers concerned have removed certain restric-'' 
tions placed upon China and have further prom- 
ised to remove others upon her fulfilment of 
certain conditions considered by them to be nec- 
essary, though their commitments have not all 
been carried out; neither are the changes effected 
fundamental enough to satisfy the cherished wishes 
of the Chinese people. 

~ Dr. Schurman, the former American minister to 
China, favors the so-called evolutionary method of 
treaty revision, involving co-operation with the 
treaty powers in the direction of a gradual revision 
of the treaties as provided in the Washington Con- 
ference commitments. Karakhan, the soviet am- 
bassador to China, advocates the revolutionary 
method of disposing of the unequal treaties, involv- 
ing the radical abrogation of the existing treaties 
and the creation of new ones, as has been done in 
the case of Germany and the soviet republic. 
China is not particular about the exact method to 


{173 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


be used but she does insist that some definite steps 
be taken soon looking toward the realization of her 
legitimate aspirations. 

It is encouraging to note that Senator Borah, 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
in a recent message to China declares that he favors 
the withdrawal of extraterritorial rights in China 
as speedily as practicable and the adoption of a 
policy by all which would respect the territorial 
integrity and national rights of China. And it must 
be a source of satisfaction and encouragement to 
the Chinese people to learn the good news that 
the United States is in favor of the calling of a 
special conference to consider the question of treaty 
revision and other questions concerning China now 
pressing for immediate solution. Let us hope that 
the proposed conference will be held soon, and that, 
as a result, a satisfactory solution may be found 
and the relations of other nations with China be 
more cordial and friendly than in days gone by. 


{174 } 


II] 


CHINA’S RELATIONS WITH 
THE: UNITED STATES 


In studying China’s relations with the United |, 
States we come to the brightest chapter in the 
history of China’s foreign relations. The inter- 
course between these two nations, covering a period 
of one hundred and forty years, has been char- 
acterized by a sustained feeling of friendship and 
cordiality. Ever since her first contact with China, 
America has endeavored to practice the highest 
ideals of justice and righteousness. Of all the 
treaty powers having relations with China, she 
alone has never taken advantage of China’s mili- 
tary weakness and reaped benefits from it to satisfy 
her own ambitions. She has never waged any real 
war with China, and is the only nation which does 
not possess any territorial concessions, not even in 
the treaty ports. On the other hand, she has always 
stood for the political and territorial integrity of 
China and equal opportunity in trade and com- 
merce. In the settlement of the Boxer uprising she 
used her influence in the interest of Justice and 
moderation, succeeded in urging the powers to re- 


1175 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


duce the amount of indemnity demanded from 
China, later returned to China a handsome por- 
tion of that indemnity for the promotion of educa- 
tional and cultural enterprises, and has influenced 
other nations to take the same step. After the 
European war she further used her good offices in 
calling the Washington Conference, which made 
possible the settlement of the long-disputed Shan- 
tung question and the adoption of measures cal- 
culated for the benefit of China. She may have 
taken some steps the wisdom of which is question- 
able, but it cannot be denied that, on the whole, 
America in her dealings with China has played fair, 
and has tried her best to maintain the high ideals of 
international relationship. 

On the other hand, the Chinese people have 
always entertained a very kindly feeling toward 
America, and stand ready to reciprocate her acts of 
friendship whenever they have an opportunity. 
During the Chinese Taiping Rebellion, which oc- 
curred in the middle of the nineteenth century, an 
American citizen by the name of Frederick Town- 
send Ward, of Salem, Massachusetts, rendered 
significant service in the suppression of that re- 
bellion, and upon his untimely death the Chinese 
government gave him posthumous promotion in 
military rank and a temple was erected to his 


[ 176 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


memory in which sacrifices are regularly offered at 
the altar to his departed spirit as an appreciation of 
his willingness to lay down his life for the welfare 
of a country not his own. 

In appreciation of the good will and sincerity 
of one of the early American ministers to China, 
Anson Burlingame, the Chinese government ap- 
pointed him, in 1868, head of the first Chinese 
diplomatic mission to the nations of the West, an 
honor which China never before or since has given 
to a foreign national. Previous to his acceptance 
of this post, Minister Burlingame was reported to 
have written to the American secretary of state to 
thesetiect: 

When the oldest nation in the world, containing one-third 
of the human race, asks for the first time to come into rela- 
tions with the West and requests the youngest nation through 


its representative to act as a medium of such a change, the 
mission is one not to be solicited or rejected. 


In 1908 the Chinese government, upon receipt 
of the news that the American government had 
decided to return to China a portion of the Boxer 
indemnity, immediately made the decision, as an 
expression of appreciation, to use the money so 
returned for the establishment and maintenance 
of Tsinghua College and for sending her youths 


to study in American colleges and universities. 


{177 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


With this general historical background, we are 
perhaps somewhat ready to proceed to the exam- 
ination of some of the relations between these two 
countries. For the sake of clearness, we shall con- 
sider them under three heads—political, economic, 
and cultural. No one of these heads, of course, can 
be considered in isolation because each is inti- 
mately bound up with the other two, but some ad- 
vantage may be derived from treating them one by 
one. 

In any attempt to study the political relation- 
ship between these two countries it is necessary to 
understand, first of all, the American policy which 
has guided her action in China, known as the 
“open-door”’ policy—its origin and its significance. 
It is to be recalled that following the Sino-Jap- 
anese War, which revealed to the world the mil- 
itary incompetency of China, there followed a 
period during which the various treaty powers 
struggled for concessions and carved out for them- 
selves various spheres of influence, thus threaten- 
ing the very sovereignty and integrity of China. 
In order to prevent further aggravation of the 
serious situation and for fear that the tendency if 
unchecked might lead to the dismemberment of 
China, John Hay in 1899 exchanged notes with 
England, Germany, Russia, France, Italy, and 


[ 178 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


Japan, in which he advocated the doctrine of equal 
opportunity for trade and commerce in China. To 
this all the powers addressed, except Russia, who 
made a more or less indefinite reply, gave their 
assent. In 1900, when the Boxer uprising once 
more imperiled the integrity of China, John Hay 
re-afirmed the principle of the open-door policy, 
but this time he proclaimed openly that the United 
States policy in China was not only to maintain 
the equal opportunity of trade but also to preserve 
the integrity of China. 

The spirit of this policy, however, had been 
adopted by America from the beginning of her 
intercourse with China. As early as 1842, after the 
conclusion of peace at Nanking, Admiral Kearney, 
of the American squadron, then visiting Canton, 
induced the viceroy of the two southern provinces 
to memorialize the throne, that America be placed 
on the same footing as England with respect to 
the advantages of that treaty. The request was 
complied with in the first American treaty with 
China, known as the Cushing Treaty of 1844. In- 
deed, China on this occasion showed her magna- 
nimity and breadth of view by throwing open the 
five treaty ports to all nations alike. Burlingame 
had the same idea in mind when he declared that 
his government was opposed to any policy of spoli- 


[ 179 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


ation toward China, and called the attention of 
foreigners to the grave dangers attending illegal at- 
tempts to exploit China for selfish aims. Tyler 
Dennett, in his book entitled Americans in Eastern 
Asia, says that in the nineteenth century the issue 
in American policy in Asia was not the open door; 
that was never a question. The real issue was 
whether the United States should follow an isolated 
or a co-operative policy to make sure of the open 
door. 

Such being the case, one is led to raise the ques- 
tion: Why is it that such an important policy was 
never a question in America and at the same time 
it was welcomed by China and readily accepted by 
other treaty powers though not followed strictly 
and consistently? To my mind the answer can be 
easily stated. The policy, being a liberal one, works 
for the best interests of all parties concerned. 
Through this policy China has the assurance that 
her territorial integrity will be preserved. Through 
this policy America secures open access to all parts 
of China for trade and commerce and for the in- 
vestment of capital on a basis of equality with 
other nations. She has everything to gain and 
nothing to lose. And through the general adoption 
of this policy the nations of the world are saved 
from the necessity of setting up spheres of influ- 


{ 180 | 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


ence and other barriers against one another and 
from cutting one another’s throats. 

Since the European war China and America 
have been brought closer together by the Wash- 
ington Conference. The holding of the Washington 
Conference, while it was not primarily for the con- 
sideration of problems of China, did give her an 
opportunity to present her case. While China did 
not get all she wished to obtain, the powers repre- 
sented at the Conference did make a number of 
significant commitments, which if carried out, 
would work for the benefit of China. 

The nine powers represented at the Conference 
concluded a treaty with a view to increasing the 
customs revenues of the Chinese government, ac- 
cording to which China was to have an immediate 
revision of tariff valuations so as to be able to 
collect an effective 5 per cent upon her imports. 
And by means of steps to be arranged by a special 
conference she was to be allowed to levy a surtax 
of 24 per cent ad valorem and a further surtax 
on luxuries not to exceed § per cent ad valorem. 
Also, when thework of the special conferenceis com- 
pleted and the abolition of /zki7 is effected, she is to 
be allowed to raise her import tariff to 123 per cent 
ad valorem. Since the closing of the Washington 
Conference the revision of the tariff to an effective 


{ 181 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


5 per cent has been duly made and carried out, but 
the special conference which was to make arrange- 
ments for the levying of a surtax has failed to meet, 
owing to the fact that France demanded of China 
the settlement of the Gold Franc case as a condi- 
tion to her ratification of the treaty, although she 
was not supposed to make any ulterior demand and 
America could have demanded her immediate 
ratification as was the case with the Four Power 
Treaty. 

The effect of this long delay has been to keep 
back the development of commerce and industry, 
which is partly responsible for China’s failure to 
meet some of her financial obligations. Both China 
and America have suffered loss. It is therefore 
pleasant to record that the long-disputed Gold 
Franc case between China and France is settled 
and the way is now open for the calling of the 
special conference provided for by the Nine Power 
Treaty. 

The Chinese delegation in assenting to the 
treaty of tariff revision did not relinquish their 
claim for the restoration of complete tariff auton- 
omy for which they fought throughout the Wash- 
ington Conference. Their position is that tariff 
autonomy is a sovereign right enjoyed by all 
independent states. Its free exercises is essential to 


{ 182 }. 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


the well-being of the state. The existing treaty 
provisions by which the levy of customs duties, 
transit dues, and other imports is regulated consti- 
tute not only a restriction upon China’s freedom 
of action but an infringement upon her sovereignty. 
It was therefore somewhat of an anomaly that the 
Washington Conference, after declaring that it 
recognized the sovereignty and territorial integ- 
rity of China, should refuse to restore to China 
tariff autonomy, which is a part of her sover- 
elgnty. 

The representatives of the powers at the Wash- 
ington Conference also passed a resolution to estab- 
lish a commission within three months after the 
adjournment of the Conference to inquire into the 
present practice of extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
China and into the laws and methods of the judicial 
administration of China, with a view to reporting 
within one year to the governments of the powers 
their findings of facts in regard to these matters and 
their recommendations as to what means they may 
find suitable to improve and assist the efforts of 
the Chinese government to effect such legislation 
and judicial reforms as would warrant the powers 
in relinquishing, either progressively or otherwise, 
their respective rights of extraterritoriality. Since 
then China has asked for an extension of time of 


{ 183 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


one year, to enable her to make the necessary 
preparation, but three long years have now passed 
by and no action has been taken to carry out this 
important resolution, the chief reason being the 
objection raised by France. Meanwhile, the Chi- 
nese people are becoming impatient of waiting 
and are making insistent demands for the early 
relinquishment of this special right, believing as 
they do that the reforms already made in Chinese 
law and the arrangements for their administration 
justify their expectations. 

Inasmuch as the question of the removal of 
extraterritoriality has become the burning question 
in contemporary international politics, it seems 
necessary that we give the matter a little further 
consideration. During the Washington Conference 
China’s wishes with regard to the modification and 
ultimate abolition of the extraterritorial rights of 
foreigners within her borders were presented by Dr. 
C. H. Wang, one of the well-known Chinese experts 
in international law, who received his education 
both in America and in Great Britain. Extraterri- 
toriality in China, said Dr. Wang, dated back al- 
most to the beginning of China’s treaty relations 
with foreign countries. It was clearly laid down 
in the treaty of 1844 between the United States and 


[ 184 ] 


CHINA AND: THE UNITED STATES 


China, and similar provisions had since been in- 
serted in treaties with other powers." 

These extraterritorial rights were granted at a 
time when there were only five treaty ports, that 1s, 
places where foreigners could trade and reside. 
Now there are fifty such places and an equal 
number of places opened to foreign trade upon 
China’s initiative. This means an ever increasing 
number of persons within China’s territory over 
whom she was almost powerless. The anomalous 
condition had become a serious problem with which 
local administration was confronted, and if the im- 
pairment of the territorial and administrative in- 
tegrity of China was not to be continued the mat- 
ter demanded immediate solution. 

Some of the serious objections to the extra- 
territorial system that were pointed out are as 
follows: 

a) In the first place, it is a derogation of 
China’s sovereign rights, and is regarded by the 
Chinese people as a national humiliation. 

6) There is a multiplicity of courts in one and 
the same locality, and the interrelation of such 

The views of Dr. Wang on extraterritoriality are quoted or 


paraphrased from United States Senate Document by Willoughby 
in his China of the Conference, pp. 114-16. 


[ 185 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


courts has given rise to a legal situation perplexing 
both to the trained lawyer and to the layman. 

c) Disadvantages arise from the uncertainty 
of the law. The general rule is that the law to be 
applied in a given case is the law of the defendant’s 
nationality, and so, in a commercial transaction 
between, say X and Y of different nationalities, the 
rights and liabilities of the parties vary according 
as to whether X sued Y first, or Y sued X first. 

d) When causes of action, civil or criminal, arise 
in which foreigners are defendants it is necessary 
for adjudication that they should be carried to 
the nearest consular court, which may be many 
miles away; and so it often happens that it is 
practically impossible to obtain the attendance of 
the necessary witnesses or to produce other nec- 
essary evidence. 

e) Finally, it is a further disadvantage to the 
Chinese that foreigners in China under cover of 
extraterritoriality claim immunity from local.taxes 
and excises which the Chinese themselves are re- 
quired to pay. Sir Robert Hart, who worked and 
lived in China for many years, has said in his book, 
“These from the Land of Sinim’’: 

The extraterritoriality stipulation may have relieved the 


native official of some troublesome duties but it has always 
been felt to be offensive and humiliating and has ever a dis- 


{ 186 } 


CHINA AND: THE UNITED STATES 


integrating effect, leading the people, on the one hand, to 
despise their own government and officials, and, on the other, 
to envy and dislike the foreigner withdrawn from native 
control. 


Until the system is abolished or substantially 
modified, Dr. Wang explained, it would be in- 
expedient for China to open her entire territory to 
foreign trade and commerce. The evils of the exist- 
ing system had been so obvious that Great Britain 
in 1902, the United States and Japan in 1903, and 
Sweden in 1908 agreed to relinquish extraterri- 
toriality rights when satisfied that the state of the 
Chinese laws, the arrangements for their adminis- 
tration, and other considerations warranted them 
in so doing. More than twenty years had elapsed 
since the conclusion of those treaties and while it is 
a matter of opinion as to whether or not the state 
of China’s laws has attained the standard to which 
she is expected to conform it is impossible to deny 
that she has made great progress on the path of 
legal reform. A few facts would suffice for the pres- 
ent. A law codification commission for the compila- 
tion and revision of laws has been sitting since 
1904. Five codes have been prepared, some of 
which have already been put into force: (a) the 
civil code, still in course of revision; (4) the criminal 
code, in force since 1912; (c) the code of civil pro- 


{ 187 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


cedure and (d) the code of criminal procedure, both 
of which have been promulgated; and (e) the com- 
mercial code, part of which has been put into force. 

These codes, Dr. Wang said, have been pre- 
pared with the assistance of foreign experts, and 
are based on the principles of modern jurispru- 
dence. Among the numerous supplementary laws 
special mention might be made of a law of 1918, 
called Rules for the Application of Foreign Laws, 
which deals with matters relating to private inter- 
national law. Under these rules, foreign law is 
given ample application. Then there is a new 
system of law courts established in 1910. The 
judges are all modern, trained lawyers, and no one 
can be appointed a judge unless he has attained the 
requisite legal training. These are some of the 
reforms which have been carried out in China. 

It is not claimed that the Chinese laws and 
their administration have reached such a state 
that there is no room for improvement, but as yet 
no nation can boast of a perfect law, and the crea- 
tion of the commission contemplated could have 
hastened and encouraged further reform in this 
direction. Since the Shanghai tragedy China has 
been asking for the immediate relinquishment of 
extraterritoriality. 

At the Washington Conference a resolution was 


{ 188 ] 


CHINA AND. THE UNITED STATES 


also adopted to the effect that all foreign postal 
agencies in China, except those “‘in leased terri- 
tories or as otherwise specifically provided by 
treaty,” should be withdrawn not later than Janu- 
ary 1, 1923. The other powers one by one acted in 
pursuance of their resolution, but Japan, pleading 
geographical proximity as well as enormity of mails 
exchanged between her and China, persistently 
urged that a Sino-Japanese postal conference be 
convened with a view to arriving at some special 
postal arrangements for the benefit of the nationals 
of both countries. 

After agreement by the Chinese government, 
such a conference was held between the representa- 
tives of the two countries, and as a result four 
agreements were signed bearing the date of Decem- 
ber 8, 1922, and covering the exchange of (a) cor- 
respondence, (4) money orders, (¢) parcels, and 
(d) insured letters and boxes. Everything went off 
very smoothly, except the question of the with- 
drawal of Japanese postal agencies in the South 
Manchuria Railway zone. 

The Japanese delegation contended that this 
question had already been decided by the Washing- 
ton Conference, and that these postal agencies 
should be retained. The Chinese delegation, how- 
ever, insisted that the Japanese position was un- 


[ 189 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


tenable as, in conformity with the Washington 
resolution, of the foreign postal agencies in China 
only those “in leased territories or otherwise 
specifically provided by treaty” might be ex- 
empted, while the South Manchuria Railway zone 
was not, and could not be construed as a leased 
territory, nor were there any specific treaties au- 
thorizing the establishment therein of any Japanese 
post-offices. 

Though there was not much formal discussion 
on this question, the Japanese delegation con- 
tended that it, being rather of a political nature, 
was not within the sphere of the Conference, which 
view was finally shared by the Chinese delegation. 
As it appeared that no definite result could be 
obtained thereon and in order that the question 
should not become a stumbling-block to the success 
of the Conference, it was eventually agreed that the 
status quo of the said Japanese postal agencies 
should be provisionally maintained, and that “‘the 
relations between the Japanese and the Chinese 
post-offices in the South Manchuria Railway zone 
should be governed by the same terms as were laid 
down in the postal agreements of Ig10, pending a 
final decision through some future diplomatic 
negotiations.” 

What has been said is perhaps sufficient to show 


{ 190 } 


CHINA AND, THE UNITED STATES | 


that the more important commitments of the 
Washington Conference, contrary to expectations, 
have not all been carried out, and one is led to the 
wish that America, as the convenor of the Con- 
ference, would take upon herself the responsibility 
of seeing that its commitments are fulfilled at an 
early date. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
decisions reached by the Sino-Japanese Conference 
held collateral with the Washington Conference, 
which provided for the restoration of Kiaochow to 
China and the settlement of the Shantung ques- 
tion, all have been amicably carried into effect 
between the two Asiatic countries, China and 
Japan. 

If there is any blemish in America’s dealings 
with China it is found in the Chinese exclusion 
laws. In principle, China believes that the action 
of America in this matter is unjust. The treaty of 
1868 made between China and America has the 
definite provision that the two countries cordially 
recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man 
to change his home and allegiance, and also the 
mutual advantage of the free migration and emi- 
gration of their citizens and subjects, respectively, 
from one country to the other, for the purposes 
of curiosity, of trade, or of permanent residence. 
It further declares that the Chinese subjects visit- 


{ 191 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


ing or residing in the United States shall enjoy the 
same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in re- 
spect to travel or residence as may be enjoyed by 
the citizens or subjects of the most favored nations. 
In 1880, upon the request of America, China en- 
tered into a new treaty in which she agreed that 
America might regulate, limit, or suspend the com- 
ing of Chinese, but might not absolutely prohibit 
it. Upon the basis of this treaty the American 
Congress passed a bill suspending Chinese immi- 
gration for twenty years, and later, yielding to the 
argument of President Arthur, reduced it to ten 
years. 

Not satisfied with this, America once more 
sought for a new treaty with China aimed at a 
virtual prohibition of Chinese labor immigration. 
While the negotiations were going on Congress 
passed a bill absolutely prohibiting the immigra- 
tion of Chinese laborers in glaring violation of the 
provisions of the treaty of 1880. The situation was 
somewhat rectified in 1894 by a new treaty, which 
permitted the exclusion of Chinese laborers for ten 
years, but upon the termination of that treaty, 
China, acting upon public opinion, gave due notice 
to the American government that it would not be 
renewed. Congress, ignoring the treaty rights of 
China, has since passed a law making permanent 


[ 192 ] 


CHINA AND. THE UNITED STATES 


the exclusion of Chinese laborers from the United 
States, which has been made more strict by recent 
legislation. Thus the status of the Chinese in the 
United States is based not chiefly upon treaty 
engagements between China and America but upon 
American law and American interpretation of the 
law. 

While fully appreciating the difficulties which 
have confronted the statesmen and legislators of 
this country and of other nations in dealing with 
this problem, the Chinese people—speaking very 
candidly—fail to see any justification of their 
violating treaty stipulations while insisting that 
China should fulfil hers, nor do they see any good 
reason why the nations of the world insist upon 
China’s observance of the open-door policy while 
they close their own doors against the Chinese. If 
the adoption of exclusion laws is of absolute nec- 
essity, why has there been until recently a differ- 
ence of treatment as between Chinese and Jap- 
anese, and why 1s there not a general law restricting 
labor immigration under a uniform standard, irre- 
spective of race or color, instead of the policy of 
discrimination against a particular race or a par- 
ticular country? 

As the law now stands, the Chinese and other 
Asiatic peoples are debarred from the privilege of 


[ 193 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the so-called quota system on the ground that they 
are not entitled to naturalization, a privilege en- 
joyed by the white and black races but denied to 
the Asiatic races because they are neither white ' 
nor black. By the intelligent people of Asia this 
is generally regarded as an insult, and an unnec- 
essary insult, for under the quota system there is no 
further danger of America’s being overrun by the 
Asiatic races. Moreover, those who are familiar 
with the history of America remember that upon 
the discovery of America the Pilgrim forefathers 
dedicated it as a haven of refuge to the suffering 
and oppressed of the entire world, and that the 
principle that all men “‘are created equal” is one 
of the very first enunciations of the Declaration 
of Independence which the American people 
have just recently celebrated with patriotic feel- 
ing throughout the world. 

The question may be raised: If this represents 
the Chinese attitude toward the American exclu- 
sion law, why is it that no agitation has been con- 
ducted in recent years for its abolition or modifica- 
tion? | 

On the part of China the answer is that the 
traditional friendship toward America is so over- 
whelmingly strong that the dissatisfaction over the 
immigration question is relegated to the back- 


[ 194 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


ground. Moreover, the Chinese people believe that 
the immigration act does not represent the best 
opinions of the American people. Again China has 
been reluctant to see her laboring class migrate to 
countries where they are not welcomed, and where, 
through them, China is often misjudged. As her 
industrial enterprises expand and her own vast 
undeveloped regions open up, she can easily absorb 
into her own system all her surplus population froYn 
any overcrowded regions—at least for the next 
half-century. Indeed, within the last two decades 
no less than fifteen to twenty million people have 
migrated from their home provinces of Shantung, 
Chihli, and Honan to settle in the sparsely popu- 
lated regions of the north and west, notably in 
Manchuria and Mongolia. Therefore, as a do- 
mestic question the problem of China’s surplus 
millions will be automatically solved by the com- 
ing in of.a new era of industrial progress. Not only 
will the number of emigrants seeking to make a 
humble living abroad be likely to decrease year by 
year, but it is hoped that those who have already 
left may return to their fatherland and help in its 
commercial and industrial progress. With China, 
then, the objection against the exclusion of labor 
immigration is not a question of necessity, but 
that of national honor and justice. Friends of 


[195 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


America entertain the hope that the American 
people, who have always stood for international 
justice and fair play, will bring their influence to 
bear upon their legislators for a reconsideration of 
the immigration act, and that the day will come 
when the United States of its own accord will 
rectify its error by amending the existing exclusion 
law. 

We now pass on to the consideration of China’s 
economic relationship with America, which, in a 
way, is more important than the political. In fact, 
in an industrial age such as the present the foreign 
policy of a nation is very apt to be dictated and 
influenced by the demands of economic necessity. 
The insistence of the United States upon the open- 
door policy in China is itself prompted by economic 
considerations, for its observance insures for her 
an open market and equal treatment in all parts of 
China for trade and commerce as well as for profit- 
able investment of American capital. Bearing this 
in mind, let us examine briefly two questions of eco- 
nomic bearing, namely, the new international 
banking consortium and China’s trade relations 
with the United States. 

The new international banking consortium, 
participated in by the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Japan, and formally organized in 1920, 


[ 196 |] 


CHINA AND.THE UNITED STATES 


was proposed by the United States after the war. 
Its purpose is to finance all future loans to China, 
industrial as well as political, with a view to help- 
ing China in the establishment of her great public 
utilities, such as railways, canals, etc., thereby as- 
sisting in establishing China economically and finan- 
cially. Those who first suggested the idea wanted to 
remove the evils which unrestrained internation- 
al competition after the war would surely have 
brought about. They desired, also, to protect the 
future of Chinese national life by preventing the 
development of mutally exclusive spheres of influ- 
ence which would tend to weaken if not to destroy 
the unity of China. However plausible those de- 
sires may seem to be, the consortium has not been 
received with favor by China. At least two objec- 
tions are raised: 

First, China objects to the monopolistic char- 
acter of the consortium. Had it laid down new 
rules for the game of international finance in China, 
on a basis of free, fair, and friendly competition 
untainted with diplomatic pressure or political 
coercion, it could have become a potential instru- 
ment for good. But, as it was, the different bank- 
ing groups went ahead to combine all their so- 
called vested interests in a consortium of four 
powers only, at the expense of an open door for 


[ 197 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


other nations. Although such a common pool 
would insure for the four national banking groups 
the privilege of equal opportunity, it could be at- 
tained only at the expense of China’s right of free 
bargaining. Furthermore, in designating “‘loans of 
a public character’”” emanating from the Chinese 
government as its exclusive option, the consortium 
has in effect substituted for the regional spheres of 
interest a fiscal sphere of interest. It 1s an absolute 
banking combination, a credit monopoly, so com- 
plete and overwhelming that little freedom would 
be left to China as a money-borrower. 

Second, China objects to the political nature of 
the consortium. The method of financing as it is 
contemplated, having the backing of four control- 
ling political bodies of the world, has the danger of 
infringing upon China’s sovereign rights by taking 
China’s public finance under foreign supervision or 
control, by granting the land tax of the nation as 
security for the loan and by making additional 
revenues flow into foreign banks acting as govern- 
ment depositaries. So long as foreign investment 
has more of a political than a business flavor, the 
Chinese will be unwilling to accept the loaning 
terms, feeling as they do that it is better to remain 
in national poverty than to suffer from a foreign 
financial yoke. 


[ 198 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


Turning to trade relations, we find that indirect 
commercial relations between China and America 
had been existent long before the establishment of 
the United States as an independent nation. Dur- 
ing Colonial days, Chinese tea, silk, and other 
articles had been regularly imported from England 
through the East India Company. But it was not 
until 1784, the year following the peace, that it 
first was made possible for an American ship undét 
the American flag to cross the ocean in safety, 
carrying with her a cargo of ginseng and bringing 
back a cargo of tea. From that time until this day 
the trade between China and America has been 
prospering and expanding year after year. During 
the past century American imports from China, 
with only a few exceptional years, have been con- 
sistently greater in value than exports thereto. 
Yet the general tendency is for their difference to 
become smaller and smaller in proportion to the 
total trade because American exports to China 
have increased on the whole more rapidly than im- 
ports therefrom. Among the nations that now 
have commercial relations with China the United 
States occupies a position only next to Japan in 
importance, claiming 16 per cent of China’s for- 
eign trade as against 24 per cent for Japan and 11 
per cent for Great Britain. As it is certain that 


{ 199 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


there is to be a great trade expansion in China, so 
it is certain that the American share of the trade 
is to grow as time goes on. 

It is to be noted, however, that while the gen- 
eral commercial relationship has remained the 
same, the trade currents between these two coun- 
tries are distinctly changing. Relatively speaking 
exports of Chinese finished or consumers’ goods, 
such as tea, silk, textiles, and other luxuries, are 
gradually decreasing, while the exports of raw and 
semi-raw materials, such as hides and skins, furs, 
straw-braids, wool, vegetable oils, and other great 
staples of the world’s industry are increasing. This 
is because, on the one hand, the increasing activity 
of American industries results in more intense de- 
mands for these materials, and, on the other, China 
is able to supply the United States with a larger 
quantity of such articles as her agriculture and 
other forms of industry are gradually developing. 
As to American exports to China, we find that 
manufactured goods of the simpler forms such as 
flour, cotton cloth, manufactured tobacco, leather 
goods, and other simpler forms of manufacture, 
which formed the largest part of American exports 
to China in the past decades, are now decreasing 
in importance, both in absolute and in relative 
shares, owing to the fact that their place is being 


[ 200 } 


CHINA AND. THE UNITED STATES 


gradually taken by products of China’s own indus- 
try, as well as those of Japan. On the other hand, 
American exports to China in iron and steel 
machinery and other manufactures, electrical ap- 
pliances and materials, motor vehicles and other 
carriages, chemicals and drugs, and all other 
materials of the finer products of the highly de- 
veloped American industries are rapidly increasing. 
The reason for such a rapid expansion along these 
lines can be readily found in the twofold fact that 
while China’s demand for this industrial equip- 
ment and these provisions has greatly increased, 
due to her recent industrial development, the 
United States is now better able to supply China 
with these articles, due to the increased output of 
her various industries. 

In the study of the trade relations between 
China and the United States Dr. S. L. Pau points 
out several significant features which are worthy of 
notice. One of them is the purity of motive which 
has characterized their commercial intercourse 
since its very beginning. There is no ulterior aim 
on the one side and no suspicion on the other, as 
contrasted with so much of these which has marked 
the history of China’s trade with other powers. 
Here commerce is carried on with no other con- 
sideration than that of a legitimate profit of busi- 


{ 201 }} 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


ness.. The Chinese are strictly a peaceful business 
people with a keen business sense. They perceive 
and appreciate and therefore do not hesitate to 
reiterate their desire for closer commercial relations 
with the Americans. 

Identity of interest is another significant feature 
of the Chinese-American trade. The interests of 
China and those of the United States run along 
parallel lines with a peculiar consistency, and there 
is no fundamental conflict or clash to mar the de- 
velopment of their commercial intercourse. In 
fact, no two countries could be better qualified 
than the United States and China to co-operate 
with each other in bringing about the realization 
of the immense possibilities of trade in the Pacific 
and in effecting the economic development of East 
Asia to their mutual benefit. 

The third feature is their interdependence. 
Everyone realizes that further development of the 
foreign trade of the United States in the future will 
to no small extent depend upon the extension of 
her market in China because, being a vast country 
of fabulously rich resources together with an im- 
mense population, China is the greatest potential 
market in the whole world. China, in turn, if she 
desires to have her vast resources developed and 
population enriched, must look mainly to the 


[ 202 ] 


CHINA AND.THE UNITED STATES 


United States for the initial capital, for a large part 
of the machinery and equipment, and also for a 
reciprocal market, almost as unlimited as China’s 
own, in which to dispose of her raw or semi-raw 
materials which the developed Chinese industries 
will turn out in the near future and of which 
American manufacturers will feel in great need. 
There remains to be considered the cultural 
relationship between China and the United Statés, 
which is intimately bound up with political and 
economic questions and in a way is the most funda- 
mental of all, though it has little or no interest for 
men of practical affairs in government or in busi- 
ness. In our study of the political, economic, and 
social tendencies we have observed that the culture 
of China has been undergoing a change since its 
contact with Western civilization. Although it is as 
yet too early to tell what is to be the ultimate re- 
sult of this change, one thing seems to be certain, 
which is that if the Chinese people see to it that 
they assimilate only the best elements of Western 
civilization and reject those that are undesirable, 
they will be able to achieve an organic growth from 
the best of their own culture, producing a result 
having the merits of both. In the eagerness to 
affect change, there is however a danger of over- 
emphasizing the importance of Western culture 


[ 203 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


at the expense of all that is really vital in the 
Chinese national life. Bertrand Russell sees two 
dangers to be avoided. The first danger is that 
they may become completely westernized, retain- 
ing nothing of what has hitherto distinguished 
them, adding merely one more to the restless, 
intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations 
which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The 
second danger is that they may be driven in the 
course of resistence to foreign aggression, into an 
intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards every- 
thing except armaments. 

Of all the nations having cultural relations with 
China, America has exerted the greatest influence. 
The earliest cultural relationship between China 
and America lies in the Christian missions. There 
is a tendency among some American people, en- 
thusiastic about Christian missions, to suppose 
that the only force entering into the regeneration 
of China is that exerted by their missionary repre- 
sentatives. This is, of course, far from the truth, 
as there have been many external as well as inter- 
nal forces affecting change in China. Nevertheless, 
it cannot be denied that the Christian movement 
did make a very valuable contribution to Chinese 
education and culture. The early missionaries 
were the pioneer educators, and their schools and 


[ 204 ] 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


colleges were the first modern educational institu- 
tions of China. The first president of the first 
government school in China was an American 
missionary by the name of Dr. A. P. Martin. To 
the early missionaries also must be given the 
credit of having translated and written a number 
of books on Western learning. The education of 
women first received attention in Christian mis- 
sions. For some time some of the best-conductell 
colleges in China were maintained under the 
auspices of missions and supplied teachers to 
government schools and colleges. In the light of 
history they constitute an object lesson and a 
stimulus for the introduction of modern schools 
and colleges by the Chinese government and 
people. 

During recent years Christian education has 
made great progress. The standards have been 
raised and the work is much better correlated and 
co-ordinated than in the days gone by. Neverthe- 
less, with the growth of the Chinese educational 
system it no longer holds as important a position 
as it did once. The enrolment in Chinese schools 
in 1923 was 6,615,772 as against 558,953 in mis- 
sion schools—a ratio of 8 to 1. Some of the 
strongest and best-conducted schools and colleges 
are under Chinese auspices. In view of this fact 


[ 205 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


the question may be raised: Is there a continued 
demand for the existence of mission schools? Many 
hold the belief that for some time to come China 
will not be able to provide sufficient education for 
all the children of school age nor will she be able to 
reach the millions of her illiterates. Christian edu- 
cation can continue to supplement the efforts of the 
government in these directions. Even when the 
government is able to take care of all the work 
there will still be room for the existence of some 
schools and colleges under the mission or Christian 
auspices to meet special needs of the Christian com- 
munity and to serve as a stimulus to government 
education, as it has done in the past. It seems de- 
sirable that Christian education should then em- 
phasize quality instead of quantity and that in- 
stead of having many schools of mediocre or poor 
grade it should build up a few schools and colleges 
of the highest standard that may be models to 
other private and government institutions. 

If there is a justification for the continued 
existence of mission schools then what are the 
causes of the existence of the so-called Anti- 
Christian Education Movement in China? Let us 
examine some of the criticisms and see if they are 
justifiable. It is claimed that the Christian school 
is a denationalizing force, tending to weaken the 


{ 206 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


patriotism of the students and to make them sub- 
servient to the interests of foreign nations, and 
that it minimizes the importance of the Chinese 
language and gives undue emphasis to English. It 
is true that graduates of Christian schools in gen- 
eral are friendly to the missionaries and to the 
country which they represent, but they are certain- 
ly no less patriotic than students of government 
schools. The neglect of Chinese and the overr 
emphasis of English has been more or less true but 
is being remedied by the best of the Christian 
schools. Again, the contention is made that it 1s 
undemocratic to allow any section of a nation to 
send their children to other than the public schools. 
This criticism is the same as that which 1s raised 
in America against church parochial schools and 
other private schools and is not peculiar to China, 
and much may be said both in favor of and against 
such a contention. By far the chief reason, how- 
ever, that has been advanced against Christian 
education is that the Christian school is used as 
an agency for propagating religion or as an 
evangelizing agency. To a certain extent this 
criticism is true. If we cannot expect Christian 
schools to give up their religious character, cer- 
tainly it is reasonable to expect that the religious 
work of the Christian schools should be so con- 


[ 207 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


ducted that it does not interfere with the real ed- 
ucational work and sacrifice the best educational 
principles and practices. 

What are some of the measures that have been 
proposed by Chinese educational bodies for the 
regulation of schools under foreign auspices? First, 
all schools under foreign auspices should be regis- 
tered in the Ministry of Education and required to 
be subject to the supervision of the government. 
Second, such registration presupposes the fulfil- 
ment of certain government laws and regulations. 
Third, no preaching, religious teaching or worship 
should be allowed in the schools. It must be ad- 
mitted that the first two measures proposed are 
reasonable and could be followed without difficulty 
on the part of mission schools, and that the real 
difficulty lies in the third proposal, which, however, 
can be partly overcome by making religious teach- 
ing and worship voluntary, instead of compulsory. 
As a whole, then, the Anti-Christian Education 
Movement is not as serious as it appears, and it 
may result in the improvement of Christian educa- 
tion in China. 

That the Christian work is conducted on a large 
scale can be seen from the fact that some six thou- 
sand missionaries are engaged in educational and 
religious work in China and that over ten million 


{ 208 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


dollars are contributed annually by Americans 
toward missionary and philanthropic work in 
China. In spite of the existence of anti-religious 
movements, and despite the mistakes made by 
Christian missions, one is led to say in all fairness 
that their work, taken as a whole, constitutes one 
of the important factors in the development of a 
new China. 

There are other cultural relations between 
China and America. There has been a movement 
on the part of some American universities and col- 
leges to have representatives in China engaged in 
educational enterprises. Thus Yale has been inter- 
ested in Yale College in Changsha, Pennsylvania 
in the medical work of St. John’s University in 
Shanghai, Oberlin has educational interests in 
Shansi, and Princeton in Peking. The interna- 
tional committees of Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., 
through the Chinese national and local organiza- 
tions, have been exerting a moral and spiritual 
influence over the young men and young women of 
China. There is also the Peking Union Medical 
College, built, equipped, and maintained by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, providing the very highest 
standards of teaching, training, and research work 
in medicine, giving aid to various mission and 
government institutions, and co-operating with 


[ 209 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


them in the promotion of the teaching of science 
and premedical education. 

During the last few years an increasing number 
of American scholars, scientists, and teachers have 
successively made their visits to China and through 
their lectures and contacts with our intellectual 
leaders and students have exerted much influence 
upon Chinese thought-life. Dr. John Dewey’s 
pragmatic philosophy of education has been one of 
the guiding principles in the reforms of Chinese 
elementary education. The visit of Dr. Paul Mon- 
roe has awakened interest in the reform of second- 
ary education and in the teaching of science. Pro- 
fessor McCall, of Columbia University, spent a 
year in China and in co-operation with Chinese 
psychologists succeeded in the construction of 
some twenty educational tests and measure- 
ments for the use of elementary and secondary 
schools. Professor Twiss, of Ohio State University, 
spent two years in China for the improvement of 
the content and methods of science education in 
Chinese schools and made a scientific study of the 
problems connected with the reconstruction of the 
curriculum. These represent but a few of the sig- 
nificant contributions to the reconstruction of Chi- 
nese education by American scholars and scientists. 

But perhaps the strongest, and most significant 


{ 210 | 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


cultural relationship between China and America 
lies in the movement for sending Chinese students 
to America for higher education. Of all the West- 
ern nations America claims the largest number of 
Chinese students in her institutions of learning. 
This is partly because the distance from China to 
America is shorter than that to Europe, and partly 
because of the influence of the earlier students to 
the United States. But by far the chief reasons for 
this popularity of America are the return of the 
Boxer indemnity and her historical friendship with 
China. It is estimated that there are at least 
twenty-five hundred Chinese students now enrolled 
in American universities and colleges, and a greater 
number have returned to China and are working 
for the regeneration of their country. In spite of 
cases of failure and disappointment which have 
attended the career of individuals, to them as a 
class must be given the chief credit for the intro- 
duction of Western ideas and ideals, the institution 
of fundamental reforms, and the gradual transfor- 
mation of the social and political order of the 
country along modern lines. 

It is to be regretted that the cultural relation- 
ship between China and America has so far been 
more or less one-sided. Americans have gone out 
to China to teach, but few to learn. Many Chinese 


{ 211 | 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


students have come to America to receive what 
America has to give, but few American students 
have been sent to China to receive what China has 
to offer. Millions of dollars are spent every year 
to educate the Chinese to know America, but com- 
paratively little has been done to teach America 
to know China. 

A recent study shows that while no less than 
70 per cent of the news on China published in the 
American press and periodicals is devoted to po- 
litical questions, only 15 per cent is devoted to 
educational and cultural matters, showing clearly 
that not enough attention has been given to 
China’s educational and cultural life. Let us hope 
that this state of affairs may be speedily remedied 
so that the contact between these two nations may 
be fruitful to both parties, and that while China 
may learn from America her scientific knowledge, 
her efficiency, and her power and skill in handling 
human affairs, America may learn from China 
something of her attitude toward life, of tolerance, 
of ease, and of peace to mind. “‘When I went to 
China,” says Bertrand Russell, “I went to teach; 
but every day that I stayed I thought less of what 
I had to teach them and more of what I had to 
learn from them.’ It should be the responsibility 

* The Problem of China (New York, 1922), p. 209. 


{ 212 } 


CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 


of the university to promote the study of Chinese 
civilization. In this study Chinese language, litera- 
ture, art, and archaeology will naturally have their 
places, but the chief place should be given to 
Chinese history, economics, society, government, 
philosophy, and religion. A department of Chinese 
should be established in every great university of 
this land, and should be made a center of reliable 
information about China in the more recent years 
of her history. 

Such, in brief, are China’s relations with the 
United States. Taken as a whole, they are ties of 
mutual interest and of good will. Let us hope that 
these ties of friendship will be preserved and im- 
proved upon as the years go by, to the end that 
these two nations may continue to live in a happy 
state of friendship. 


{ 213 } 


(vi ktUuretiget ae 
i Me (F4yeer 2 
ee a ; 


ao ‘ Aa 





INDEX 


‘ 


al id 
arin 
vet 


») ah 
Rca 


Pee a i 


ae 


hate 
vit 


A 


That Me Phe 
VI 7 


OR WLR Sr ok 
aye: ate 


a 
i 





INDEX 


American-Japanese relations, 86 


Anglo-Chinese relations in Tibet, 
162 ff. 

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 13, 19, 
78 

Anti-Christian Education Move- 
ment, in China, 206, 208 


Antung-Mukden Railway, 47, 
156 
Arnold, Julean, 121 


Banking, international banking 
consortium, 196 ff. 

Borah, William E., relinquish- 
ment of extraterritorial rights 
in China, 174 

Boxer, indemnity, 177; uprising, 
44, 148, 175 

Bureaucracy, in Japan, 19 

Burlingame, Anson, 77, 179 


Canton Christian College, 124 

China: agriculture in, 123 f.; 
America in, see United States; 
Chinese Citizens’ Conference, 
165; Chinese Rehabilitation 
Conference, 165; economic life 
in, 118 ff.; education in, 129 ff., 
204 ff., see also United States; 
extra-territoriality in, 184 ff., 
objections to, 185 ff., see also 
Borah; financial rehabilitation 
of, 120 f.; foreign trade, 124 f.; 
governmental control of in- 


dustry, 123; industrial, 121 ff.; 
new Japanese policy toward, 
160; open door policy in, 146, 
178; public opinion in, 127 f.; 
social life, 126 f. 

Chinese Eastern Railway, 154 

Chinese Taiping Rebellion, 176 

Chino-Japanese: treaties of J 915, 
48; War, 43 

Churchill, Winston, 96 

Commercial Press, 123 

Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 


yeie 
Cushing Treaty of 1844, 179 


Democracy vs. bureaucracy in 
Japan, 35 

Dennett, Tyler, Americans in 
Eastern Asta, 180 


Dewey, John, 210 


East India Company, 199 
England, acquisition of Wei-hai- 
wel, 44 


Feng Yu-hsiang, 116 f. 

Feudalism, of old Japan, 3, 8 

Financial Rehabilitation Con- 
ference, 120 

Foster, John W., American 
Diplomacy in the Orient, 5 

Four Power Treaty, 182 

France: advice to Japan, 10; 
Liaontung peninsula, 44 


{ 217 ] 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


Genre, 14, 20, 23 

Germany: advice to Japan, 10; 
Kiaochow, 44 

Gold Franc case, 182 

Good Roads Movement, m 
China, 119 

Government: bureaucratic, 11; 
constitutional, 8; parhamen 
tary, 6, 16; party, 11, 16 

Great Powers, Japan one of, 3 

Great War, 17, 79, 89; economic 
depression followane, 7 


Hart, Sir Robert, “These from the 
Land of Sinim,” 186 

Hasegawa, Count, Govermor 
General of Korea, 59, 60 


Hay, John, 178, 179 


International Ant-Opmm Con- 
ference, 139 
Tot, nce 10, 11; president of 
13; assassin 
"3 aa a 
Itagaki, Taisuke, 8, 9, 10 


Japan: agriculture im, 31 £; ant- 
Japanism, 92; atitmde w- 
ward Chima, 40, 49, 85; a 
constitutional monarchy, 6, 
100; Diplomatic ikedeke 
Council, 52, 95; House of 
Peers, 7, 12, 155 Reform Bill 


Jmeosm, 9, 37,49, 73. 88 


Kacmpicr, History of Fapen, § 


INDEX 


Mukden, Battle of, 45 
Municipal Council, of Shanghai, 
168 ff. 


Narikin, 34 

National Anti-Opium Associa- 
tion, 139 

National Association for the 
Promotion of Popular Educa- 
tion, 136 

National Association for Voca- 
tional Education, 134 

National Good Roads Associa- 
tion, 119 

National Southeastern Univer- 
sity, 124 

New Thought Movement, in 
China, 132 

Nine Power Treaty, 182 


Oath of Five Articles, 6 

Okuma, Marquis, 8, 10; prime 
minister, 11, 15, 76; author of 
Twenty-one Demands, 157 

Opium War, 53 


Pag. Dr. 5. 1; 201 

Peace Preservation Bill, 36 

Peking Agricultural College, 124 

Peking Union Medical College, 
209 

Peoples’ Party, see Kuomintang 

Perry, Commodore, conditions 
when he came to Japan, 41 ff. 

Portsmouth, Treaty of, 154 

Prime Ministers, 15 


Rehabilitation Conference, of 
China, 116, 139 

Roosevelt, Theodore, at Ports- 
mouth, 45 


Rules for the Application of 
Foreign Laws, 188 

Russell, Bertrand, 204, 212 

Russia: advice to Japan, 10; in 
Manchuria, 147 f.; in Mon- 
golia, 149f.; policy toward 
Japan, in 1903, 14; treaty with 
Japan, see Japan Yr 

Russo-Japanese War, 13, 77, 94, 
149, 154, 158; American atti- 
tude toward, 69 


St. John’s University, 209 
St. Petersburg, Treaty of, 149 
Saionji, Prince, 14, 20 


Saito, Baron, Governor-General 
of Korea, 60 


Schurman, Jacob, American min- 
ister to China, 173 


Shantung question, 161; settle- 
ment of, 176, Ig! 

Shidehara, Baron, Japanese min- 
ister of foreign affairs, 40; 
on Japanese attitude toward 
China, 160; on non-interfer- 
ence in China, 50 ff.; on rela- 
tions with the United States, 
gif. 

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 48 
Siberia: Japanese policy toward, 
§2 ff.; withdrawal from, 83 
Sino-Japanese: future relations, 
161; postal conference, 189, 
Ig1; relations, 86, 159; War, 

94, 178 


[ 219 } 


ORIENTAL INTERPRETATIONS 


South Manchuria Railway, 47, 
154, 156; zone, 189, 190 

Soyeshima, Michamasi: in the 
Fapan Advertiser, 69; in the 
Fapan Chronicle, 39, 69; in 
Fapan Times, 99; in Fapanese 
Diplomatic Review, 39, 49, 69 

Speech, regulation of liberty of, 9 

Sternberg, von, Baron Ungern, 
150 

Suffrage: adoption of Japanese 
Manhood Suffrage Bill, 25; 
universal, in Japan, 3, 16, 18, 
20; universal, and the prole- 
tarian class, 29; Universal 
Franchise Bill, 35; Universal 
Law in Korea, 63; Universal 
Suffrage Bill, 7, 22 

Sun Yat-sen, 117 


Tanaka, General, president of 
the Seiyukai, 37 


Tendokyo, 59 
Terauchi cabinet, 157 


Tibet, British protectorate es- 
tablished, 163 ff. 


Trans-Siberian Railway, 53 

Tsao Kun, 138 

Tsinghu College, 177 
Twenty-one Demands on China, 


9, 15, 17, 47, 76 79s 945 1555 
157, 161; abrogation of, 159, 


161 


United States, and China: cul- 
tural relationship, 203; educa- 
tion, 71 ff.; finance, 196 ff.; 

_ political relations, 178; trade 
relations, 199 


United States, naval expansion 
of, 80 ff. 


Universal Suffrage Bill, see suf- 
frage 

University of Chicago, 1o1 

University of Nanking, 124 


Ward, Frederick Townsend, 176 


Washington Conference, 93, 118, 
166, 173, 176, 181 ff.; Nine 
Power Treaty of, 159 f. 


Wilson, Woodrow, doctrine of 
self-determination of nations, 
result of policy in Korea, 59 


Xavier, St. Francis, 4, 30 


Yale College, at Changsha, 209 
Yamagata, Prince, 12 


Yamamoto, Prince, prime minis- 
ter, 14, 22 

Younghusband, Sir F., India and 
Tibet, 163 f. 

Yuan Skih-kai, 128; ministry, 79 


PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. 








The Norman Wait Harris Lectures 


Pet Fs 


The Occident and the Orient 
By Sir Valentine Chirol 


A clear and connected story of the interrelationships, both past 
and present, of East and West as they affect Western civilization 
today. Through his former position as director of the foreign de- 
partment of the London Times, Sir Valentine Chirol has had a re- 
markable opportunity to study the changing relations of the East 
and West. 


Germany in Transition 
By Herbert Kraus 


What do the German people think about the Versailles Treaty ? 
about guilt for the war? about the League of Nations? This book' 
describes Germany in transition from war and revolution, a subject of 
world-wide importance. Dr. Kraus gives a skilful analysis of German 
problems that cannot fail to help one understand present-day 
Germany. 


The Stabilization of Europe 
By Charles de Visscher 

A logical treatment of the problems of nationality, security, and 
international communications, problems that are most vital to the 
moral, political, and economic rehabilitation of Europe. Charles de 
Visscher brings to this book a wide knowledge of international 
problems. 

Oriental Interpretations of the 
Far-Eastern Problem 
By Count Michimasa Soyeshima and Dr. P. W. Kuo 


A volume by a member of the Japanese House of Peers and a 
prominent Chinese educator. 


Occidental Interpretations of the 
Far-Eastern Problem 
By H. G. W. Woodhead, H. K. Norton, and 
Julean Arnold 


The views of a prominent British editor in Pekin and two widely- 
traveled American business men on what is happening across the 


globe. Each $2.00, postpaid $2.10 


The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, III. 


eg 
via 
Wi fr 


nah! Cy 


a at 


ea 1 
i 

} 
EM 
" are 


TY | 


i: re, 


a 

A Fey 
Pau be 
Cte 


i 
ae, at 
a, ayn id 
Z Toily 9 


; “te 
ey nM f ' 
ul . 
ONY, | 


~ 


j 


ous a 
Wah 











¥ ha 
q ra = 4 
“ 3 
Tein © 
' Ls] 


Date Due 


cat 


f buy 
es 


We. 


oS 
Sw a eS 


~~ 


Oo, 


a 





hs 
oO 
i 
av 
<= 
~ 
— 
o 
A) 
c 
2 
~ 
Lae) 
~ 
(7) 
pas 
a 
- 
5°) 
~ 
= 
6 
~ 
i 
wv 
he 
oO 


— 
~ 
“) 
ce 
a 
wy 
2) 
Oo 


Princeton Theological Seminary—Speer Library 


1 1012 00135 2675 





